Performing Hysteria by Braun, Johanna

PERFORMING HYSTERIA
Contemporary Images and Imaginations of Hysteria
P E R F O R M I N G  
H Y S T E R I A
Leuven University Press
P E R F O R M I N G  
H Y S T E R I A
CONTEMPORARY IMAGES AND IMAGINATIONS OF HYSTERIA 
EDITED BY JOHANNA BRAUN
Published with the support of the KU Leuven Fund for Fair Open Access
and 
funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) as part of the Erwin Schrödinger research project 
“The Hysteric as Conceptual Operator”: [J 4164-G24].
Published in 2020 by Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / 
Universitaire Pers Leuven. Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).
© Selection and editorial matter: Johanna Braun, 2020
© Individual chapters: the respective authors, 2020
This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 
4.0 Licence.
Further details about Creative Commons licenses are available at http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/
Attribution should include the following information:
Johanna Braun (ed.), Performing Hysteria: Contemporary Images and Imaginations of 
Hysteria. Leuven, Leuven University Press. (CC BY-NC- 4.0)
ISBN 978 94 6270 211 0 (Paperback)
ISBN 978 94 6166 313 9 (ePDF)
ISBN 978 94 6166 314 6 (ePUB)
https://doi.org/10.11116/9789461663139
D/2020/1869/1
NUR: 670, 612, 757
Layout: Coco Bookmedia, Amersfoort
Cover design: Daniel Benneworth-Gray
Cover illustrations: left: J. Babinski, ‘Contracture hysterique’ 1891.
right: detail from Three photos in a series showing a hysterical woman yawning. 
Photograph c.1890, by Albert Londe in ‘Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpetriere’; 
Clinique des Maladies du Système Nerveux’, 1890.
(Wellcome Library, London. Wellcome Images images@wellcome.ac.uk http://
wellcomeimages.org) 
Copyrighted work available under Creative Commons Attribution only licence CC 
BY 4.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Illustrations on pp. 25, 39, 59, 85, 103, 123, 145, 165, 187, 205: Johanna Braun, 
Performing Hysteria: Images and Imaginations of Hysteria (Study 1–10), 2019 (image 
atlas, mixed media), photo credits © the artist.
Every effort has been made to contact all holders of the copyright in the visual 
material contained in this publication. Any copyright-holders who believe that 
illustrations have been reproduced without their knowledge are asked to contact 
the publisher.






Hysterical Epidemics and Social Media
Elaine Showalter
WANDERING IMAGINATIONS OF RACE AND HYSTERIA 41
The Origins of the Hysterical Body in Psychoanalysis
Sander L. Gilman
TRAUMATIC DANCES OF “THE NON-SELF” 61
Bodily Incoherence and the Hysterical Archive
Jonathan W. Marshall
THE PHANTOM ERECTION 87
Freud’s Dora and Hysteria’s Unreadabilities
Dominik Zechner
6 PERFORMING HYSTERIA
“A SLIGHT HYSTERICAL TENDENCY” 105




Feminist Collectives for the Twenty-First Century 
Elke Krasny 
DELILLO AND MASS HYSTERIA 147
Sean Metzger
HYSTERIA IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION 167
Back to the “Image Factory” in WestWorld 
Cecily Devereux
#METOO’S FIRST HORROR FILM 189
Male Hysteria and the New Final Girl in 2018’s Revenge
Tim Posada
HYSTERICAL CURE 207
Performing Disability in the Possession Film
Johanna Braun
Bibliography 233
Notes on the contributors 257
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This publication is part of the research project entitled “The Hysteric as 
Conceptual Operator”, which is funded by the Austrian Science Fund 
(FWF): [J 4164-G24], and the publication is an outcome of its event 
series #masshysteria. Hysteria, Politics, and Performance Strategies, which 
took place at the University of California, Los Angeles in November 
2018.
Therefore, I want to take the opportunity right away to thank those 
on campus who made this possible. #masshysteria was organized 
in cooperation with and was generously sponsored by the UCLA 
Department of French and Francophone Studies and UCLA Department 
of Germanic Languages, and the Department Chair, Prof. Dominic 
Thomas; the UCLA Department of English, especially the Department 
Chair, Prof. Lowell Gallagher; the UCLA Department of Theater, and 
its Chair, Prof. Brian Kite; the UCLA Center for Performance Studies, 
and its Director, Prof. Suk-Young Kim; and the UCLA Center for the 
Study of Women, and its Director, Prof. Rachel C. Lee; the UCLA Alan 
D. Leve Center for Jewish Studies, and its Ludwig Kahn Director, Prof. 
Sarah Abrevaya Stein; the UCLA LGBTQ Studies Program, and its 
Chair, Prof. Alicia Gaspar de Alba; and the UCLA Department of World 
Arts and Cultures/Dance, and its Department Chair Prof. Dan Froot.  
Most importantly I want to thank my advisor on campus, Prof. Laure 
Murat, and Director of the UCLA Center for European and Russian 
8 PERFORMING HYSTERIA
Studies (CERS), for her dedicated endorsement of this project, her 
continuous support and the many shared vivid discussions on hysterical 
women, madness, and politics. I also want to thank Liana Grancea 
and Sanja Lacan at CER who helped tremendously in organizing and 
promoting the events and this project.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank especially for his energetic 
support Sean Metzger, Professor in the UCLA Department of Theater 
and President of Performance Studies international, who was a driving 
force from the very beginning and helped significantly in facilitating 
the much needed information and resources on campus that brought 
this event series to life.
An aller herzlichstes thank you goes to my advisor Arno Böhler, Professor 
in the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, and Susanne 
Valerie Granzer, Professor at the Max Reinhardt Seminar at the 
University of Music and Performing Arts Vienna, who have supported 
me and this project critically and enthusiastically from the very first day 
when I started to timidly envision this endeavor, and also didn’t spare any 
labor and resources to come out to energetically support #masshysteria 
on UCLA campus and delivered an astonishing, highly entertaining, 
and enchanting hysterical performance at the Los Angeles theater on 
Halloween eve, which I see as the ritualistic premiere of #masshysteria.
It is hard to say a simple “thank you” for having the honor to work with 
one of the leading Hystorians and inspiring academics of our times. 
In defiance of the limits of language in communicating my gratitude, 
I want to wholeheartedly thank Elaine Showalter, for her generosity 
in participating in this project, for her openness to discussing the 
complex relations of hysteria, and for her very personal revelations at 
the conference as well as in the essay she has contributed to this volume. 
I also want to thank the driving force behind her: English Showalter, 
who made sure that our minds and bodies were able to meet so freely 
on campus. 
In the same language-defying vein, I want to express my herzliches 
gratitude to Sander L. Gilman, whose contribution to the field of hysteria 
and visual studies cannot be expressed in such a short comment, but 
which is undeniably echoed in many of the contributions in this volume. 
It was an honor and privilege as well as highly entertaining and insightful 
to spend so many hours in Los Angeles traffic with him discussing the 
many complex layers of hysterical critical engagement, and have him 
conclude the event series on campus. I thank him for his openness from 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 9
the very first email to engaging in this ongoing discussion and for his 
euphoric willingness to contribute to this publication.
This publication would not have seen the light of day without the 
untiring work and support of and the entire Leuven University Press 
team, especially Mirjam Truwant, Acquisitions Editor, which somehow 
mysteriously found out about this project and has since then made 
sure this publication was delivered, through albeit a Pappenheimsche’ 
hysterical labor, into this world. I want to thank it for its infectious 
vision, inexhaustible patience and continuously energetic endorsement. 
It saw the potential of this project from the very beginning and has also 
generously supported it with a grant from the Leuven Fund for Fair 
Open Access.
Speaking of financial support: This entire project, and the many 
connections that were facilitated through the lively engagements of it, 
would not have been possible without the very generous support of the 
Austrian Science Fund (FWF), which has not only provided the resources 
to conduct such an ambitious project but has also shown how relevant it 
is to endorse an in-depth study of such a current phenomenon, thereby 
attesting its mission to support the ongoing development of (Austrian) 
science and basic research at a high international level. Thank you 
to the FWF Advisory board for endorsing this project, and especially 
the scientific project supervisor, Dr. Barbara Zimmerman, and the 
administrative project supervisor, Robert Gass, for their ongoing and 
unflagging support.
Thank you to the wonderful Alexandra Cox, from Coquelicot Translation, 
who has continuously untangled and translated my hysterical thoughts 
whenever I got lost or carried away from a frantic train of thought and 
who somehow always manages to find time in her very busy editorial 
schedule for this project. 
I also want to send a loving thank you to Michael Niemetz, the best 
partner in crime, who was instrumental in putting the event series 
together and who endured my hysterical cries and laughter while 
working on this publication with much caring patience and often needed 
encouragement. It goes without saying that a lamentation in solidarity 
goes out to my beloved Lilli Braun whose hysterical fits accompany me 
on every journey.
And of course, last but not least, the most significant and sincere 
acknowledgments go to all the wonderful authors in this volume. 
Without their hard work and dedication Performing Hysteria would be 
10 PERFORMING HYSTERIA
filled with blank pages. Thank you Vivian Delchamps, Cecily Devereux, 
Sander L. Gilman, Elke Krasny, Jonathan W. Marshall, Sean Metzger, 
Tim Posada, Elaine Showalter, and Dominik Zechner. It has been a 
pleasure and pure delight working with you and I’m looking forward to 
continuing our transnational hysterical discussions.
To conclude, I thank all the engaging readers of Performing Hysteria 
who will hopefully join this ever contagiously growing dialog on the 
hysteric’s performance and enrich the field even further.
INTRODUCTION 11
INTRODUCTION
We seem to be living in hysterical times. Anyone who has been following 
public political discourse in recent months cannot avoid the buzzword: 
hysteria. We see countless reports—especially in the United States, but 
also beyond—and a simple Google search reveals the sheer bottomless 
well of “hysterical” discussions, on diverse topics such as the so-called 
global warming and climate change hysteria, migration hysteria, Trump, 
Anti-Trump hysteria, xenophobic hysteria, trans bathroom hysteria, or 
feminist hysteria, and most recently Black Lives Matter hysteria and 
COVID-19 or corona hysteria, to name only a few. Numerous men in 
politics and Hollywood warned of hysteria generated by the so-called 
#metoo movement, and Peter Haneke and Roman Polanski made it 
more specific and highlighted the distinction with their warning of the 
epidemic and contagious nature of “mass hysteria” within the movement.
Especially the first two decades of the twenty-first century have displayed 
an ever increasing interest in the hysteric, from recent literature, film, 
and television programs to the return of an academic interest in this 
apparent “hysterical revival”. Although the history and evolution of the 
representation of hysteria have been extensively researched, the study 
of how these discourses have been transferred to twenty-first-century 
culture remains largely uncharted territory. 
The main focus of Performing Hysteria: Contemporary Images and 
Imaginations of Hysteria is the way in which the hysteric is involved in 
and performs on this pressing intersection of hysteria and cultural and 
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performance studies, as the book examines the current phenomenon of 
hysteria in visual culture and sheds light on its historical entanglements 
and its complex developments and transformations in the present.
The hysteric, who was a well-represented poster child in European artistic 
and scientific studies at the fin de siècle, is celebrating a surprisingly 
popular comeback in visual culture a century later. But the figure of the 
hysteric in this current imagery echoes evidently established medical, 
artistic, and religious representations of the hysteric that extend well 
beyond the European studies of the nineteenth century.
It is interesting that while in the late twentieth century the medical 
term hysteria was struck from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, it simultaneously reappeared as Histrionic 
Personality Disorder (Latin: histrio, actor/actress). This rebranding just 
further underlines the point of this investigation: the hysteric is thereby 
diagnosed as performer, and has moved beyond the limits of medical 
discourse. (For the developments and transformations of the medical 
term, please see: Skull, Devereux) Given this reintroduction, one may 
assume that the self-reflective media figure of the hysteric will only 
continue to gain ground in its cultural impact.
The title Performing Hysteria. Contemporary Images and Imaginations of 
Hysteria already reveals the central focus of this volume: How are the 
current manifestations surrounding hysteria informed by historical 
performance practices and how do they, in turn, produce new ways 
of performing hysteria? To understand these hysterical images, I 
contend, one needs to locate them within their broader visual culture, 
furthermore drawing on the cross-disciplinary potential of performance 
studies, foregrounding images of hysteria in visual representation and 
in textual discourse.
Both terms, hysteria and performance, are central to a variety of academic 
fields; therefore, their definitions are ambiguous and remain contested. 
The term “hysteria” is here chosen deliberately, because it includes 
religious, medical, and political concepts through its extensive histories 
(in fact and fiction), and the forms of its representation, so the argument 
goes, were conceived in terms of performance art. This figure is not 
just mad, possessed, or simulating excessively one of the former: it 
references a range of representations that are historically specific to 
the hysteric. It is interesting to witness how the hysteric visualizes and 
transgresses boundaries of relating to the politics of classes, genders, 
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races, sexualities, religious beliefs, locations, or time periods with ease. 
Therefore, it is the aim of this volume to uncover the culturally induced 
discourses that produce this image on one hand, and to trace the images 
that are (re)produced by the hysteric in turn.
In order to thoroughly analyze the current phenomenon, this book 
brings together a diverse group of authors who follow the hysteric’s 
performance as an object of inquiry and investigate the multilayered 
and complex discussions that surround and foster this resurgent interest 
in hysteria—covering wide areas of hysteric inquiry from art, literature, 
theater, film, television, dance; crossing disciplines in the humanities 
from cultural studies, political science, philosophy, and history, media, 
disability, race and ethnicity, and gender studies; and who look into 
the emergence of the hysteric performer in well-covered locales such 
as the United States and Europe, as well as under-represented areas 
of the hysteric’s performance, in China, Japan, and India; and analyze 
stereotypical images and representations of the hysteric in relation 
to cultural sciences and media studies, with a particular emphasis on 
performance studies. They also very much attest to the changing nature 
of the representation of the hysteric: While the hysteric in historical 
and previous artistic sources was dominantly represented as a woman 
or girl, it becomes evident in the current representations, which are 
investigated in this volume, that the hysteric is currently manifesting 
beyond those presumed gender boundaries and also appearing more 
strikingly in the form of group or mass hysteria.
The authors ask pressing questions, such as, what reveals the hysteric’s 
performance in its current manifestations? What historical events or 
customs have triggered this particular enthusiasm for depicting the 
hysteric? How has the representation of the hysteric evolved over the 
centuries and how is it visualized and performed in the present? Why 
does the hysteric capture the imagination, of Anglophone audiences as 
well as beyond those often-covered borders? Each chapter will address 
these and related issues as we focus on hysteria from a variety of critical 
perspectives, contextualizing the works in the cultures that produce 
them.
This collection of essays therefore draws on a series of studies that 
examine the cultural relevance of the representation of the hysteric 
in visual media. Although the diagnosis of hysteria started to vanish 
from the medical context by the end of the twentieth century, as already 
mentioned, a wealth of historical studies about hysteria simultaneously 
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appeared as a cultural phenomenon (Veith 1965, Micale 1995, Shorter 
1997, Showalter 1997, Skull 2009; please also consult the bibliography in 
the appendix). Mark S. Micale gave the first comprehensive overview of 
the research landscape in Approaching Hysteria (1995), introducing the 
term New Hysteria Studies. Elaine Showalter later coined in response the 
term New Hysterians (Showalter 1997, 7) and has named those cultural 
narratives Hystories (5). The authors in this volume are in many ways 
informed by and draw on these influential discussions.
But besides the extensive literature at the end of the twentieth century, 
it is interesting to witness that the performance of the hysteric as a 
culturally relevant representation gets too little attention in today’s 
cultural sciences. This volume examines specific forms of performance 
with regard to philosophical and cultural discourses. Due to its 
multimedia representation it would not be sufficient to analyze the 
hysteric’s performance through the perspective of one single medium 
(e.g. photography, theater, film, or text). Therefore, the contributions 
are furthermore located in the relatively new field of performance 
(history) studies. Performing Hysteria unites the hysteric as mediator 
between historical practices that were aware of their own performativity 
with the current representations that are performing this historical 
awareness and self-reflection. 
This volume is therefore influenced by cultural studies that deal with 
the representation of hysteria in its medical context, especially in 
the context of visualizations of “madness”, in visual media in general 
(Gilman, Haslam, Philo, Blackman/Walkerdine, Pickering, Didi-
Huberman, Harper, Cross, Serlin, Hustvedt, Scott/Scarth/Chung, 
Timpano), in theater (Kaplan/Rudolph, Reiss, Harpin/Foster, Wald, 
Mukherjee, Marshall), and in film (Fleming and Manvell, Gabbard/
Gabbard), but also much beyond the medical context, as hysteria has 
moved beyond those lines of discipline. This can be seen as a reflection 
of the development that hysteria is not considered to be an “official” 
medical diagnosis as of the late twentieth century, and nevertheless 
retains its relevance for a contemporary audience.
The goal is thus to develop a set of tools for an extensive discussion of 
the performing arts, as well as for the enhanced analysis of the staging 
of hysteria as performance and the hysteric as popular performer. Thus, 
the aim of this book is to provide insight into the current elaborate, 
complex engagement with hysteria and its performance hystories, rather 
than to impose any rigid structure of analysis or fixed theoretical 
framework.
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Although hysteria was extraordinarily prominent in nineteenth-century 
European medicine and culture, only a couple of full-length historical 
surveys have been published in the twentieth century, most notably: 
Ilza Veith’s Hysteria: The History of a Disease (1965) and Etienne Trillat’s 
Histoire de l’Hysterie (1986, which was unfortunately never translated into 
English and not widely publicized, and had therefore little impact on 
Anglophone academic scholarship). Both written from an internalist 
medical perspective, they did not yet consider the cultural, contextual, 
and discursive implications of these forms of representation in their 
negotiations of class, gender politics, and ideology.
French medical historian Georges Didi-Huberman’s often-cited Invention 
de l’Hysterie: Charcot et l’Iconographie Photographique (1982) shifted the 
focus and has been influential in fusing the diagnosis and appearance of 
hysteria and its connection to visual images and artistic representations, 
especially since its English translation appeared as Invention of Hysteria: 
Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière in 2003.
Sander L. Gilman, Helen King, Roy Porter, G. S. Rousseau, and Elaine 
Showalter have broadened this field extensively, through their individual 
contributions to the latter, as well as through their comprehensive 
collection of essays in their jointly edited Hysteria Beyond Freud (1993).
Hysteria Beyond Freud, a medical history of hysteria that makes a strong 
case that Freud’s influential studies on hysteria were neither the 
beginning nor the end of the field, and that uncovers the social and 
cultural implications of the representation of hysteria, can be broadly 
divided into a historical first section (with the essays by Helen King and 
G. S. Rousseau) and the thematic one (by Roy Porter, Elaine Showalter, 
and Sander L. Gilman) and has significantly contributed to a new 
generation of hysteria studies. (Please refer to their extensive literary 
review on discussions about the representation of hysteria and its 
medical histories.)
The scholarly move to extend the scope of medical and psychoanalytic 
studies on hysteria, and unravel the cultural implications of those 
representations, has informed several hysteria studies of the early twenty-
first century, especially in relation to representations of hysteria in the 
arts. Nevertheless, these studies are still very much informed by the 
medical and historical discussions of the early New Hystorians. Jonathan 
W. Marshall’s insightful Performing Neurology: The Dramaturgy of Dr. Jean-
Martin Charcot (2016), for example, focuses on late nineteenth-century 
French neurology and performance and the history of medicine as it 
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relates to theater and art. Nathan J. Timpano’s Constructing the Viennese 
Modern Body: Art, Hysteria, and the Puppet (2017) focuses on Vienna 
around 1900 and makes a case that hysteria was already well discussed 
in Vienna in artistic productions before Freud’s often-cited studies. 
Anna Harpin and Juliet Foster take a broader approach in their edited 
collection, Performance, Madness and Psychiatry: Isolated Acts (2014), and 
discuss the representation of “madness” in general and the “medical 
theaters” of psychiatric asylums and hospitals specifically, and their 
relation to performance and theater practices, from the eighteenth 
century to the present. Ankhi Mukherjee’s deconstructive psychoanalytic 
study Aesthetic Hysteria: The Great Neurosis in Victorian Melodrama and 
Contemporary Fiction (2007) operates on the fringes of emotion/affect 
and trauma studies, which she investigates through literary texts that 
range from authors such as Charles Dickens to contemporary literature 
by Pat Barker, while incorporating discussions around hysteria from the 
fields of the history of medicine, aesthetic theory, speech act theory, 
feminism, and gender and performance studies. Christina Wald’s 
Hysteria, Trauma and Melancholia: Performative Maladies in Contemporary 
Anglophone Drama (2007), as well, focuses on theater plays and traces 
the theatrical performance, gender performativity, and what she calls 
the “drama of performative malady” in performance and theater 
practices that were concerned with representation of hysteria in the 
1990s. Anouchka Grose’s edited volume Hysteria Today (2016), as part of 
the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research Library Series, is also a 
psychoanalytical approach to the theme and looks at how and if hysteria 
is still relevant within contemporary clinical practices.
It is interesting to witness this continuing academic interest in hysteria. 
Performing Hysteria very much draws inspiration from these investiga-
tions, while also showing the many ways hysteria has been celebrating a 
fruitful revival in countless contemporary forms. Furthermore, while I 
acknowledge the importance of hysteria and psychoanalytic theory, this 
book follows the same historical objective as its predecessor, in Hysteria 
Beyond Freud, with the editorial decision not to include professional 
psychoanalysts or medical practitioners among the authors, as well 
as approaches fundamentally psychoanalytical in their motivation. 
Although the medical diagnosis of hysteria is still referenced in 
many of the contributions, it is evident that hysteria functions in our 
contemporary context far beyond the clinical and psychoanalytical 
limits of debate.
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While those publications attest to the ongoing artistic and academic 
interest in hysteria, and have contributed significantly in continuing 
the discussion on hysteria, Performing Hysteria. Contemporary Images and 
Imaginations of Hysteria goes even further and investigates through 
a range of contemporary case studies how pressing public discourses 
are negotiated through images of hysteria. Therefore, Performing 
Hysteria is not a “complete” history of hysteria, proceeding in linear 
time. Nor is it an attempt to rewrite previous studies on the history of 
psychiatry and medicine under contemporary circumstances. This is 
the first book-length study of the twenty-first century to systematically, 
theoretically, and historically analyze the hysteric’s performance in 
various contemporary performance practices. Therefore, as we can 
witness in the diverse chapters in this volume, images of hysteria are very 
productive in the present in communicating a wide range of discussions 
and topics that may include but also extend beyond the medical and 
psychoanalytical imagery of hysteria. The essays in this volume are 
therefore also informed by and reference previous academic and artistic 
explorations on the intersection of hysteria and performance, most 
notably Anna Furse’s Augustine (Big Hysteria): Writing the Body (1997) 
and Dianne Hunter’s The Makings of Dr. Charcot’s Hysteria Shows: Research 
Through Performance (1998), among many others, who investigated how 
the hysteric was staged and performed in Charcot’s influential medical 
studies and its impact on performance art practices at the end of the 
twentieth century. Currently, we can witness countless explorations of 
artists and writers that “reclaim” hysteria, and draw heavily on this school 
of thought, as well as expand it beyond Charcot’s archive of performance 
practices well into the present and tie it into the rich discussions of 
hysteria as a language of feminist protest, most prominently informed 
by the writings of Hélène Cixous, Catherine Clément and Luce Irigary. 
This current phenomenon merits a focused and in-depth investigation 
of its very own which I explored separately, as a complementary study 
to this volume, in There is a Method to this Madness: Hysteria and the Arts 
(2020).
With the resurgence of hysteria in public discourse and such a broad 
cultural output, the time seems ripe to reexamine the multilayered 
hystories that are revealed in the hysteric’s contemporary performances. 
The aim of Performing Hysteria is to paint a clear picture of the 
intersections of hysteria and performance, to be able to understand 
the complex ways in which performance and hysteria are informed by, 
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and forming of, culture, politics, and history. Performing Hysteria is the 
first to make explicit the lines of progression running from the figure 
of the hysteric, and the theoretical discourses surrounding it, into 
contemporary (popular) culture.
This publication attests to hysteria’s fragmentation and explores 
hysteria and performance through a wide range of theoretical modes 
of thought. Through several case studies, which encompass literary 
works, photography, paintings and drawings, theater, dance, film and 
television productions, the figure of the hysteric has come to personify 
a wide range of cultural and social discussions, ranging from disability, 
healthcare, reproduction, and labor rights to pressing questions of 
changing social and cultural environments through new developments 
of the internet, social media, and the blurring of transnational borders.
The “hysterical archive” is a recurrent theme in many of the essays, 
revealing how the image archive of the hysteric is re-producing and 
re-performing artistic, medical, and religious representations of 
the hysteric that were already established in European studies of the 
nineteenth century, and attesting to its legacy that reaches well beyond 
these borders of inquiry. The publication can be roughly divided into 
two complementing parts: the authors initially lay out the historical 
connections, and tie in the fragmented parts and pieces of the 
hysteric’s performance practice that inform the current discussions very 
effectively, while the ensuing contributions tie this historical awareness 
to a series of contemporary case studies and show how these discussions 
are still enchanting a mass audience. Further, they demonstrate how 
these historical practices have transformed and shaped current 
representations of the hysteric.
We start the investigation with an essay by Elaine Showalter, who “revisits” 
the ongoing public and academic interest in hysteria and points to 
the parallels and differences to her influential work at the end of the 
twentieth century. Showalter has been exploring the cultural narratives 
and representations of hysteria and how it has multiplied rapidly and 
uncontrollably in the era of mass media, telecommunications, and 
e-mail for the past two decades, and in this very personal essay she 
reflects on the consequences that her influential “hysterical” research 
practice had on her academic career and personal life.
Sander Gilman, who has published extensively on the imaginations that 
have shaped images of hysteria, then follows right next and traces in 
his essay how concepts and questions of race have shaped ideas and 
representations of the hysteric. He presents an interesting case: the 
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hysteric—the Jewish hysteric to be precise—was perceived as out of mind 
because they are out of place, thereby making an interesting connection 
between the disturbing imaginations of the “wandering womb” to the 
anti-Semitic notion of the “wandering Jew”. Those far-reaching concepts 
of hysteria and dis-placement, especially in connection with wandering, 
are returning in many of the following essays, that trace how hysterical 
imaginations are still traveling into the very present and how those 
medical concepts of the wandering hysteric migrated very much beyond 
the medical discourse into the representation of hysteria in culture at 
large.
Jonathan W. Marshall then casts a wide net of investigation and joins the 
dots of an extensive network of itinerant and dancing images of hysteria 
from Europe to Japan, traversing centuries of hysterical performance 
practices. In doing this, Marshall follows hysteria and its choreography 
of a well-established performance archive, which he calls a “hysteriform 
archive”, that constitutes a set of bodily gestures and actions that recur 
across history, crossing from early modern demonical possession, 
exorcism, and religious ecstasy to medical studies of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, in order subsequently to become a significant 
resource for international performing artists in the last two centuries. 
Marshall lays out a series of significant performance strategies that are 
echoed in many of the following investigations.
Dominik Zechner revisits the infamous hysterical Freud case study 
of “Dora” and draws compelling connections, by means of employing 
Haslam’s “creep concept” (2016) between the current phenomenon 
of the “massification” of hysteria in the #metoo movement and public 
debates surrounding abuse and sexual misconduct in the workplace 
and their philosophical implications in particular. Zechner paints 
a compelling picture of Dora as a feminist heroine and what he calls 
an “epochal icon of analytic collapse” whose legacy echoes well into 
these pressing public debates in the present and especially in current 
representations of the hysteric as resistance to cure and “the master 
narrative”.
Vivian Delchamps draws this line, of the hysteric as a figure of protest, 
further, and discusses how the literary motive of the hysteric from 
nineteenth-century American literature was informed by, as she calls it, 
the “performance of diagnosis” in medical texts which in turn led to an 
equally elaborate “performance of rebellion” in literary representations, 
and in doing this she provides an interpretive framework for 
understanding issues of gender and hysteria relevant to modern 
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discourses in literature, disability studies, and medical humanities that 
can be traced in many of the following contributions that investigate the 
resurgence of this feminist trope, especially in visual culture.
Elke Krasny, for example, spins this thread into the present, and 
discusses itinerant concepts of hysteria in performance practices in 
contemporary art, especially by feminist art collectives, moving on the 
intersection of art and politics; hysteria and protest culture; in Europe, 
North America, and India. Employing Mieke Bal’s methodological 
approach of “traveling concepts” (2002) allows Krasny to trace the 
hysterical complex in its transhistorical itineration from Greek 
antiquity to the politics and labor of performing hysteria in Jean-Martin 
Charcot’s Salpetrière and Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer’s Studies on 
Hysteria, and on to current art practices that perform hysteria as activist 
movements that mobilize and politicize hysterically in a global context.
Sean Metzger continues this traveling train of hysterical thought and 
further investigates the blurring of cultural and national borders in the 
hysteric’s performance. Metzger looks specifically into the theatrical and 
political implications of (mass) hysteria in the work of American novelist 
Don DeLillo and the stage adaptation by Jody McAuliffe of DeLillo’s 
novel Mao II and traces compelling parallels between an hysterical 
archive, mass production, and the theatricality of the crowd. He thus 
attests as well to the complex representations and misconceptions of 
creative and human capital in China, and how images of (mass) hysteria 
negotiate these pressing debates surrounding labor and reproduction 
rights.
Cecily Devereux follows this and makes as well a compelling case for the 
reproduction and repetition of a hysterical archive and its connection 
to labor and reproduction in hysterical performances. She considers the 
reproduction of maternal bodies in the HBO television series WestWorld 
(2016–), how they reproduce and perform hysterical images of the 
hysteric, and looks both at the reproduction of cyborg bodies as hosts 
put to work in the form of, in effect, three-dimensional images for the 
pleasure of guests in the immersive theme park of the series’ title and 
at the representation of hysteria of those bodies as they experience and 
stage the repetitive stress of their labor.
Cecily Devereux’s essay is followed by another contemporary case 
study that focuses on a recent manifestation of the hysteric that is well 
informed by historical images of the hysteric’s performance archive with 
a new twist. Tim Posada traces the development of the iconic horror film 
trope of the Final Girl (Clover 1992) and how the recent film Revenge 
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(2018) became an unlikely anthem of and provides insights relevant to 
discussions to the #metoo movement. He traces interesting parallels 
between European studies of male hysteria to current discussion around 
rape culture and sexual violence and how the so-called Rape-Revenge 
film enriches the hysterical archive with a new horror trope: hysterical 
men.
As a complement to this contemporary case study in horror film, my 
concluding essay takes a closer look at a specific expression of the 
hysteric’s performance in the present: the hysteric’s politically charged 
and highly popular performance in mainstream US horror films of 
the so-called Possession film, which draws heavily on historically well-
established notions surrounding staging and performing hysteria 
to discuss pressing topics of its time, especially around disability and 
health care, and how the recent development has led to a new trope: the 
hysteric as resistant to treatment and cure, and therefore attesting to a 
new self-consciousness of the self-reflective media figure of the hysteric.
What becomes evident in these brief summaries is that the current highly 
popular and versatile performance of the hysteric draws on and ties in a 
multitude of discussions, blurring previously established boundaries of 
discussion around hysteria’s presumed gender, nationality, discipline, 
genre, or media.
Performing Hysteria does not aim to be complete but to give advanced 
consideration to the wealth of existing examples of the hysteric’s 
performance in its manifold manifestations. While the figure of the 
hysteric has attracted considerable scholarly attention over the decades, 
the current critical academic engagement turns out rather slim; 
therefore, it is the aim of Performing Hysteria to lay out several recent 
developments in the hysteric’s performance that will hopefully also 
lead to focused studies of their own that explore the highly complex 
representations of the hysteric’s performance in specific mediums and 
genres, in contemporary literature, fine arts, theater, film and television 
productions in the present. As a starting point for further investigations, 
please refer to the extensive bibliography in the appendix for further 
readings on hysteria, which have a focus on the visual representation 
and performance of hysteria.
I’m very much looking forward to seeing how this exploration unfolds 
and to what discussions and investigations it might lead. In light of 
the ongoing “trending” of hysteria in public discussions and artistic 
inquiries, it remains thrilling to witness the complex, while also at 
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times troubling, prevailing currency of the hysteric which speaks 
great volumes about the hysteric’s ongoing highly politically relevant 
performance repertoire.
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Hysterical Epidemics and Social Media 
Elaine Showalter
In 1997, my book Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media, was 
published by Columbia University Press in New York and by Picador 
in London. Hystories was the culmination of twenty years that I spent 
working on the history of psychiatry, and the third of three books I wrote 
during this period. In it, I looked at the forces that shaped hysterical 
epidemics, placing them in their fullest sexual, historical, cultural, and 
political contexts: their rise in the 1990s; intersections with literature, 
theatre, and film; and connections with conspiracy theories, witch-
hunts, and mass panics. As I wrote, “in the interaction between 1990s 
millennial panic, new psychotherapies, religious fundamentalism, 
and American political paranoia, we can see the crucible of virulent 
hysterias in our own time. The heroes and heroines of 1990s hysteria 
call themselves traumatists and ufologists, experiencers and abductees, 
survivors and survivalists. As their syndromes evolve, they grow from 
micro-tales of individual affliction to panics fueled by rumors about 
medical, familial, community, or governmental conspiracy”. Moreover, 
hysteria is more contagious than in the past. “Infectious epidemics 
of hysteria [are] spread by stories circulated through self-help books, 
articles in newspapers and magazines, TV talk shows and series, films, 
the Internet, and even literary criticism. The cultural narratives of 
hysteria, which I call hystories, multiply rapidly and uncontrollably in 
the era of mass media, telecommunications, and email” (Showalter 5).
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My aim was to produce a work of applied scholarship that used my 
research on the history of psychiatry and especially the history of 
hysteria to address some very controversial contemporary issues of 
public value and policy, and in that it succeeded. It was widely read 
and reviewed, published by a trade press in the UK and translated 
into German. As a result of the book, I spoke to military doctors at the 
Veterans Administration in Washington, at a conference on Gulf War 
Syndrome in Edinburgh, to the staff at the Salpêtrière in Paris, and at 
hospitals in New York and Toronto. But I did not anticipate that writing 
Hystories would change my life and work in profound ways, and launch 
me into a new field of risk communication. And I did not foresee that in 
the twenty-first century, with the shift from mass media to social media, 
the spread of hysterical epidemics and conspiracy theories, would be 
speeded up and alarmingly changed. What I saw as uncontrollable 
in the 1990s would become viral by the 2000s. Revisiting the story of 
Hystories is also my personal story of the way circumstance and history 
affect scholarly choices and theories.
From about 1978 to 1998 I lived what felt like a double life, as a professor 
of English and a historian of psychiatry. From September to May, I was 
a literary scholar and feminist critic, teaching Victorian and American 
literature, fin-de-siècle fiction, women writers, and contemporary 
novels at Princeton University. In June, July, and August, and longer 
when I could get a sabbatical and a fellowship, I was a researcher and 
then a Fellow, at the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine in 
London, during the period when Roy Porter was its legendary director 
and galvanizing spirit. 
Roy came to the Wellcome in 1979 from Cambridge University. An 
enormously productive scholar, brilliant writer and speaker to both 
professional and general audiences, media star, and convivial, five-
times-married colleague, Roy was the charismatic center of a vibrant 
community of academia, social history, medicine, and popular 
culture, bringing people together, supporting conferences, and 
enabling connections. Under his leadership, new approaches and new 
methodologies were welcomed indeed, and the Wellcome became the 
destination for an international, interdisciplinary circle of scholars, 
historians, and doctors who had become interested in the subject of 
hysteria as a cultural phenomenon. Playing off the literary group called 
the New Historians led by Stephen Greenblatt and based at Berkeley, I 
called us the New Hysterians. 
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As Roy wrote in the introduction to our co-authored book Hysteria 
Beyond Freud (1993), medical history had changed dramatically over the 
1980s. It had shifted “from the scientific history of disease to the cultural 
history of diseases and the study of illness as metaphor”. Historians 
began to look more closely at “the complex dynamics of doctor/patient 
relationships”. The role of language, linguistics, and discourse in the 
analysis of medical conditions had received enormous attention. The 
“interface of literature and medicine” had become one of the most 
important themes in scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic. Above 
all, feminist scholarship had brought attention to “gender and social 
control encoded in women’s diseases, especially the hysteria diagnosis, 
in the age of Freud” (Porter viii).
I first wrote about hysteria in my book The Female Malady (1985). Hysteria 
is a major term in the history of the treatment of women in psychiatry. 
By the time the book came out, I had started to look at performance and 
the relation of hysteria and histrionic, as well as doctors and asylums, 
especially in nineteenth-century realistic drama like Ibsen. Metaphors 
of the histrionic have long been part of the clinical discussion of hysteria, 
and nineteenth-century physicians generally believed that hysterical 
women were skillful performers, faking their symptoms in order to get 
attention and special treatment. In 1980, this theatrical subtext was 
officially codified when the third edition of DSM-III (1980) renamed 
what had previously been “hysterical personality disorder” as “histrionic 
personality disorder”. In 1977, two psychiatrists indeed recommended 
acting as the ideal career choice of the female hysteric (Showalter 1997, 
202).
The definitions and diagnoses came at the height of the Women’s 
Liberation Movement, and were uncannily similar to the media’s view of 
feminist activism as over-reactive, self-dramatizing, and irrational. Labels 
of “hysterical” and “histrionic”, still routinely used against feminism and 
the #metoo movement, were also applied to gay rights groups, which 
responded by reclaiming and reframing the issue in names like ACT-UP 
and the slogan “Silence=Death”. Many contemporary women artists and 
performers reframed the histrionic elements of hysteria for a feminist 
art and theater.
At the same time, French feminist theorists led by Hélène Cixous 
claimed the nineteenth-century hysterical woman as a precursor of 
feminist revolution. I found that identification risky, and I wanted 
instead to write about hysteria without making it essentially female. In a 
chapter on male hysteria in The Female Malady, and my section of Hysteria 
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Beyond Freud, “Hysteria, Feminism, and Gender”, I wrote at length about 
the history, representation, and performance of male hysteria, looking 
particularly at the international debates about shell shock in World 
War I. 
By the late 1980s many psychiatrists and historians had proclaimed 
that hysteria had disappeared. In 1986, for example, the French 
psychoanalyst Étienne Trillat declared that “hysteria is dead, that’s for 
sure. It has carried its mysteries with it to the grave” (Trillat 274). The 
scholars at the Wellcome were skeptical of that pronouncement, and I 
certainly thought it was premature. In the 1990s, a form of shell shock 
was reappearing in what was called “Gulf War Syndrome”, a disorder of 
Gulf War veterans in the US and UK, afflicted with symptoms ranging 
from memory loss to hair loss, from night sweats to disabling muscle 
spasms. These wide-ranging symptoms seemed much more akin to 
post-traumatic stress disorder than an organic illness. Some American 
journalists and activists, however, claimed that it was a contagious 
disease caused by exposure to gas or drugs, which was being covered up 
by the US government. 
In the mass media, additionally, there were frequent stories about 
hysteria, in the form of psychogenic disorders, conspiracy theories, 
urban legends, and epidemic rumors and panics. In 1994, tales of 
alien abduction, in which people reported being kidnapped by large 
grey alien creatures and subjected to sexual probes, got quasi-scientific 
legitimacy when Professor John Mack at Harvard Medical School wrote 
a book called Abduction: Human Encounters with Aliens (1994). Mack 
suggested that there might be an extraterrestrial breeding program to 
produce human-alien babies, again being covered up by a government 
conspiracy. The historian and ufologist David M. Jacobs, in his book, The 
Threat: The Secret Alien Agenda  (1998), warned that it may already be 
too late to stop an alien breeding program aimed at taking over the 
planet. Handsome, Levi-wearing aliens, he wrote, have been assigned 
as “personal-project hybrids” to have regular sex with various earth-
women. The aliens tell lies and have several projects apiece, but they are 
so seductive, romantic, and cute that most of the women fall in love with 
them. The alien-abduction stories were silly, but even in 2018 a GOP 
congressional candidate claimed that as a child she had been taken to a 
spaceship by three blond extraterrestrials (Folley). 
But the most harmful of these conspiracy theories was that teachers in 
preschools and kindergartens were subjecting children to satanic ritual 
abuse, a form of devil worship carried out by hidden cults. In fact there 
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were no cults, but rumors and hysterical panics spread by the media 
led to arrests and imprisonment of child-care teachers and workers 
in the US and the UK. Children were taken away from their families 
as well. In addition to magazines and newspapers, daytime TV talk 
shows, and specials including a two-hour “documentary” from Geraldo 
Rivera called  Devil Worship: Exposing Satan’s Underground  that aired in 
1998, endlessly recycled the allegations. It took many books, law suits, 
and government investigations and reports before the falsely accused 
teachers were acquitted and cleared, and the panic subsided. 
But as one hystory was contested another seemed to spring up in its 
place. As I found after Hystories was published, some believers and 
advocates were infuriated by my critique, and, accustomed to the civil 
debate of academic conferences, I was initially unprepared for the angry 
response. In Washington, DC, giving my first ever bookstore reading, I 
was confronted by a young man in army fatigues yelling “Bullets are 
too good for you!” He had to be escorted from the store, and the event 
ended when some audience members tried to destroy copies of the book. 
As I went on to speak at bookstores around the country, the threats got 
worse. In American bookstores there was always the chance that the 
curses and inflammatory language that greeted my appearance would 
alert a lunatic with a gun or a bomb. I got used to having photographers 
from the local press pools show up at the bookstores to get the picture in 
case I got shot. Barnes and Noble in New York had its own security staff 
that took me to a safe room when the audience got too close and hostile, 
and then smuggled me out a back entrance.
I also went on daytime TV talk shows, another form of media which 
spread conspiracy theories and toxic rumors. In New York, I appeared 
on  Rolonda with half-a-dozen people with multiple personalities, 
recovered memories of sexual abuse, or tales of alien abduction; and 
their therapists, publicists, and advocates. In Seattle I was tricked into 
appearing on what I was told was a serious TV discussion of Gulf War 
Syndrome. Once I got on stage for the live program, I faced an angry 
audience of flag-waving veterans and co-panelists promoting conspiracy 
theories of government cover-up. One of my co-panelists was a woman 
who claimed to have caught Gulf War Syndrome at a party and given 
it to her dog. I had a lot of hate mail, and a few stalkers. One serial 
emailer showed up at my bookstore reading in Chicago. Another was 
convinced that we had both been abducted by aliens, and that they had 
brainwashed me into writing  Hystories  as a smokescreen. All the hate 
mailers were convinced that I had been paid huge sums to write the 
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book by US chemical megacorporations, or that I was the mouthpiece 
of an evil scientist. In England a doctor predicted that my book would 
drive patients to suicide. (It didn’t.)
Writing Hystories taught me that it is much safer and calmer to write 
about hysteria in Charcot, Freud, and Ibsen. Looking at the connection 
between media attention, hysterical epidemics, and conspiracy theories 
became standard practice in many scattered incidents. Nonetheless, as 
I concluded, as one form of hystory was contested and one conspiracy 
theory exposed as false, another seemed to spring up in its place. 
The year 2001 marked a clear millennial change in the circulation of 
rumors and panics, and the ability to contest them with reason and 
evidence. After September 11, 2001, conspiracy theories of vague and 
mysterious enemies and villains briefly subsided in the face of a real and 
lethal conspiracy against the United States. When terrorism posed clear 
threats, beliefs in alien abduction, for instance, quickly lost followers. 
As one journalist wrote, “Two planes crashed into the Twin Towers 
and no one cared about little green men anymore”. Coincidentally, but 
meaningfully to me, Roy Porter retired from the Wellcome Institute that 
fall, and died suddenly from a heart attack at the age of 56 five months 
later. The Wellcome was reorganized and its Golden Age as a center for 
cultural inquiry was over.
Of course 9/11 quickly generated its own conspiracy theories, security 
problems, and issues of government communication to an anxious 
and suspicious public. On March 25, 2002, I participated in a three-
day conference on bioterrorism and public policy in Brussels, the first 
ever Advanced Research Workshop co-sponsored by NATO and Russia. 
The workshop had been organized by Professor Simon Wessely (Kings 
College School of Medicine, London) and Professor Valery Krasnov 
(Director, Moscow Research Institute of Psychiatry), after President 
Putin and NATO Secretary-General Robertson agreed to co-operate on 
studying ways to combat terrorism. 
This kick-off meeting of international experts from Russia, the US, 
Britain, Belgium, France, Spain, Norway, Turkey, Israel, and Japan 
addressed the “importance of psychological factors in understanding 
and mitigating our response to terrorism” and the problems of 
communication for authorities addressing the public about risk (Wessely 
1–2). For everyone, it was a historic occasion. “If you had told me ten 
years ago that I would be addressing a NATO conference”, one Russian 
psychiatrist told me, “you would have been one of my patients”. 
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As a professor of English literature, I was almost as amazed as the 
Russians to find myself at NATO. Simon Wessely had invited me to give 
one of the closing keynote addresses, on the long-term problems of 
distrust, and secondary symptoms after a real or suspected biochemical 
or nuclear incident, such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. On the 
first day, we focused on what could be learned from previous episodes 
of chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism and disasters; on the 
second day, we looked at the psychological effects of mass terrorism; 
and on the final day, we considered interventions, rumor panics, and 
risk communication. 
Only four speakers at the workshop were female, and all participants 
were white, a situation that led one of the women delegates to comment 
to a male delegate that the diversity of the conference left something to 
be desired. “I’ve noticed that”, he agreed; “all the Russians are from the 
same region”. In several studies of disasters, women and girls had higher 
anxiety levels than men, and lower levels of trust, leading to speculation 
about whether women were less disposed to believe what they were told 
by men. I suggested that what was needed was more female role models 
in the mass media during emergencies—women needed to see and hear 
other women being courageous, calm, and self-possessed. 
All the delegates agreed that bioterrorism was addressed to a group 
rather than to individuals, and designed to destroy social cohesion, 
including values, morale, and trust in government and society, and to 
sow distrust and fear. One delegate proposed the term “catastrophic 
reaction syndrome” for the psychological symptoms of a disaster.
Over the three days, two distinct positions on how to handle bioterrorism 
began to emerge from the meeting. On one side, led by the Russians and 
the Germans, were the civil defense officials, emergency management 
teams, and psychiatric intervention experts, who were concerned 
about controlling public behavior, and anticipated panic, short-term 
dysfunction, and long-term traumatic reactions. On the other side, led 
by the Americans and the British, were academic psychologists, public 
health scholars, risk communication experts, and media professionals 
who believed that public responses to catastrophes and disasters 
were generally rational, constructive, and predictable, and should be 
expedited and supported by official and government sources. Both sides 
favored rapid dissemination of accurate information by the authorities; 
but we differed about exactly what the public needs to know, and even 
whether the public can know too much. 
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We also differed about the role of the media. Whether a free press is 
still a concerned part of the social order, a detached observer outside of 
it, or, whether they like it or not, a player in the construction of social 
responses to emergencies became one of the touchiest issues of the 
meetings. One official argued that the media could not be counted on 
to help, and might even increase public disquiet. A BBC journalist and 
correspondent who briefed the group stressed the importance of the 
speed of official response to a crisis. He warned us that the narrative 
agenda of a bioterrorist incident would be determined within the first 
twenty minutes. In the absence of government announcements, other 
stories—conspiracy theories, false information, rumors, hystories—
would rush in to fill the gap. He also reminded us of the wide range of 
media sources, with varying ethical and professional standards. 
As the Washington Post reported (2002), more than half of all Americans 
got their political information from the popular media as well as the 
news elite, including talk shows, MTV, “Saturday Night Live”, Oprah, 
David Letterman, and Jay Leno. Another delegate presented research 
that showed the more TV people watched after September 11, the 
more psychological symptoms they reported. But was this the result of 
exposure to the terrible images, or the corollary of those who were most 
disturbed being least able to limit their watching? Overall, it was clear 
that modern technology—the cellphone, the internet, television—was 
part of the bioterrorist scenario.
One outcome of the NATO workshop was an ongoing effort to share 
and circulate ideas about communicating in a crisis, and to help draw up 
policies for public officials in the countries participating. For me, it was 
a sobering acknowledgment of the obstacles to rational communication 
and argument even in an emergency or crisis. I understood then that 
hysterical panics and conspiracy theories would be almost out of control 
in the age of terrorism. That NATO conference was two years before 
the age of social media. Facebook did not launch until February 2004. 
Twitter was launched in July 2006.
As New York Times journalist Kevin Roose wrote in 2018, the advent 
of social media has accelerated the circulation of conspiracy theories 
and false narratives. “Conspiratorial thinking has always been with us—
the grassy knoll, the moon landing, the Freemasons. But it has been 
turbocharged as cable news networks and pliant social media networks 
allow hastily assembled theories to spread to millions in an instant. 
Often, by the time the official, evidence-based explanation has taken 
shape, it has already been drowned out by a megaphonic chorus of 
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cranks and attention-hungry partisans…. Fact-checking, long offered as 
a possible antidote to misinformation, is not likely to solve the problem. 
The available data on the effectiveness of fact-checking, especially 
on social media, is  mixed. Facebook halted a program last year that 
labeled false news stories with red flags, after  finding that the labels 
actually induced more people to click. The company’s current approach 
is to decrease the visibility of stories labeled false by third-party fact-
checkers, in hopes of starving them of oxygen”. But “unfounded gossip 
and innuendo are easier than ever to stumble upon and to believe 
without question. Daytime television and nightly news shows are no 
longer required for these stories to spread—all you need is Facebook 
and Twitter” (Roose).
Look at Pizzagate. In fall 2016, online rumors of a child sex-trafficking 
ring led by Hillary Clinton, in which children were kidnapped and 
hidden in tunnels underneath a Washington, DC, pizza parlor, incited 
a North Carolina man named Edgar Welch to drive to Washington 
and open fire on the restaurant to free them. Echoing the language 
and content of the satanic ritual abuse panic, the story had spread 
uncontrollably on social media. 
Comet Ping Pong, the family pizza parlor Welch invaded with his assault 
rifle, is next door to the bookstore where I gave my first book reading 
twenty-one years ago. Then the people who crowded into the store 
and tried to snatch the books off the shelves had been recruited by a 
small group of people making phone calls and sending emails. Now 
social media messages, organized by faceless groups or bots, do the 
recruitment work, and recipients are much more likely to be alone and 
armed.
Rumor panics and conspiracy theories existed centuries ago, but were 
hard to transmit and stayed locally contained, because communications 
were so bad. The details of the Salem witch-hunt took months to spread 
to neighboring towns and states. Even in the 1990s, when I started 
working on hysterical epidemics, there was time to challenge false 
stories with accurate information. Today social media make events, 
lies, and rumors globally available in seconds and controlling them is a 
mammoth and usually futile task.
In The Pursuit of the Millennium (1957), his classic book about apocalyptic 
panics in the year 1000, the historian Norman Cohn described the fears 
that attract followers to paranoid mass movements. “Those who are first 
attracted will mostly be people who seek a sanction for the emotional 
needs generated by their own unconscious conflicts.… But these first 
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followers, precisely because they are true believers, can endow their 
new movement with such confidence, energy and ruthlessness that it 
will attract into its wake vast multitudes of people who are themselves 
not at all paranoid but simply harassed, hungry or frightened”. And if 
a political leader appears to take advantage of these volatile emotions, 
followers and believers rapidly find scapegoats to attack and punish. 
As Cohen warns, when “a paranoiac mass movement captures political 
power”, disaster ensues (Cohn 314).
In Donald Trump, the US elected a president who is the master of 
conspiracy theories, “false flag” narratives (stories claiming that 
“powerful groups stage threats and tragic events to advance their 
agenda”), and imaginary threats of invasion, carnage, and conquest. 
“We have a president who pushes these ideas because he built a coalition 
that believes in conspiracy theories”, said Joseph Uscinski, an associate 
professor of political science at the University of Miami who studies 
conspiracy theories. “He has to continue pushing these ideas to keep 
his people motivated” (Roose).
In 2002, I stopped writing about the social meaning of hysterical 
epidemics. That was mainly because I wanted to go back to writing 
about literature. But it was also because conspiracy theories had become 
too immense, unstable, and intractable to be addressed through the 
medium of a book. The hystories spread by social media today have to be 
fought with social media and by a dangerously besieged free press. But 
I am grateful to have had the chance to work with the New Hysterians 
during an extraordinary period at the Wellcome; to have confronted 
false narratives in print, in person, and on radio and television; to have 
stood up to threats; and to have taught some students who are now 
journalists and activists as well as scholars and are finding new ways to 
investigate hysterical narratives and advocate for truth. 
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WANDERING 
IMAGINATIONS OF RACE 
AND HYSTERIA
The Origins of the Hysterical Body in 
Psychoanalysis
Sander L. Gilman
One of the most extraordinary moments in the history of medicine 
occurs when the young neurologist Sigmund Freud, newly returned 
from a post-doctoral stay in Paris studying with the preeminent 
neurologist of the day, Jean Martin Charcot, speaks to the medical 
establishment in Vienna about the non-gendered nature of hysterical 
symptoms. Freud’s initial presentation of his work on hysteria in Vienna 
was a paper on male hysteria—not the Jewish male predisposition for 
hysteria but on the universal male potential for hysteria. Freud’s overt 
argument was evidently (the paper is lost) that men, too, suffer from 
hysteria as the etiology of the disease was not in the gender of the 
patient but in the patient’s traumatic experiences. It is well known that 
Freud, in the autobiographical account he wrote of the occasion some 
forty years after the event, recalled the “bad reception” which this paper 
on male hysteria had when he presented it before the Viennese Society 
of Physicians on October 15, 1886.1 Freud’s powerful memory was that 
his hearers thought that what he “said was incredible.… One of them, 
an old surgeon, actually broke out with the exclamation: ‘But, my dear 
sir, how can you talk such nonsense? ‘Hysteron’ [sic] means the uterus. 
So how can a man be hysterical?’”2 Freud’s angry memory was aimed at 
the narrow-minded claim of this old man, representing the Viennese 
medical establishment, that it, and it alone, had command of Greek. 
Here the Jewish psychoanalyst placed his claim to control a discourse of 
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academic culture. Freud’s memory was certainly shaped by the hostile 
reception which psychoanalysis had gotten in the four decades following 
his talk. Psychoanalysis was seen as a Jewish pseudo-science and as a 
form of mass hysteria, a “psychic epidemic among physicians”.3 Freud 
laughs at the “old surgeon” who claims to understand culture but whose 
very inability to command its language disqualifies him from it. 
It was the young, French-trained Freud who knew that the concept 
of hysteria was tied to universals (which, at that point, he thought of 
as having their origin in trauma) and was not merely a reflex of the 
biological uniqueness of a sub-group. It was hysteria (the hallmark of 
the new science) that Freud wished to rescue from the crabbed claws of 
a Viennese medical establishment which could not even get its Greek 
correct, for “hustera” is the correct form of the Greek noun for uterus. 
Thus the young Jew (and Freud understood himself from his exposure 
to the virulent “scientific” anti-Semitism of the Viennese University 
as a Jew) showed his command over not only the language of science 
(represented by Charcot’s discourse on hysteria) but also the language 
of culture (Greek). Freud’s sense, like that of his contemporaries, was 
that hysteria did not manifest itself as a disease of the “womb” but of the 
imagination. It was a functional illness resulting from trauma, rather 
than the result of inheritance, as he had shown in his paper on heredity 
and inheritance. And with the claim that male hysteria existed, he 
attempted to free the other group targeted, women, from their special 
risk. This did not absolve the female from being the group most at risk, 
however, for the idea of a pathological human imagination structurally 
replaced the image of the floating womb as the central etiology of 
hysteria. And women’s imagination was understood by the physicians 
of the time, such as Paul Julius Möbius, as diseased (Möbius). What 
was removed from the category of hysteria as Freud brought it back to 
Vienna was its insistence on another group, the Jews, as the group which 
essentially replaced the woman as at risk.
In the actual contemporary record of the discussion following Freud’s 
paper, attributed to the young Austrian-Jewish physician-writer Arthur 
Schnitzler, there is a further complication.4 Not only is there no mention 
of the impossibility of male hysteria, but Theodor Meynert as well as 
Moritz Rosenthal claim that, while less frequent than female hysteria, 
cases were well documented in the various Viennese hospitals as well as 
in the German medical literature. Heinrich von Bamberger, who was 
WANDERING IMAGINATIONS OF RACE AND HYSTERIA 43
in the chair at the meeting, commented further that while he certainly 
had seen cases of male hysteria, he was troubled by Freud’s claim that 
his case was only the result of trauma. Indeed, he notes, the very case 
Freud cites, “shows a hereditary predisposition” for the disease. It is not 
trauma, which is the result of accident, but heredity, which cannot be 
altered, that is the source of male hysteria, according to Bamberger. Thus 
within the very concept of hysteria as Freud elaborated it, the question 
of the hysteric’s heredity and predisposition was hotly contested. 
The impact of such fantasies of the biological nature of the Jew, the Jew’s 
body, his psyche, his soul, on the development of psychoanalysis is clear. 
The special nature of the Jew, the diseases and sociopathic acts ascribed 
to it, are a universal in the general culture of the nineteenth century. It 
is of no surprise that the Jew is seen in terms of this dominant paradigm 
of the late nineteenth century as this age saw the biologization of all 
arenas of culture. We find Jewish biological and medical scientists of 
the late nineteenth century forced to deal with what is for them the 
unstated central epistemological problem of late nineteenth-century 
biological science: it is how one can be the potential subject of a scientific 
study at the same time that one has the role of the observer; how one 
could be the potential patient at the same moment one was supposed 
to be the physician. This was especially a problem in Vienna, where 
the domination of the so-called “second Viennese” school stressed the 
central role of the physician as scientist and the independent, neutral 
role of the physician-scientist as diagnostician. It is the striving of the 
neutral, the universal, for the over-arching explanation which provides 
the rationale for the scientist-physician’s gaze in the world of Viennese 
academic medicine.
And that science saw the Jew as the sufferer from hysteria. Maurice 
Fishberg’s The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment (1911) states the case 
boldly: “The Jews, as is well known to every physician, are notorious 
sufferers of the functional disorders of the nervous system. Their 
nervous organization is constantly under strain, and the least injury 
will disturb its smooth workings”.5 The origin of this predisposition is 
neither consanguineous marriage (“the modern view… [is that they] 
are not at all detrimental to the health of the offspring”) nor the 
occupations of the Jew (“hysteria [is]… met with in the poorer classes 
of Jews… as well as in the richer classes”) (“Nervous Diseases” 225). It 
is the result of the urban concentration of the Jews and “the repeated 
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persecutions and abuses to which the Jews were subjected during the 
two thousand years of the Diaspora” (“Nervous Diseases” 225). These 
influences, found at the fin de siècle primarily among Eastern Jews, 
according to Fishberg show the predisposition of these specific groups 
of Jews to illnesses such as hysteria: “Organic as well as functional 
derangements of the nervous system are transmitted hereditarily from 
one generation to another” (“Nervous Diseases” 225). It is not all Jews 
who are hysterics, but Eastern Jews, and primarily Eastern male Jews, 
according to Fishberg: “The Jewish population of [Warsaw] alone is 
almost exclusively the inexhaustible source for the supply of specimens 
of hysterical humanity, particularly the hysteria in the male, for all the 
clinics of Europe” (The Jews 324–25). Here the American Jew Fishberg 
misquotes the French psychiatrist Fulgence Raymond, who had stated 
that Jews of Warsaw formed a major sector of the mentally ill of that 
city.6 It is Fishberg’s misquote of Raymond which becomes the standard 
view in German psychiatry (as quoted, for example, in Hoppe 26). It 
appears within Freud’s circle when Isidor Sadger noted at the November 
11, 1908 meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society: “In certain races 
(Russian and Polish Jews), almost every man is hysterical”.7 It is the male 
Jew from the East, from the provinces, who is most at risk from hysteria. 
This view had been espoused by Charcot, who diagnosed on February 
19, 1889 the case of a Hungarian Jew named Klein, “a true child of 
Ahasverus”, as a case of male hysteria. Klein had a hysterical contracture 
of the hand and an extended numbness of the right arm and leg. It is 
the limping of the Jew which Charcot stressed. Klein “wandered sick 
and limping on foot to Paris” where he arrived on December 11, 1888. 
He appeared at the Salpêtrière the next day, “his feet so bloody that 
he could not leave his bed for many days”. Klein “limped at the very 
beginning of his illness”. Charcot reminded his listeners that the patient 
“is a Jew and that he has already revealed his pathological drives by 
his wanderings”. His “travel-mania” could be seen in the fact that “as 
soon as he was on his feet again, he wanted to go to Brazil”.8 Wandering 
and limping mark the hysterical Jew as diseased, and diseased because 
of intermarriage. This theme is elaborated in the work of Charcot’s 
last major student, Henry Meige, who writes his dissertation on these 
“wandering Jews”, seeing them as the contemporary incarnation of the 
legendary Wandering Jew. In his thesis he reproduces their portraits so 
that one can study their physiognomy for the signs of their hysteria.9
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The hysteria of the male Jew, especially the Eastern Jew, remains a truism 
of medical science through the decades. Prof. Hermann Strauss of the 
Jewish Hospital in Berlin, in one of the most cited studies of the pathology 
of the Jews, provides a bar chart representing the risk of the Jews getting 
hysteria (Strauss 33–39; chart on 35). Here the relationship between 
men and women indicates that male Jews suffer twice as often from 
hysteria than do male non-Jews. The standard textbooks of the period 
reflect this view. While it is clear that women still are the predominant 
sufferers from the disease, it is evident from the visual representation of 
the cases of hysteria that there is a clear “feminization” of the male Jew 
in the context of the occurrence of hysteria. This view is paralleled by 
the findings in the United States that “in European races, melancholic 
or depressive types of mental disorder are most frequent amongst the 
Germanic and Scandinavian peoples” (Bannister/Hektoen 464).
The liberal-Jewish neurologist, Moriz Benedikt, Professor of Neurology 
at the University of Vienna at the fin de siècle, also linked the 
“American” quality of life with the appearance of hysteria, a disease 
which is accepted by him as “a uniquely feminine nervous disease”—in 
men. (Die Seelenkunde des Menschen als reine Erfahrungswissenschaft 186–
87; 223–26; It is remarkable that only Jewish physicians in Vienna dealt 
with the question of male hysteria before and including Freud.) It is the 
struggle for life in the city which causes the madness of the male Jew. 
According to Cecil F. Beadles: “Mental anxiety and worry are the most 
frequent causes of mental breakdown. They are all excitable and live 
excitable lives, being constantly under the high pressure of business in 
town” (736). The reason for this inability to cope with the stresses of 
modern life lies in “hereditary influences,” i.e., in their being Jews.10 
And their “Jewishness” is a sign of their being out of their correct space. 
For they are ill, “like many orientals (e. g., Mohammedans) who have a 
disposition to hysteria” (Weygandt 32).
Benedickt needs to argue against the equation of race and madness 
(Benedikt “The Insane Jew. An Open Letter to Dr. C. F. Beadles”). 
For the “insanity of the Jew” is one of the risks which all Jews would 
have to face. In a detailed answer to Beadles, he presents a convoluted 
and complex argument about the special status of the nervousness of 
the Jew. He accepts the reality of Beadle’s charge. It is not, however, 
a quality over which “evolution has no power … [and] which is deeply 
rooted in the organism”. Benedickt counters this by arguing against the 
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uniformity of the Jews as a race and sees the origin of the mental illness 
of the Jews in the external social pressures “in times of exile, dispersion, 
and persecution”. The Jews are not really even a nation, for “the first 
condition necessary for a nation is a common language”. “Other 
nations could find an outlet for their passions and emotions in outward 
actions; the Jews found an outlet for them usually at the expense of 
health, and so became more and more neurotic”. This neurosis resulted 
in “excessive sexual intercourse, intra matrimonium” and caused the 
“hysterical aphonia, in endemic form,… [which] are very frequent in 
Jews, male and female”. This has caused “neurologists all over the world 
[to be] interested in the number, intensity, and variety of cases seen 
amongst the Jews”. The lost language of the Jews, the inability to speak 
any tongue flawlessly, marks the Jews as ill. But what does Benedikt see 
as the cause of the madness of the Jews. Their “ill-treatment and cruelty 
to…which they have been subjected”. This even explains to him why 
Jews, who have a lower incidence of “syphilis and drunkenness”, also have 
a higher rate of general paralysis. For it is therefore clear that syphilis 
cannot be the cause of the general paralysis of the insane, luetic tabes. 
Rather it is the result of social factors. With acculturation new nervous 
diseases afflict the Jews. Jewish women, “formerly pampered neurotic 
individuals,” now became “eccentric.… Very many of them became, by 
reason of superficial learning, actually perverse”. “They quickly entered 
into the modern economic contest with all its fatal consequences as 
regards nervous integrity”. Benedikt’s model, as is clear from all of his 
examples, is the Eastern Jew, hampered by his ghetto experience.11 And 
it is Yiddish which for Benedikt is the marker of Jewish mental illness. 
The “so-called” language, Yiddish, with its coarse gestures, seems to 
have a magical quality which seems to prevent the acculturation of the 
Eastern Jews and which prolongs their risk of mental illnesses. Indeed, 
Theodor Reik pointed out that Eastern Jews communicated as much 
with “gestures and …facial expressions, the rise and fall of the voice of 
the story-teller” as with words (Reik 33–34).
Sigmund Freud struggles with this notion of predisposition in his pivotal 
paper on “Heredity and the Etiology of the Neuroses”, first written 
and published in French in 1896. In it he attempted to dislodge this 
understanding of a social trauma as the origin of hysteria. This paper 
marked his break with Jean Martin Charcot (who had died three years 
earlier) and Charcot’s view that hysteria was an inherited phenomenon. 
Freud dismissed the primacy of the inherited disposition for hysteria 
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(such as attributed by Charcot to the Jews). He stressed the deference 
between a “similar heredity” which always produces the same diseases 
with the same signs and symptoms (such as Huntington’s chorea) and 
those diseases with a “dissimilar heredity”, which produce seemingly 
unrelated illness with a myriad of signs and symptoms (Freud, referred 
as SE, here 3: 145). For the latter sources other than inheritance must be 
sought. In his search for the etiology of such psychopathologies, Freud 
further distinguished between “preconditions” (i.e., heredity) and 
“specific causes” of a disease. Both are necessary to create similar disease 
profiles, while the more general “concurrent causes” are sufficient but 
not necessary. Freud employed the model of the continuum which he 
employed in his model of “bisexuality”—he sees “preconditions” and 
“specific causes” on a spectrum; as one decreases in importance, the 
other increases. It is the totality which produces the illness, just as the 
individual may be more or less male or female, the totality making up 
the entire personality structure. 
Freud dismissed as marginal all of those “concurrent causes” which 
had been used to explain the existence of neurosis (in Jews as well as 
others): “emotional disturbance, physical exhaustion, acute illness, 
intoxications, traumatic accidents, intellectual overwork, etc.” (SE 3: 
148). Thus he also rejected the claim that psychopathologies such as 
neurasthenia are the “fruits of our modern civilization”. He found the 
roots of these neuroses in early sexual experience: “these functional 
pathological modifications have as their common source the subject’s sexual 
life, whether they lie in a disorder of his contemporary sexual life or in important 
events in his past life” (SE 3: 149). Freud makes these “sexual disorders” 
the primary cause of neuroses; heredity is a peripheral cause.
Freud proposes two sets of differential diagnoses: He distinguished 
between neurasthenia, the product of masturbation or “a sexual 
constitution analogous to what is brought about in a neurasthenic as a 
result of masturbation”, and anxiety neurosis, the result of “abstinence, 
unconsummated genital excitation …, coition which is imperfect or 
interrupted…, sexual efforts which exceed the subject’s psychical 
capacity, etc.” (SE 3: 150–51). He also differentiated between hysteria 
and obsessional neurosis: the former caused by “some event of the 
subject’s sexual life appropriate for the production of a distressing 
emotion”; the latter caused by such “an event which has given pleasure” 
(SE 3: 155). The pleasure in the sexual act is different for the male and 
for the female: for the male pleasure is the result of the aggressive desire 
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of experienced sexuality; for the female, the enjoyment generated by 
the sexual act.
Both hysteria and obsessional neurosis are caused by real events, 
remembered physical contact with the child’s genitalia. Hysteria is the 
result of “passive sexuality, an experience submitted to with indifference 
or with a small degree of annoyance or fright” (SE 3: 155). This event 
is real to the sufferer, not as an event in the past, but “…as though it 
were a contemporary event” (SE 3: 154). The living of a life in the present 
which has been marked in the past (either past of the individual or the 
group) by trauma is the basic explanatory model for the present state of 
the difference of the Jews. Thus, Freud concludes, what appears to be 
hereditary in the acute symptoms of patients, such as the occurrence 
of “a pair of neurotic patients” in the same family, proves to be a “pair 
of little lovers in their earliest childhood—the man suffering from 
obsessions and the woman from hysteria. If they are brother and sister, 
one might mistake for a result of nervous heredity what is in fact the 
consequence of precocious experience” (SE 3: 156). Here Freud has 
gendered the differential diagnosis—the female is passive or frightened; 
the male feels pleasure.
Yet Freud’s dismissal of heredity as the cause of the neurosis provides 
a rationale for restructuring the concept of trauma, removing it from 
the world of daily life and centering it in the world of the sexual. Jews 
no longer will suffer from such symptoms of neurasthenia as “flatulent 
dyspepsia, constipation, or sexual weakness” (SE 3: 150; to list only a 
few of the traditional “Jewish” symptoms which appear on Freud’s list of 
neurasthenic symptoms) purely because of their heredity, but because 
of sexual practices, such as masturbation, which are universal rather 
than particularistically Jewish. By moving hysteria to the realm of the 
incestuous, Freud eliminates the trauma of circumcision, the most 
evident “precocious experience of sexual relations with actual excitement of the 
genitals, resulting from sexual abuse committed by another person” from the 
etiology of neurosis (SE 3: 152). Circumcision is clearly understood as 
“frightening” within much of the medical literature opposed to it and 
within the complicated literature on metsitsah during the fin de siècle. 
Incest, especially brother-sister incest, is yet another charge brought 
regularly against the Jews as the etiology for specific forms of somatic 
and mental illnesses. But it is the removal of circumcision from the 
category of the causative factors for mental illness by dismissing the 
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arguments about the heredity of mental illness (or its disposition) and 
the stress on the specific nature of sexual trauma, as opposed to other 
traumatic factors, which lies at the heart of Freud’s final dismissal of 
Charcot and Charcot’s model of hysteria. Freud’s view was clearly 
a minority voice, as C. H. Hughes noted about Freud’s paper on the 
“Etiology of Hysteria” (1896): “Hysteria, whatever its exciting causes, 
whether in the premature or over sexual, grief, disappointment or other 
psychoneural sources of depression and exhausting excitation, is usually 
bad neuropathic endowment, dormant at birth but ready—prepared 
like the lucifer match—for flame when rightly struck. Herr Sigmond 
[sic] Freud should try again” (cited from Kiell 36).
And he does try again. In 1897 Freud abandoned his trauma theory of 
neurosis. He realized that it was not the specific experiences of a select 
(but extensive) group of individuals whom Freud was treating, but rather 
a reflex of human development which he was seeing. He was observing 
the results of the fantasy of maltreatment rather than maltreatment 
itself. Freud separated these two moments though continuing to see a 
linkage between the empirical and fantasy in his own empirical studies 
on fantasy. Freud simultaneously elides and displaces the distinction 
between real events and fantasy. Freud’s position was that of the 
racial biologist who saw the factors of Jewish identity as signs of the 
racial nature of the Jews. It is unimportant whether these qualities are 
understood as “inherited” (i.e., congenital) or “acquired” (but now an 
aspect of the genotype). Through this mechanism Freud hopes to free 
Jews, such as himself and his father, from the charge of being diseased, 
of lying, of being corrupt and corrupting.
In 1895, Freud evolved a four-fold formula to describe the origin of 
neurosis, based on Aristotle’s four-fold analysis of causality. Needed 
was 1) a precondition 2) specific cause 3) concurrent cause and 4) 
precipitating cause (SE 3: 135–36). The precondition was the existing 
disposition to disease, a disposition either acquired or innate. The 
specific causes, such as the seduction of the child, led to the specific 
symptom formation, like the “globus hystericus”. The “concurrent 
causes”, such as overwork or exhaustion, are seen as less important but 
as having a contributory role in the appearance of the neurosis. The 
actual precipitating cause was simply the final trigger which occurred 
before the symptoms became evident.
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This model was certainly sufficient to explain the mental illnesses of 
the Jews. The precondition was either the inheritance of the Jews or 
precipitating diseases such as syphilis; the specific cause the “2000 
years of oppression”, the concurrent cause the “overwork” and “stresses 
of civilization”, and whatever individual precipitating cause could be 
found in each individual case.
But Freud needed to discount the role of degeneracy, of “pathogenic 
heredity”, as it “left no room for the acquisition of nervous disease” (SE 
3: 23). It also meant that all Jews, including Sigmund Freud, were at risk 
of specific forms of mental illness. His answer was to see the inheritance 
of trauma, following a Lamarckian model, as the source of disease, 
rather than some vague “Jewish predisposition to mental illness”. 
What was originally sufficient (the specific cause) became necessary in 
Freud’s revision of the etiology of neurosis. Trauma becomes the cause 
of neurosis.
Once “real” seduction is abandoned as the source of hysteria, and the 
source of neurosis is seen as lying in the fantasy of the Oedipal struggle, 
then the reality of this model is drawn into question. In order to 
universalize the Jewish physical predisposition to illness, Freud evolved 
his own theory of the relationship between constitution and neurosis. 
He developed the law of the etiological complemental series, the idea 
that constitution and trauma complement one another: the weaker the 
constitution, the less the trauma needed to create a neurosis. Seeking 
after the meaning of trauma, Freud restructured his presentation of the 
etiology of neurosis. In the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916–
17), Freud stressed the etiological significance of 1) hereditary (and 
primal) dispositions 2) infantile impressions and 3) adult experiences 
(SE 16: 362). It is in the clinical significance of phylogeny as a universal 
source of the predisposition to neurosis that Freud remains adamant. 
“Real” trauma lies in the universal past of all human beings, not solely in 
the Jewish experience in the Diaspora.12 Here degeneracy is abandoned 
and the inheritance of acquired characteristics becomes a means of 
moving the Jews into the mainstream of the neurosis.
On December 5, 1906, this topic came up for discussion at the Viennese 
Psychoanalytic Society following a paper on Wilhelm Stekel’s theory of 
the origin of nervousness. Isidor Sadger commented “on the widespread 
occurrence of nervousness (especially obsessional neurosis and hysteria) 
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among the Polish Jews” (Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, 
op. cit., 1: 70; translation from Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, 
op. cit., 1: 73).
The cause of this is the “Jew’s addiction to rumination… [which] has 
been characteristic of the for thousands of years”. It is the inheritance 
of specific forms of a “common mental construction” which lies at 
the heart of the Jew’s predisposition to mental illness (Protokolle 1: 
93; translation from Minutes 1: 98). The view that the Eastern Jew was 
essentially at risk of hysteria permeated even the discussion of this circle 
of mainly Eastern European Jews, transplanted to Vienna. They saw, not 
themselves at risk, but “those” Eastern Jews, an abstraction which they 
distanced from their own persona.
In Charcot’s clinic there was an often-stated assumption that Jews, 
especially Jews from the East, were at great risk of mental illness (see 
Goldstein). This view was shared in the general culture of the time. 
Following the collapse of the Catholic Union Generale Bank in 1882 
there was a great rise in public anti-Semitism. In the spring of 1886, 
as a result of Eduoard Drumont’s best seller, La France juive, appeared 
perhaps the most important French anti-Semitic tractate. Drumont 
cited psychological statistics to show that Jews, especially Jews from 
the East, were most at risk of mental illness and, therefore, presented a 
social danger to the French body politic. And he cited statements made 
by Charcot “in his lectures in the Salpêtrière” quite directly.13
No wonder that Jewish scientists such as Jacobs, Fishberg, and Freud—
in very different ways—sought to find the hysteric outside of their own 
immutable self-image. For that image was within the biology of race. 
This consistency of character, with its deviant sexual nature, leads to 
the disease which marks the Jew—hysteria. The etiology of the Jew’s 
hysteria, like the hysteria of the woman, was to be sought in “sexual 
excess” (Beadles 732). Specifically in the “incestuous” inbreeding of this 
endogenous group: “Being very neurotic, consanguineous marriages 
among Jews cannot but be detrimental to the progeny” (Fishberg 
349). And the converse is also true: “The excessive tendency to the 
neuroses [among] …the Jews, [results] from their mode of life and 
consanguineous marriages through long centuries”.14 Jews (especially 
male Jews) are sexually different; they are hysterical and their gaze 
reveals it.
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Race is but one category in the visualization of the hysteric which 
played a role in shaping the image of the hysteric during the nineteenth 
century. For the construction of seeing the hysteric took many different 
forms in providing a composite image of the hysteric, an image in bits 
and snatches, an image which revealed the “truth” about the hysteric’s 
difference from him- or herself.
In the course of the 1890s Freud abandoned much of the work of the 
anti-Semitic Charcot15—for whom Jews, as the essential “moderns”, 
were at special risk as hysterics—and entered his new alliance with 
the provincial Jew Hippolyte Bernheim (Morgan 268–72). Much of 
this is worked out in Freud’s French-language paper on the meaning 
of heredity for the etiology of hysteria (1896). Such a movement is 
paralleled to the abandonment of ideas of trauma—still for Charcot the 
cause of hysteria (in women as well as in Jews) and its replacement with 
the etiology of hysteria in the psyche. As Freud states:
For [the physician] will be able to convince himself of the correctness 
of the assertions of the school of Nancy [Bernheim] at any time on 
his patients, whereas he is scarcely likely to find himself in a position 
to confirm from his own observation the phenomena described by 
Charcot as “major hypnotism,” which seem only to occur in a few 
sufferers from grande hysterie (SE 1: 98).
It is the scientific “observation”, the gaze of the Jew rather than the gaze 
directed at the Jew, which marks the distinction between Bernheim 
and Charcot. Freud’s “conversion” to Bernheim’s mode of seeing the 
“usual” rather than seeing the “unique” also marks the beginning of 
his rejection of reducing the origin of hysteria to the single, traumatic 
event.
But what does “trauma” mean? One meaning relates it to the debate 
about congenital circumcision and the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. To trace the meaning of trauma means seeing the 
reason the Eastern European Jew appears as an hysteric (or, perhaps 
more accurately, the provincial Jew as parvenu, out of his mind because 
he is out of his natural place). It is the discourse on the relationship 
between “trauma” and “hysteria” which provides the key to Freud’s—
and many of his contemporaries’—ambivalence concerning models for 
therapy.
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All human beings become inventors of their own past. All trauma is 
part of the universal experience of growth and development. The 
Jews’ rationale that their illness is the result of two thousand years 
of persecution becomes no more important than any other claims 
of trauma. It ends the inheritance of the acquired trauma of Jewish 
experience and makes it part of the origin of that which makes all 
human beings human. In the famous letter of September 21, 1897 Freud 
admitted to Fliess “I no longer believe in my neurotica.…” (Masson 264–
66; hereafter Freud-Fliess). For believing in the reality of trauma would 
mean “…in all cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused 
of being perverse”. Freud abandoned a system which demands mimetic, 
psychic representation of reality for one which sees the psyche as the 
place for the play of fantasy. He abandoned the act of seeing difference. 
And yet he clearly never abandoned the status of science associated with 
that manner of seeing. For as much as Freud was aware of the problems 
of positivistic epistemology, the status of the scientific gaze overcame his 
sense of its limitations.
Notes
1 This is the “myth” which Frank Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind (New 
York; Basic, 1979), p. 592 wishes to identify as “Myth One,” the primal myth, 
in Freud’s falsification of his own history. It is clear that this (and the other 
“myths”) are fascinating insights into Freud’s understanding of his own 
career and provide the material for interpretation, not censure.
2 Freud, Sigmund. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, edited and translated by J. Strachey, A. Freud, A. Strachey, 
and A. Tyson, 24 vols. Hogarth, 1955–1974, referred to as SE, here 20: 15. On 
the background and meaning of male hysteria, see Mark Micale, “Charcot 
and the Idea of Hysteria in the Male: Gender, Mental Science, and Medical 
Diagnosis in late Nineteenth-Century France.” Medical History, vol. 34, 1990, 
pp. 363–411. Micale does not link the question of the gender specificity of 
hysteria to that of race.
3 See the comments by the neurologists Theodor Sommers and Alfred Hoche 
quoted in the Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Wochenschrift, vol. 12, 1910, p. 128.
4 Schnitzler, Arthur. Medizinische Schriften, edited by Horst Thomé. Vienna: 
Paul Zsolnay, 1988, pp. 75–80. There are other accounts of this talk which 
supplement this report, see Sulloway, p. 38.
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5 Fishberg, Maurice. The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment, New York: 
Walter Scott, 1911, p. 6. Compare his statement in The Jewish Encyclopedia,12 
volumes. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1904, “Nervous Diseases,” 9: 225–
27, here, p. 225: “Some physicians of large experience among Jews have even 
gone so far as to state that most of them are neurasthenic and hysterical.”
6 “La population israélite fournit à elle seule presque tout le contingent 
des hystériques mâles,” Fulgence Raymond, L’Étude des Maladies du Système 
Nerveux en Russie, Paris: O. Doin, 1889, p. 71.
7 Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, op. cit., 2: 40; translation 
from Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, op. cit., 2: 44.
8 Charcot, J. M. Leçons du Mardi a la Salpêtrière, op. cit., 2: 347–53; see the 
translation of the Poliklinische Vorträge, op. cit., 2: 299–304.
9 Meige, Henry. Étude sur certains néuropathes voyageurs: Le juif-errant à la 
Salpêtrière. Paris: L. Battaille et cie., 1893. On Meige and this text, see 
Jan Goldstein, “The Wandering Jew and the Problem of Psychiatric Anti-
semitism in Fin-de-Siècle France,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 20, 
1985, pp. 521–52. See the images and the discussion in Sander L. Gilman, 
The Jew’s Body. Routledge, 1991, pp. 60–103.
10 Hyde, Frank G. “Notes on the Hebrew Insane.” American Journal of 
Insanity, vol. 58, 1901–1902, p. 470. On the statistical background to the 
shift between the primarily German-Jewish population and the huge influx 
of Eastern European Jews into the United States, see John S. Billings, Vital 
Statistics of the Jews in the United States. Census Bulletin, No. 19, December 30, 
1890, pp. 23. This is based on a questionaire sent to 15,000 and responses 
received from 10,618 Jewish families (60,630 persons), whose names had 
been obtained from “rabbis and presidents of congregations.” This study 
showed that 227 Jews (116 men; 111 women) had died of “diseases of the 
nervous system” (including mental diseases: 18 men; 17 women) between 
1885–89. The “Jews have suffered a relatively greater loss than their 
neighbors by deaths from … disease of the nervous system… than the other 
peoples with whom they are compared” (p. 15). This report was condensed 
and published in a “popular” version as “Vital Statistics of the Jews.” North 
American Review, vol. 153, 1891, pp. 70–84.
11 Benedikt, Moritz. “Der geisteskranke Jude.” Nord und Süd, vol. 167, 1918, pp. 
266–70. This is also a detailed attack on Rafael Becker’s Zionist explanation 
of the mental illness of the Jews.
12 On the discussion of Jewish experience after the Shoah and the 
reintroduction of the question of trauma, see Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, 
Routledge, 1992.
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13 Drumont, Eduoard. La France juive: Essai d’histoire contemporaine, 2 vols. Paris: 
C. Marpon et E. Flammarion, 1886, 1: 105–106. On the complicated issue 
of the structure this argument and the Jewish response in the German-
speaking lands, see Gilman, Difference and Pathology, op. cit., pp. 150–62.
14 J. Mitchell Clarke, “Hysteria and Neurasthenia.” Brain, vol. 17, 1894, pp. 
118–78, here, p. 150. Freud cites this volume in SE 3: 74.
15 See the discussion in my Difference and Pathology, op.cit., pp. 150–162. See 
also Yves Chevalier, “Freud et l’antisemitisme – jalousie.” Amitié judéo-
chretienne de France, vol. 37, 1985, pp. 45–50.
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TRAUMATIC DANCES OF 
“THE NON-SELF”
Bodily Incoherence and the 
Hysterical Archive
Jonathan W. Marshall
an involuntary dance—it’s the dance you do when one of your 
fingers gets wedged in a live socket and your arms start pumping 
up and down and your mouth is slowly opening and closing 
and you can feel the power but no words will come out.
— Laurie Anderson, “Dance of Electricity” (1984)
In 1892, a hysteric being treated at Paris’ Salpêtrière hospital employed 
language very similar to that Luce Irigaray was to use to describe the 
position of woman in modern society. The patient, known only by the 
pseudonym of “H…”, declared herself to be “the self of the non-self [le moi 
du non-moi]” (Séglas 805). Between suffering from seizures, attacks, and 
ecstatic states, she felt herself “dash forward, I devour space without ever 
stopping” in an apparent effort to meet her other self (803–5). In these 
and other accounts, hysterical subjects seem almost to tear themselves 
apart, their psycho-corporeal performance so dispersing the individual 
as to render them incoherent. The hysteric has served for many artists 
as the paradigmatic example of a subject who is not singular, unified, 
or readily comprehensible. The Surrealist André Breton encountered 
H…’s peers while working at the Pitié-Salpêtrière complex. With Louis 
Aragon, he co-authored an essay illustrated with photographs from 
the wards in which they called hysteria “the greatest poetic discovery 
of the fin de siècle” (20). In these and other accounts, the female—or in 
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some cases male—hysteric was divided, fractured, and barely legible. 
Locating signs of hysteria-like choreography might therefore act as a 
heuristic for identifying moments where historical experience itself 
challenges language and representation. One might begin here to 
visualize performances of the incoherence of subjective experience and 
history itself. At times of socio-cultural crisis, the body’s forces spill over, 
instances of such eruptions revealing a lineage which joins otherwise 
distant historical moments. Bodily performance functions here less 
as a sign and more as a symptom, a dialectical manifestation of psycho-
corporeal conflict.
Joseph Roach argues that humans possess a “kinesthetic imagination” 
which is expressed through various “performance genealogies”, 
constituted by those bodily movements and practices which are shared 
and transmitted across time. Such performances serve as:
mnemonic reserves, including patterned movements made and 
remembered by bodies, residual movements retained implicitly in 
images or words (or in the silences between then), and imaginary 
movements dreamed in minds (26).
Hysteria and its choreography constitute such a performance archive, 
a deeply material, gendered history which is directly manifested 
via the muscular action and spasmodic extremes of flesh, bone, and 
limb (Fig. 1). As Joan Scott observes, gender is “a primary way of 
signifying relationships of power” and has been “invoked to mobilize 
constituencies, to tar enemies, to put groups and individuals in their 
place” (“Gender” 1067, “Unanswered Questions” 1423). Gender is 
inculcated throughout history, culture, and politics, and the hysteric is 
a commonly cited bellwether of crises in society. H…’s contemporary, 
Hippolyte Taine, went so far as to describe the French Revolution as 
an instance of “group hysteria”, while later historians have shown that 
women in Weimar Germany occupied an ambivalent, unstable social 
position, caught between metropolitan mobility and ongoing demands 
of domestic femininity (Micale 207; Hales). The highly visible “Girlkultur” 
of young office workers and their peers came to be viewed either as 
exhilarating signs of liberation or as indicators of decline and hysterical 
modernity. Similar gendered critiques circulated within interwar Japan 
as well as France, both before the Great War and after (Mackie; Gilman 
et al).
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The hysteriform archive constitutes a set of bodily gestures and actions 
that recur across history, tending to emerge in the context of social 
crises within which gender and other factors have been implicated. 
Surveying the hysterical archive demonstrates how hysteriform poses 
and gestures initially visible within early modern demonical possession, 
exorcism, and religious ecstasy moved into the medical sphere during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, becoming a significant 
resource for international performing artists of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In examining these shifts, I do not wish to simply 
read back hysteria as a sign of something else, as scholars in the Freudian 
tradition have sometimes done. H…’s patient records are revealing here, 
since they show the utility of a psychoanalytic reading of hysteria which 
identifies the root causes in gendered personal and social repression, 
while corporeally exceeding what psychoanalysis can fully account 
for. H… was a troubled young university student, dismissed by male 
doctors, before going to the specialist department at the Salpêtrière. 
Although this was the base for the leading international authority in 
1.  Table of hysterical gestures (Richer Études cliniques la grande hystérie. 1885; 
courtesy of Harvard Medical Library in the Francis A. Countway Library of 
Medicine)
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hysteria, neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (with whom Sigmund Freud 
studied), H… was treated by Jules Séglas, a former student of Salpêtrière 
psychiatrist Jean-Pierre Falret. Séglas published on hallucination, 
hypnotic fugue, and automatism, all of which were diagnostic features 
of hysteria. Séglas supported Charcot’s attempts to have unlicensed 
presentations of hypnosis banned. Though influenced by Charcot, 
Séglas’ different disciplinary position meant we have a detailed account 
of H…’s condition in her own words. Charcot by contrast was more 
materialist, his abundantly illustrated patient records focusing on 
tissues and their visible action, particularly gestures and seizures.
I propose to follow Charcot in conducting a dramaturgical analysis, 
examining the choreography of historical subjects who exhibit 
hysterical motions, and the context within which such corporeal forms 
arise—the discursive and historical mise en scène, if you will. Viewed in 
material and corporeal terms, gestures do not categorically identify the 
performer as “hysterical” as such. This reflects the uncertain status of 
hysteria. The diagnosis is only very rarely employed today, and even fin 
de siècle hysteria was seen as a semi-fictional performance, a functional 
disorder of neuromotor action which mimicked transitory physical 
signs of other diseases normally caused by tissue damage or other non-
hysterical agents.1 Jean-Pierre Falret’s son Jules, who also worked at the 
Salpêtrière, claimed that hysterics were:
veritable actresses; they do not know a greater pleasure than to 
deceive […] Hysterics exaggerate their convulsive movements (which 
are often partly simulated), as much as they dress up [travestissent] 
and exaggerate all of the movements of their souls, their ideas and 
their deeds (502–3).
Charcot concurred, using the term “neuromimesis” to describe how 
the hysterical body could, like an artwork, mimetically reproduce other 
functionally distinct conditions (vol. 3, p. 16). The very words used to 
describe the hysterical body and its seizures—epileptoid, choretic, 
clownism, acrobatic—reflect these representational echoes. Hysteria 
could be recognized by its corporeal similitude to, but non-identity with, 
epilepsy. Charcot employed the phrase hysterioepilepsy to make clear 
he considered seizure the chief diagnostic feature of hysteria. Although 
psychiatrists like Séglas focused more on psychological symptoms than 
their neurologist peers, psychiatric, parascientific, and lay accounts from 
TRAUMATIC DANCES OF “THE NON-SELF” 65
the eighteenth to the early twentieth century routinely made reference 
to disorderly neuromuscular tremors, intermittent spasms, or “fits” of 
laughing, shaking, and crying which overtook the body, sometimes as 
“prodromes” or a precursor “aura” (Fig. 2), which might then give way 
to trance and dissociated states. Commentators also regularly classified 
hysterical spasms as “choretic”, resembling chorea, yet another disease 
whose title marked it as a condition characterized by movements which 
were dance-like, but which vexed the clarity and repeatability of dance 
proper—a non-choreography if you will.2 Additional parallels were 
drawn between hysterical poses and athletic acts such as the tumbling 
and mugging of clowns (Gordon). The hysteriform archive consistently 
confused non-pathological, intentional, and semi-intentional perfor-
mances with those of involuntary pathology. Indeed Alfred Binet 
claimed that it was a question of degree rather than a clear distinction 
between the actor who was able to “duplicate himself in the theatre”, 
and so critically observe and control their own performance, versus the 
hypnotized hysteric, who was consumed by a veritable “paroxysm” of 
corporeal and subjective displacement (542–44).
Tracing the filiations of the hysteriform body across the historical 
record, one crisscrosses a set of trajectories running from seventeenth-
2.  Prodromes (Richer Études cliniques 
sur la grande hystérie. 1885; 
courtesy of Harvard Medical Library 
in the Francis A. Countway Library 
of Medicine)
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century demoniacal possession—retrospectively diagnosed by Charcot 
as hysterical—through to twentieth-century avant-garde dance, from 
various European artists between the wars who consulted or were 
influenced by neurological writings, back to the actual patients of 
Charcot and his peers, and on to the Japanese avant-garde dance form 
of butoh.
Three scenes might serve to illustrate the widespread iteration of 
hysteria-like performances across time and space. The first comes from 
the epidemic of demoniacal possession which afflicted the town of 
Loudon, France, between 1632 and 1637. The second report is of seizures 
recorded in Charcot’s wards in the 1880s by the artist and physician, 
Paul Richer. The third comes from photographs and writings published 
alongside scholar Jean Baudrillard’s account of early performance of 
butoh in Paris from 1985. A witness from Loudon claimed that the 
afflicted nuns he observed had:
passed from a state of quiet into the most terrible convulsions, and 
without the slightest increase of pulsation. They struck their chests 
and backs with their heads, as if they had had their neck broken, and 
with inconceivable rapidity; they twisted their arms at the joints of 
the shoulder, the elbow and the wrist two or three times round; lying 
on their stomachs they joined the palms of their hands to the soles 
of their feet; their faces became so […] frightful one could not bear 
to look at them; their eyes remained open without winking; their 
tongues issued suddenly from their mouths, horribly swollen […] 
[and] hard […] they threw themselves back till their heads touched 
their feet, and walked in this position with wonderful rapidity […] 
They uttered [mostly non-verbal] cries so horrible and so loud that 
nothing like it was ever heard before (Des Niau 36–45).
In Charcot’s wards, Richer observed:
After the tonic convulsions, the patient is soon immobilized by 
muscular tetanization taken to its height.
 […] The position of the patient thus immobilized is variable, 
most often it is in full extension and the supine position.
 The head is thrown backwards, the neck swollen to the highest 
degree, the veins form prominent ropes. The patient is strongly 
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cyanotic, the face also becomes puffy and its features are contracted 
and motionless.
 Foam appears on the lips. The arms are extended in adduction 
and outside rotation, the wrist flexed, the fist closed; sometimes 
both hands, brought to the middle of the body, touch each other 
by their backs and even cross each other. The lower limbs are also 
in extension, the knees strongly applied against each other, and the 
feet in the pied-bot position, turned inwards or outwards (50–51).
Photographs of Murobushi Koh, Carlotta Ikeda, and their dancers 
show them grimacing, tongues twisted and contorted, eyes rolling 
back in their sockets (Rancilio, ed.).3 Bodies collapse on the ground 
and the muscles of the back tighten to cause an extreme arch (Fig. 3). 
Hands and feet claw or ball up, as in the pied bot pose mentioned by 
Richer above. Baudrillard characterizes these scenes as a “theatre of 
[…] convulsion” in which bodies are “twisted, electric […] whose limbs 
search for themselves.” Even “mucous membranes are turned outwards”, 
as in the gape of the jaws, or the exposure of the tissues behind the 
eyelid. When rendered immobile, bodies come to resemble non-human 
entities such as “pillars of salt”, or a hard, mineral-like cyst (“une gangue”; 
Marshall/Baudrillard).
3.  Murobushi Koh, The Mummy (Photo by Laurencine Lot, c.1985; courtesy of 
Laurencine Lot, Paris)
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Though dispersed across a period of over three hundred years and 
occurring in diverse cultural and historical contexts, the scenarios 
are remarkable for their choreographic similarities. In each, there is 
a tendency towards spasmodic fluctuations which leap from extreme 
contraction (clonic gesture) versus muscular extension (tonic, tetanic, 
opisthotonic). These oscillations between clonic and tonic states are 
unevenly distributed throughout the body, generating asymmetry, 
facial grimaces, and the distortion of lines, limbs, and poses. There is 
consequently a tendency towards twisting. These distortions often elicit 
comparisons with animals and non-human beings. Between the clonic 
and the tonic, the body is at times supine and relaxed. The subject may 
become hyper-sensitive and responsive, taking on outside influences 
(welts caused by demons, the touch of a doctor’s probe, or echoing 
actions from their surrounds). Bodies appear possessed, with apparently 
non-human or abnormal forces moving through them, temporarily 
lodging in diverse locations. The body becomes cataleptic, lethargic, 
and may produce involuntary actions or automatisms. At other times the 
hysterical body is rendered hard or rigid, coming to recall inanimate 
matter. Klaus Theweleit notes that a common trope of fascist literature 
and sculpture is to see the body as an all but impermeable armor against 
which subjectively threatening forces crash, fracture, and roll off. He 
sees this as a fundamentally hysterical or neurotic reaction to the fear 
of contamination and collapse. The tetanization of the body in hysteria, 
especially of the male body, has some of this character, and it is a trait 
that recurs within the work of the founder of butoh, Hijikata Tatsumi.
Poses such as those listed above are so striking as to be perceived 
by observers as being “dramatic” or “theatrical,” in that they project 
outwards towards possible audiences with considerable force. These are 
however scrambled messages—“electric” and shocked in the words of 
Baudrillard—the rapid shifts in direction and intensity making the 
specific content of the drama unclear at best. These performances 
do not conform to Aristotle’s rules of classical theatrical form, fitting 
neither tragedy, nor comedy, nor satire. They are closest to burlesque, or 
the imperfect and disrespectful echo of other forms and styles. Hijikata 
described the butoh dancer as a body on the edge of “crisis”, and this 
certainly applies to the examples above.
Georges Didi-Huberman argues that the fascination and pathos which 
hysteria provoked is a product of the contradictory forces latent within 
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the corporeal image itself (Invention 8–9). The dominant approach since 
the Renaissance has been to read the image as a legible symbol of 
something else, such as a real body, an incident, or a message. Didi-
Huberman however points to an alternative tradition in which images 
convey their own insufficiency, directing attention towards that which 
cannot be visualized (as in the representation of the divine) but which is 
nevertheless present at some level within the image—or, in hysteria’s 
case, something which passes through the body without entirely leaving 
it. Didi-Huberman provides the art historical example of how Fra 
Angelico’ fresco of The Annunciation is suffused with “the indescribable 
and unfigurable divine voice to which Angelico, like the Virgin, was 
obliged to submit completely” (Confronting 15). The image here becomes 
a paradoxical container for presence itself, no longer entirely separate 
from what it alludes to. Didi-Huberman traces a similar duplicity within 
the action of the hysterical body, which since the early modern period 
had been seen as an index for the presence of a materially recognizable, 
corporeal illness (hysteria). Hysteria however also externalizes, “dresses 
up”, and “deceives” the viewer (in Falret’s words), its internal causes 
remaining unclear at best, moving through those same parts of the body 
affected by other “real” illnesses, but not necessarily residing in these 
regions. This capacity of the hysterical body to generate forms, poses, 
and gestures renders hysterics as consummate artists, and their bodies 
as media, compared by commentators to automatons, marionettes, music 
boxes, and impressionable balls of wax or clay. The hysterical body also 
reproduced pre-existing representations, becoming what in semiotic 
terms is known as a simulacrum: a representation of a representation 
or, alternatively, a representation for which no known original can be 
identified. Hysterics both reproduced the actions of, and were likened 
by others to, figures taken from the history of literature, drama, and 
art. The patient Suzanne N…, for example, told Richer that she would 
“enter the Conservatoire” where “I will become like Sarah Bernhardt”, 
the leading French actress of the time (Richer 315). Richer, Charcot, 
Salpêtrière neurologist Guillaume Duchenne de Boulogne, and others 
compared the poses adopted by these subjects to those seen in famous 
paintings of saintly beatitude and possession, to the writhing dances 
of the Bacchants, Salome, and even Bernhardt’s own re-enactment of 
consumptive spasms. Bernhardt’s various performances had not only 
been influenced by her observation of hysterics and other sufferers at 
the Salpêtrière. Her voluntary, fictional reproduction of seizure became 
real and involuntary in the bodies of her audience, who “were seized by 
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an absolutely characteristic coughing reflex”, suffering from hysterical 
“contagion of [an] identical reflex movement” (Vigouroux/Juquelier 
29; Veyrac).
Didi-Huberman challenges historians to submit to the aporetic “not-
knowledge” contained within these bodily images, and to try to share the 
depicted subject’s own lack of certainty about themselves. One should 
follow H…, who admitted, “I do not know how to explain myself, I cannot 
find the terms”, and yet nevertheless recognized that “I have again 
two selves [individus], the one who sees and the one who acts” (Séglas 
805–6). “What then does a symptom ‘symbolize’”, Didi-Huberman asks? 
(Confronting 179) “It symbolizes events that have taken place”, but it also 
may allude to “events that have not taken place”, particularly in the case 
of hysterical trauma. A symptom not only signifies that which is present 
in the body—a disease, a disorder, a response to pain and suffering—
but also that which is latent and not fully present. Cathy Caruth similarly 
contends that traumatic symptoms arise out of:
an inherent latency within the [historical] experience itself […] And 
it is this inherent latency of the event that paradoxically explains the 
peculiar, temporal structure, the belatedness […] [the event] is not 
experienced as it occurs […] For a history to be a history of trauma 
means that it is referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully 
perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat differently, that a history 
can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence (187).
Didi-Huberman argues then that the symptom:
bears within it the three fundamental conditions of a withdrawal, 
a presented return of this withdrawal, and a fraught equivocation 
between the withdrawal and its presentation; such perhaps would be 
its elementary rhythm (Confronting 179).
In corporeal and performative terms, this means that hysterical symptoms 
are manifest through performances which literally shake and vibrate 
with this rhythm of traumatic manifestation and withdrawal. The art 
historian Aby Warburg (who quoted works of the Salpêtrière school in 
his own archival project, the Mnemosyne) called this the Pathosformel, by 
which he meant how certain ways of figuring the violent, often traumatic 
disturbances of the body recurred across art history, constituting both 
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a kind of “survival”, as well as a deformation or evolution of art and its 
forms (Didi-Huberman Atlas). As Didi-Huberman explains, “Here the 
symptom is understood as movement in [and across] bodies” (Michaud 15).
Although hysteriform attacks often included ecstatic periods, seizures 
were more commonly characterized by pain and suffering, as when H… 
returned to college only to endure “[a] loud scream, foam on the lips, 
nervous tremor requiring men to hold me back … then after, complete 
annihilation” (Séglas 804). An initial shock or trauma generally brought 
on the patient’s first fits, and the case histories record a sorry history of 
largely working class subjects who survived animal attacks, industrial 
accidents, childhood encounters with corpses, as well as sexual assaults 
at the hands of employers and others (Bourneville/Régnard IPS 1–3). 
Causative incidents were rarely singular, but commonly multiple, 
overdetermined, and hence impossible to logically or affectively 
disentangle. Geneviève Basile Legrand, for example, was a foundling 
from Loudon, given from a young age to violent “attacks of anger” 
which earned her many beatings. Her lover died when she was fifteen, 
leading Geneviève to throw herself into his grave (IPS 1:50–57). She 
was later found in a dissociated state at the cemetery. While working 
as a chambermaid, her master raped her, and she went back to the 
orphanage, giving up the child. In 1870–71, Geneviève survived the 
Siege of Paris and subsequent civil unrest, and had a second child with 
an invading soldier. She returned to the Salpêtrière, where Charcot 
took over her case. Désiré-Magloire Bourneville, who oversaw Charcot’s 
wards, noted that the attacks of Geneviève and her peers often included 
allusions of one kind or another to such occurrences, with the patient’s 
fits functioning as “reminiscences”, evoking in an abstract fashion 
the “physical pains of events which were the motivating cause of their 
attacks” (IPS 2:189). These included “scenes from the Revolution” and 
other incidents.
Hysteriform choreography therefore constituted a bodily eruption 
of non-sense generated by multiple antagonizing forces. In the case 
of demoniacal outbreaks of seventeenth-century France, the conflict 
between Protestantism and Counter Reformation led to the large-scale 
murder of Protestants in the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (1572). 
Several Protestant holdouts survived the Wars of Religion (1562–1598), 
including Loudon, which remained the fertile center of religious 
fervor. Michel de Certeau, Sarah Ferber, and others have shown that 
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the rash of possession cases which occurred across seventeenth-century 
France served as sites where conflicts between different ecclesiastical, 
lay, parlementary, legal, medical and royal authorities and their 
jurisdictional limits were played out (Sluhovsky; Marshman). Hysteria 
was regularly invoked as a contributing factor, or even an alternative 
diagnosis, to demoniacal possession. Exorcisms were performed in 
front of religious houses and for assembled guests, becoming a closely 
watched theater where the mastery of the male exorcist over the Devil, 
hiding in different parts of the women’s bodies, was repeatedly staged. 
The destructive effect of these events on the body and the mind is 
exemplified by how the leading exorcist Joseph Surin ended up drawing 
the malefic influence into his own body. Surin grew weak, had difficulty 
walking, and “agitations would seize me in all my limbs.” As with H…, 
he claimed that in these attacks, it was as if “two spirits do battle with 
each other in the same field that is the body; and the soul itself is as if 
divided” (de Certeau 207).
 Indeed, hysteria as an opaque, overdetermined cypher for wider 
social crises became an all but inescapable feature of interwar 
German culture. Siegfried Kracauer and Lotte Eisner point out that 
the stages and screens of Weimar Germany were rife with dangerous, 
demonic, or possessed hypnotists and their debilitated, emasculated 
somnambulistic victims, expressing a fear that modern life might be 
rendering individuals hysterical and degenerated. Artists in France, 
Germany, and beyond scoured lay and medical accounts of neurosis, 
hysteria and trance, as well as searching out therapies which could 
be employed to mitigate such phenomena. Figures such as Benjamin 
Christensen (director of the film The Witch, 1922), Émile Jacques-
Dalcroze (devisor of the Eurhythmic dance and one of Mary Wigman’s 
teachers), Marcel Duchamp, and Breton explicitly drew on the work 
of such Salpêtrière physicians as Paul Régnard, Paul Richer, Pierre 
Janet, and Joseph Babinski, respectively (Marshall “Priestesses” and 
“Archaeology”). Representations of hysterical behavior and nervous 
action were particularly communicated to artists via Spiritist writings, 
séances, and demonstrations. Key Spiritists reproduced neurological 
accounts in their own work, with Henry Olcott—co-founder of the 
Theosophical Society—visiting the Salpêtrière twice and introducing 
himself to Charcot (153–54). Highly respected neurologists such as 
Charles Richet and Albert von Schrenck-Notzing in turn oversaw 
mediumistic performances as part of their study into perception and 
hysterical sensitivity (Marshall “Kleist’s”).
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Modern dance for its part evolved out of the sports and physical 
hygiene movement, with rhythmic dancing promoted as a spiritual and 
corporeal therapy (Toepfer). The German body had been traumatized 
by defeat and wartime scarcity, only to be further assaulted by the trials 
of rapid modernization. Social upheavals, industrial rhythms, and 
radical changes in gender relations rendered modernity a bracing but 
highly problematic socio-cultural condition. Charcot and his colleagues 
also used gymnastic therapy on their patients, with Richer being 
particularly closely linked to those promoting athletics and corporeal 
hygiene (Marshall “Theatre”). Charcot and his students tended to see 
asymmetrical movements and irregular rhythmic choreography as 
pathological, retrospectively diagnosing not only demoniacs as hysterics, 
but also Ancient Bacchic dancers and other entranced performers, 
including the priestesses of Apollo at the Delphic Oracle, all of whom 
typically exhibited an initial seizure when otherworldly forces moved 
through their bodies (Marshall “Priestesses”). In contrast, German, 
Austrian, and Swiss dancers and musicians of the interwar period 
shared a virtual obsession with the “Dionysian” ideal represented by 
such phenomena, with Dalcroze, Wigman, Laban, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Richard Wagner, and many others celebrating Greek ritual performance 
as a precedent for their own projects of cultural and corporeal renewal. 
Dark times demanded violent, even hysterical, responses.
The method employed by the influential choreographer Mary Wigman 
was particularly close to a form of willed hysteria. She repeatedly styled 
herself as a witch or demon, as in Witch Dance II (1926), in which the 
performer seemed possessed by the rough, angular mask which she 
wore. Laura McLary notes that Wigman insisted that “the performing 
and creating dancer must necessarily split from herself, thereby creating 
a second de-personalized other” (352). Onlookers described Wigman’s 
dance as “wild”, “electrically charged”, “a mad frenzy”, “torturous” 
and “dionysiac.” There was a virtual “dislocation of the joints” before 
the body “trembles”. Hands and arms “claw the air, the body drags” 
(359–362; Toepfer 109; Dixon). She becomes “grotesque”. Wigman 
herself claimed that her performances came out of an “alien body” 
within which she staged a hallucinatory confrontation with her other 
self (Mary 98). “I shuddered at my own image”, she related (Language 
41), describing dance as a spatial and corporeal conflict similar to that 
which H… endured:
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Then, as if the space wanted to reach for her [the dancer], it pushes 
her backward on a newly created path: counter-direction: a play 
of up and down, of backward and forward, a meeting with herself, 
battling for space within space: DANCE (Mary 121).
In her epic piece Totenmal (1930), Wigman even adopted the 
opisthotonic arc en cercle position identified by Charcot in hysterical 
seizure, describing how she produced an almost “superhuman tension” 
along her spine, and “[o]nly then when the back of the head touched 
the floor […] The back gave in, the arms fell limp” (Language 98). A 
similar extreme arch of the back featured in Dance of Suffering (1930), 
with Wigman adopting a pose which closely paralleled that seen in 
various depictions of exorcism and Dionysian performance (Manning 
111; Marshall “Priestesses”; Fig. 4). Nor was Wigman alone in adopting 
such hysteriform gestures. Valaska Gert insisted that true dance arose 
only when the performer “experiences the whole convulsion”, while 
Anita Berber was said to have “moved in jerks and disconnected jumps” 
such as one might see in hysterical paralysis or athetosis (Elswit “Berlin” 
81–87). Harald Kreutzberg—a student of Wigman’s who toured Japan 
in 1934—devised a number of solos in which he played the role of a 
possessed fool, once appearing as a wandering peasant suffering from 
choreomania whose compelling gestures initiated an epidemic of 
hysterical dancing in the populace (Marshall “World” 80).
Butoh was strongly influenced by these precedents, and emerged out 
of a similar context. Japanese psychiatry was dominated by German 
neurobiological models, with once common shamanic rituals of “fox 
possession”, or the contagious eejanaika choreomania outbreaks of the 
mid nineteenth century, being interpreted as signs of a problematic 
eruption or depletion of “nerve force” (Frühstück; Harding et al; 
Marshall “World” 79–80). Like Wigman, Hijikata and his peers in Japan 
attempted to transfer these energies to their own dance.
The first performance to be explicitly labeled “butoh” was Forbidden 
Colors (1959). The piece featured the former prisoner of war and athletics 
teacher Ohno Kazuo, his son Ohno Yoshito, and Hijikata himself. Both 
Ohno senior and Hijikata traced their dance education back to Wigman 
and her peers, including Dalcroze and the Spiritist choreographers 
Rudolf Steiner and Marie von Sivers (Elswit “What” 134-35). In Forbidden 
Colors, Hijikata played the role of a shuddering figure who sexually 
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menaced Yoshito while holding a writhing, live chicken between his 
legs. Hijikata had relocated in 1952 to Tokyo where, partly by choice 
and partly out of financial necessity, he settled at the margins of society. 
The dancer frequented the docks, brothels, bars, and bombed-out ruins 
left behind in the increasingly frenetic rush towards modernity and 
4.  Mary Wigman, Dance of Suffering (1930; image from Fernand Divoire 
(1883-1951), Pour la danse. Paris: Éditions de la danse, 1935: 196-7, orphan work, 
private collection)
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urban reconstruction. Hijikata fasted in order to present a frighteningly 
emaciated body for his landmark performance of Hijikata Tatsumi and 
the Japanese People: Rebellion of the Body (1968), while in 1960 he claimed 
that his dance was produced from his status as an individual rendered 
“completely impotent” by the privations of his life in the immediate 
post-war environment. The “springs in my legs weakened in the ‘dance 
of sterilization’”, he went on. “Swaying legs are now a technique of 
my dance” (Hijikata 39). A force akin to an electrical discharge had 
leapt from “an insulator” and “scorched” his skin “pitch black”, before 
energizing his damaged body (Sas 36–37). Ohsuka Isamu, who founded 
the butoh company Byakkosha in 1976, arrived in Tokyo in 1968, when 
there were large-scale demonstrations against the ANPO US-Japanese 
military defense pact. It was also the year in which Rebellion of the Body 
premiered. Ohsuka was born to survivors in Hiroshima in the year of 
the nuclear attack, while Tanaka Min recalls being born on the night of 
the devastating Tokyo firebombing (Holborn 88; Marshall “Dancing”). 
All of the butoh artists were affected by the war one way or another.
Not unlike their German predecessors, post-war Japanese cultural 
commentators saw their task as one of corporeal reconstruction. In 
1947, the novelist Tamura Taijiro claimed:
The distrust of “thought” is complete. We now believe in nothing 
but our own bodies […] The body’s weariness, the body’s desires, 
the body’s anger, the body’s intoxications, the body’s confusion, the 
body’s fatigue—only these constitute reality (Slaymaker 93).
For Tamura, it was by passing through this traumatized “gate of 
flesh” that one might seek relief. Reacting against the increasingly 
Americanized post-war environment, Hijikata offered the image of:
a naked body [which] has come into the gun port. The naked body 
is bleeding […] I make repairs to arms and legs, which constantly go 
astray […] my dance shares a common basis with crime, [and] male 
homosexuality […] because it explicitly flaunts its aimlessness in the 
face of […] [modern] capitalist society (44).
Butoh refashioned the gendered corporeal forms which modernism 
and the war had elicited, but it did not so much simply heal or render 
healthy these forms—as Ohno did in his other role as a gymnastics 
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instructor. Rather butoh reconfigured these hysteriform tropes as a 
corporeal archive for a forceful new aesthetic. Recalling the premiere of 
Forbidden Colors, Hijikata reflected that “[i]n the early days I desperately 
tried to concoct something stiff—an inorganic hysteria dance” 
(Truter 41). Hijikata’s writings and exercises were full of references 
to neuropathological concepts and illustrations, including material 
sourced from Surrealist artists who had themselves been influenced 
by Charcot (Marshall “World”; Sas). Both butoh and interwar German 
dance had their lyrical expressions, but the most striking characteristic 
of butoh was the materialization of radically twisted, convulsing, 
tremulous bodies. Hijikata asked his dancers to embody images such 
as “a person composed of particles and tactile sensation […] insects in 
space […] people melted in furnaces in Auschwitz”, and an “ash pillar 
walk”, all of which suggested a body which uncontrollably spread into 
fragments even as it moved forward (61; Baird 178). Motifs of subjective 
and corporeal division, possession, doubling, and dispersal recurred 
throughout the work of Ohno, Hijikata, and their peers.
The most direct allusions to hysterical gesture within the twentieth-
century avant-garde art were however produced by those with the 
closest affiliation to Charcot and his school, namely the French 
Surrealists. As noted above, Breton worked for most of 1917 in the wards 
of the Pitié-Salpêtrière complex, and was acquainted with Charcot’s 
principal successor, Babinski. The neurologist wrote the script of the 
lesbian horror play, The Deranged (Palau/Olaf). Breton described the 
compelling, hypnotic effects of seeing The Deranged in his own novel 
Nadja (Breton claimed Babinski “must have had the assistance of some 
demon”) in a passage which followed shortly after a discussion about 
Robert Desnos’ experiments with hysterical sleep and automatism (31–
49). The Surrealist concepts of “Pure psychic automatism” (Breton), 
“spasmodic graphism” (Salvador Dali), and others were indebted to the 
Charcot school (Marshall “Archaeology” 105–6; Lomas). It was however 
Hélène Vanel who brought these elements together at the opening night 
of the 1938 International Surrealist Exhibition in a shocking homage to 
H… and her peers. Appropriately titled The Missing Act, Vanel leapt out 
of a corner of the gallery:
her long, thick brown hair loose and her glazed eyes bulging, 
she gestured wildly with jerky stop-action motions and posed in 
exaggerated contortions […] all the while howling […] grunting […] 
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gnashing her teeth and gibbering […] she twitched, twisted, shouted 
(LaCoss 42; Fig. 5).
Dali, who was present, identified this as a “hysterical mimodrama” in 
which Vanel:
jetted from the wings like a tornado in an unbelievable movement 
that induced a demential delirium […] She created a total uproar 
with her violent entrance, lunging up onto the bed, holding at arm’s 
length a live rooster which cackled in terror. She herself began 
screaming […] as she rolled and contorted herself on the bed 
(LaCoss 42–43).
While Hijikata was unaware of Vanel’s relatively obscure performance, 
the use of a chicken by Vanel and Hijikata is a telling continuity, 
reflecting how hysterical performance dramatized the dialectic affinities 
and distinctions between the human and non-human. Wigman went 
further, extending her human corporeal presence outside of the very 
limits of her own body. As Ann Albright observes:
5.  Hélène Vanel at the 1938 Exposition Internationale du Surréalisme, Paris (photo 
courtesy of Getty Images)
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In her dancing, Wigman was able to mobilize space beyond her own 
kinesphere. Spinning, for which she was famous, Wigman could 
alternately create the centrifugal force and then ride it, at once 
creating the whirlpool and then […] being caught up by it (314).
In Wigman’s darker works, as in Vanel’s The Missing Act, the performer 
attacked and grappled with space, producing not only a dialectic 
between the dancer and her environment, but—as Wigman, H…, and 
Surin would have it—battling for space within the body itself.
Roger Caillois described this phenomenon in his 1935 essay from 
the Surrealist journal Minotaur. He traced what he saw as a shared 
desire of insects, animals, and humans to “surrender to space”. He 
adapted this concept from Janet’s account of hysteria and hypnotic 
fugue, where subjects experienced a lack of clear spatial boundaries, 
becoming physically dispersed and dissociated from themselves as 
singular beings. Rather than fight this, both camouflaged insects and 
hysterical patients gave in to space, consuming and being consumed 
by the environment. Like caterpillars which resemble the leaves that 
they eat, the human subject extends and cannibalizes itself, hysterically 
dissipating through that which surrounds it. This may be experienced as 
“complete annihilation”, in the words of H…, or as a near religious state, 
as in the case of Wigman’s ecstatic dances. As noted earlier, there is a 
recurring “fraught equivocation” within the hysteriform archive between 
“a withdrawal” of clearly bounded presence and a “return” of corporeal 
fullness (Didi-Huberman Confronting 179). This oscillation makes up the 
“elementary rhythm” and corporeal dialectic of all of the dances discussed 
above. Thinking of hysteria as a symptomatic expression of subjective 
and corporeal non-sense and fragmentation allows one to recognize 
these incidents as powerfully charged historical moments where both 
experience and subjectivity break down. By allowing this latency of 
(non)meaning to engulf us as we gaze at these images from the past, 
we can glimpse how the bodies of both victims and artists point toward 
the subjective incoherence manifest at different times, symptomatically 
alluding to diverse, overdetermined causes and gendered conflicts.
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Notes
1 On the persistence of hysteria as a recognizable etiological complex even 
after its abandonment as a diagnostic label, see Showalter. On non-epileptic 
or conversion seizures encountered in the clinic today, see the Editors 
285–291. Also poorly understood are absence seizures, which still bear the 
nineteenth-century French title of petit mal; see Penry et al. In modern Japan, 
George Beard’s term of neurasthenia (translated as shinkei suijaku or “nerve 
weakness”) was a more common diagnosis than hysteria itself (hisuterii). 
The clinical signs of shinkei suijaku were however largely the same as those 
of hysteria, and included suggestibility, possession, and so on (Frühstück).
2 The difference between Sydenham’s chorea and Huntington’s chorea was 
not clearly established until the early twentieth century.
3 For Japanese names patronymic is given first (Ohno Kazuo).
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THE PHANTOM ERECTION
Freud’s Dora and Hysteria’s Unreadabilities
Dominik Zechner
I’d pop myself in your body 
I’d come into your party, but I’m soft
— Kings of Leon, “Soft” (2004)
It’s complicated. Sometimes you understand a phenomenon precisely in 
and through its withdrawal. As you lose your grip and become more and 
more unable to discern and identify what it is exactly that caught your 
attention in the first place, a “truth” about the object reveals itself by way 
of its very absence. Simply terming it “absence” would be too reductive, 
however—for there’s always something that remains, a trace bearing the 
entire weight of a “presence” that may never fully have realized itself (I 
put all these words in scare quotes as they are hopelessly metaphysical, 
but it’s not like we can do without them). The trace or signifier that 
stands in for the vanished object entertains a peculiar relationship with 
its referent: often, it’s as though it impresses itself all the more lastingly 
the more we lose sight of the phenomenon for which it purportedly 
stands.
Let me give an example: about thirty-five years after hysteria vanished 
as an official diagnosis from the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental 
Disorders (cf. Devereux 2014), and about a century since hysteria had 
been a “thing”, the signifier remains remarkably persistent, showing up 
as the go-to buzzword motoring pundit headlines that span the entire 
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political spectrum. One need not search long to see the evidence pile 
up—it suffices to take into consideration a number of fairly recent events 
and public conversations to encounter a shrill polyphony deploring the 
“hysteria” about the #MeToo movement, “hysteria” around trans issues, 
“hysteria” about the European migrant crisis and about refugees in 
general, “hysteria” about the planet’s future and the menace of global 
warming, anti-vaccination “hysteria”, and the “hysteria” we call Black 
Friday shopping, etc., etc.1
This list is by no means exhaustive, but it no doubt speaks to the relentless 
colloquialization of an utterly complicated term. There is certainly the 
problem of what psychologists call “concept creep” (Haslam 2016), 
meaning the dilution of a rigorous scientific or philosophical concept, 
detaching it from its core definition in order to expand its usage and 
apply it to related phenomena, or, in the case of psychological concepts, 
to situations less severe than intended by the original or prevalent 
definition (the term “trauma” is a telling example in this respect).2 It is 
certainly true that a far-ranging case of concept creep has befallen the 
problem of hysteria, severing its relation to a reliably diagnosable medical 
or psychic phenomenon, expanding its conceptual horizon in such a 
radical fashion that the term has come to encompass any challenge to a 
collectively perceived “norm” by an upsetting circumstance that impacts 
a larger number of people. As an additional facet of its concept creep, 
the dilution of hysteria in ordinary speech has caused an odd effect of 
massification according to which hysteria is never applied to a singularly 
lived-through state or situation, instead always invoking  a circumstance 
that affects a crowd or mass of people; “hysteria” nowadays means mass 
hysteria.
The easy way to surmount this observation would consist in simply 
dismissing the media’s usage of the term as a fallacy that owes its 
perseverance to the inconsistencies and inaccuracies of our shared 
vernacular. Thus, we could deny any serious connection between what 
is clinically termed “hysteria” and the average pundit’s misapplication. 
Even so, we would still have to come to terms with the astonishing 
circumstance that the signifier’s incessant proliferation takes place 
precisely as the clinical phenomenon has vanished—it takes place in 
want of scientific credibility, pragmatic applicability, yes, in want of the 
very object of its concern: the hysteric. Otherwise put, hysteria’s trope 
gains power and popularity precisely as its referential phenomenon 
disappears from the scene. As tempting as it is, then, to disconnect the 
signifier from its clinical situation and keep the discussions apart, they 
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remain undeniably linked—if only to the extent that one stands in as 
the photographic negative of the other; one’s generality bulldozes over 
the other’s idiomatic singularity; one’s timeliness trumps the other’s 
hopeless anachronism.
As I proceed, I would like to suggest that the essential connection between 
hysteria’s concept creep and its diagnostic value concerns the question of 
reading. This is to say that the indubitable link between the emergence 
of hysteria as clinical phenomenon and “hysteria” as an overused trope, 
exploited and exhausted, corresponds to a certain hermeneutic static 
effected by both. If we consider the manifold applications of hysteria 
in the popular discourses that surround us—be it in the traditional 
mainstream media or the combative channels hosting Twitter rage and 
Facebook shorthand—we notice that the term “hysteria” tends to be 
tagged or deployed whenever issues that question or openly challenge 
established modes of cognition are at stake. In other words, the signifier 
marks cultural processes that refuse to be read through traditionally 
accessible codes of hermeneutic appeasement. Take #MeToo, for 
instance: in tandem with an avalanche of revelations that concern 
sexual misconduct and the—mostly male—abuse of authority for sexual 
gain, the movement has taken up a fundamental challenge of the ways 
in which inter-subjective relationships in the workplace have thus far 
been coded and decoded. The movement raised public awareness that 
translated, in some cases, into juridical action and legal consequence; 
yet, what must not be overlooked are the hermeneutic problems posed 
by this moment of cultural tremor, for it threatened the very cognitive 
means by which mainstream culture used to understand and categorize 
constellations of sex and work. The fact, then, that #MeToo got 
pegged “hysterical”, beyond the vulgar misprision and misuse of the 
term, testifies to a fundamental crisis of understanding provoked by a 
profound defiance against reigning master codes.
I am fairly confident this “diagnosis” can be expanded, and it is possible 
to infer that “hysteria” emerges as an imposing trope precisely at times 
when intelligibility, cultural codification, and the practice of reading 
and deciphering are somehow troubled. Attentively listening in on our 
current cultural conversations—I avoid exploiting the term “culture 
wars” in this context as the overuse of bellicose rhetoric and exaggerated 
polemics proffer another set of worn out tropes whose hermeneutic 
repercussions are yet to be discerned—we are thus called upon to 
engage with the interpretive exigency lodged beneath any cultural 
phenomenon that forces the signifier “hysteria” into the headlines. The 
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wager of this essay would be that hysteria operates as the symptomatic 
stand-in for a major hermeneutic challenge, it marks a moment of 
drastic unreadability that may not be surmounted by dint of reverting 
back to established codes of decipherment and interpretive mastery.3 
A lot will hinge on convincingly demonstrating that this claim holds 
true also for the clinical emergence of hysteria: at what point does the 
symptom not just issue an invitation promting its decoding but pose a 
fundamental threat to the very principles and methodological apparatus 
of its decipherment? We shall see how Freud’s hermeneutic founders 
precisely when attempting conceptually to immure an encountered 
situation by virtue of imposing a pre-established code, i.e., the Oedipal 
paradigm governing psychosexual experience.
The massification of hysteria obscures one of the core problems Freud 
wrestled when theorizing the issue: how is it possible to bridge the 
diagnosis in its general import with the singularity of a case? Initially, 
hysteria is not a mass phenomenon or a schema that links various 
experiences together. Rather, it presents an isolated phenomenon, 
individual distress entrapped in the radical idiomaticity of one’s 
symptoms and their history. “A series of very important questions on 
the aetiology of hysteria now arise”, Freud comments at one point in 
his notes on the patient tagged “Dora”, asking whether a singular case 
can “be regarded as typical, is it the only type of cause for it and so on” 
(69/151).4 Freud does not have a clear-cut response to this dilemma; the 
relation between general aetiology and individual case has to remain 
problematic, at least for now, and for at least two reasons: first, there 
is the need to collect more cases whose similarity would support the 
establishment of a general rule; second, the term “aetiology” applied to 
psychoneurotic illness is dubious in itself and would require an extensive 
elucidation before it could allow for the constitution of a reliable 
typology analytically to determine the illness. In consequence, Freud 
finds himself thrown back at the singularity of the case, struggling to 
make the idiom of the individual symptom somehow intelligible with 
regard to a general Krankheitsbild or syndrome. This dilemma has to 
be kept in mind throughout any sort of engagement with hysteria: 
instead of starting from an abstraction whose general applicability can 
seemingly be taken for granted, the reader ought to pay attention to the 
singularity of each case—and each symptom arising within each case—
in order, perhaps, to achieve, through a careful hermeneutic effort, 
some level of legibility, as precarious and preliminary as it may turn out 
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to be. The abstraction of symptoms will necessarily end up being vague 
and undependable; the massification of hysteria will reveal itself to be 
empty if the singular constitution of its symptoms is ignored.
For the remainder of this essay, I thus propose the return to singularity. 
As “hysteria” and so-called “hysteric” masses re-emerge, not so much 
as actual phenomena but as rhetorical figures—tropes, strategically 
placed at crucial relays of contemporary political discourse—it will 
serve the conversation well simply to step back and reconsider a major 
case, in tandem with its foundational text, blockbuster intervention in 
the theoretical history of hysteria: enter Dora, feminist heroine and 
epochal icon of analytic collapse. As her story’s history of reception 
has repeatedly emphasized, Dora was the one who got away; whose 
protest not only upset the orderly family portrait but also instigated 
a textual ruin, the fragment of an analysis in which Freud confronts 
the inevitability of failure. One of the most commented-on texts in 
psychoanalytic history, the case magnetizes precisely by virtue of its 
forced finitude: the premature termination of treatment, an unrealized 
cure, the deficient protocol that remained. Dora’s appeal transgresses 
the boundaries of her own case precisely because she pushes the 
psychoanalytic endeavor at large to its limits. And as we gauge Dora’s 
afterlife on the contemporary scene, we ought to remain mindful of the 
oscillation between the singularity of the case, historically embedded, 
entrenched in unrepeatable specifics and marked by the idiomatic dates 
of its concrete situation—and her discursive role as a synecdoche for 
hysteria and the “hysteric”. Which is to say, the failure to read Dora could 
reveal a systemic failure provoked by encountering the trope of hysteria 
in general. In order to divulge the possibility of such failure, however, a 
careful textual analysis is not just called for but inevitable—for hysteria, 
as stated above, tends to scramble the codes of its own decipherment.
Let me start at the end. More precisely with an endnote—appended 
after the fact, long after, in fact, almost five years post-treatment, situated 
right at the open conclusion of Freud’s fragmentary report. Subject to 
extensive critical appraisal, this appendix takes a stab at identifying the 
incorrigible: still upset that Dora left of her own accord, unsubscribing, 
as it were, from the free trial, three months into the talking cure, Freud 
recognizes a mistake. “The further I move in time from the end of 
this analysis, the more likely it seems to me that my technical mistake 
was as follows: I failed to guess in good time that [Dora’s] homosexual 
(gynaecophile) love for Frau K. was the strongest unconscious current 
in the life of her mind” (103/184). He could have been onto it sooner, 
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Freud confesses, for Dora knew way too much about sex than was 
appropriate—but he never probed the source of this knowledge, the 
pedagogical scene whence Dora derived her surplus sex-ed creds. It must 
have been Frau K., her adulterous father’s para-spouse, who sexed her 
up rhetorically. What, for Dora, is a matter of knowledge, Freud, in his 
defense, could not have known: he scolds himself not for an epistemic 
lack but for a fortune flaw, a speculation missed out on: “Ich habe 
versäumt, rechtzeitig zu erraten …,” I neglected to guess in time.5 Lodged 
in the precinct of surmising divination, the lucky blast of a good guess 
in the right moment, female homosexuality is barred from the confines 
of reason. And the good fortune of getting it right simply happened to 
occur too late in this case.
Other things Freud did not have to guess as they apparently were all 
too obvious: for example that Dora’s desire was trapped in the circuit 
of a phallic economy that included her father, Herr K., and, ultimately, 
Freud himself. I don’t want to rehash a story all-too-well-known, let me 
simply recall the main parameters: Dora’s father entertains an affair 
with family friend Frau K. whose husband, for appeasement’s sake, gets 
Dora—who, in turn, somatizes wildly. The woman, at this point, is 18 
years old. From the get-go, Freud bases the hermeneutics of his analysis 
on the assumption of a series of substitutions securely enclosing Dora 
within a libidinal swirl flowing from guy to guy to guy: father—Herr 
K.—analyst. What Freud ultimately admits, however, in the paratext 
of a last footnote, de facto undermining his entire argument, is the 
shadow existence of a different encounter: an obscure flow of desire 
among women—a sisterhood stronger than the phallic community 
that supposedly holds Dora in thrall. There’s women talking about sex, 
there’s women in love6: there’s an aphallic coalition unfolding beyond 
the imperatives of the Oedipal configuration, and stronger than the 
paradigm of male substitutability that principally guides Freud’s 
interpretation.
It has to be taken seriously that Freud’s moment of self-introspection 
and the confessional gesture of claiming responsibility—“I made 
a mistake”—happens in a paratext, marginalized and belatedly 
appended. This not only conjures up the entire issue of supplementarity 
and the role it plays for psychoanalysis which Derrida (1996) has 
thrown into sharp relief—it also repeats a major moment in the Dora 
narrative itself, namely regarding the appendix and its status as a site 
for the manifestation of hysterical symptoms. Jamieson Webster has 
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recently made the case for a renewed understanding of hysteria as 
“conversion disorder”—and right as she concludes her exploration 
by supplementing her own appendix (quite literally), she reminds us 
that Dora’s appendicitis, which is simultaneously performed as a faux 
pregnancy, marks the hysterical symptom par excellence, disclosing the 
issue of conversion in the most striking fashion: “The rediscovery of the 
appendicitis in the final sessions becomes the linchpin in Freud’s sense 
of the point in an analysis where a hysterical symptom reveals its contact 
with an organic base. This place is where the sexual, as such, asserts 
itself, literally more than phantasmatically” (2018: 277).
There is more to be said about the literality of the hysterical symptom, 
and how it clashes with what we may call its literariness—for the moment, 
however, let me just state the observation that the fact of recognizing 
the appendix as symptom-carrier in its extraordinary value for the 
decoding of Dora’s narrative did not keep Freud from textually 
repeating its complication: for what is the supplemented footnote cited 
above other than an appendix, the very sign of the text’s own hysteria, 
an analysis gone hysterical, supreme indicator of a confusion that 
causes enough static for Dora to take off, leaving things unresolved? 
“I failed to guess in good time that her homosexual (gynaecophile) 
love for Frau K. was the strongest unconscious current in the life of her 
mind”, Freud supplements. It’s the appendix in which the “truth” of the 
matter might be encapsulated—yet, not without being affected by the 
very misspeculations that led the entire reading astray in the first place: 
notice how even the supplement needs to be supplemented, namely 
by dint of a parenthesis that supposedly functions further to elucidate 
the admission of Dora’s homosexuality. The appended term, however, 
“gynaecophile”, serves only to obscure things: isn’t “homosexual” a self-
explanatory concept in the context of Dora’s doting on Frau K., the 
emerging love between two women?
In his cross-reading of Dora and Henry James, Neil Hertz calls the term 
“gynaecophile”—or “gynaecophilic” according to the translation he 
worked with; the German original reads gynäkophil—“slightly unusual” 
and points out that Freud uses it “to describe Dora’s homoerotic 
tendencies”. For Hertz, the appeal presented to Freud by this strange 
term lies in its insistence on “philia”, i.e., love, as opposed to the clinical 
sterility of “logos” as reflected in the medical term gyneco-logy. This 
reading reflects the chasm running through Dora’s narrative separating 
issues of experience (philia) from knowledge (logos) whose discrepancy 
is one of the determining factors accounting for the analysis’s failure. 
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Putting it too reductively, Freud tends to overemphasize Dora’s lived 
experience, especially with respect to Herr K., at the expense of 
investigating the circulation of sexualized knowledge between her, Frau 
K., and also her governess. According to this schema, however, Dora’s 
relationship with Frau K. could not be one of philia and would therefore 
have to reside on the side of logos. In other words, Hertz’ explanation 
for Freud’s deploying the strange term of “gynaecophilia” to concretize 
Dora’s homosexuality might not hold up. It might even be the case 
that, instead of explaining or concretizing the term, Freud’s word 
choice openly contradicts the belated admission of Dora’s homoerotic 
disposition.
Indubitably, the parenthetical appendix to the appendix—“homosexual 
(gynecophile)”—introduces a semantic tension, and one would be 
tempted simply to dismiss the terminological oddity in bafflement if 
it were not the case that this is, in fact, the second, not first, instance 
within the case study where use of the term is made. At the very end 
of the first section, which recounts Dora’s history thus establishing her 
“Clinical Picture”, and right before jumping into the analysis of her two 
dreams, Freud writes the following: “The feminine emotion of jealousy 
[eifersüchtige Regung des Weibes] went hand in hand, in Dora’s unconscious 
mind, with the kind of jealousy that a man might have felt. These male, 
or let us say gynaecophile, currents of emotion [diese männlichen oder, wie 
man besser sagt, gynäkophilen Gefühlsströmungen], are to be regarded as 
typical of a hysterical girl’s unconscious love-life” (53/135). At stake in 
this passage is Dora’s perception of the father’s relationship with Frau 
K., and the extent to which being jealous of the woman for having “Papa” 
might serve as a cover-up for the deeper emotion of Dora’s jealousy 
of him for possessing Frau K. Astonishingly, however, this “current of 
emotion”, running from girl to woman, de facto establishing an aphallic 
economy, can only be thought of, by Freud, in phallic terms: he calls 
it “male”—and then substitutes this qualification by inserting, for the 
first time in the narrative, the word “gynaecophile”, in fact using it as a 
“better word” (“wie man besser sagt”) to refer to something masculine.
A lot has been said about Freud’s heteronormative reading strategies 
and how they reflect a deplorable heterosexual bias especially with 
regard to Dora, but keeping in mind that he appended the footnote 
which again uses the adjective “gynaecophile” precisely in order to admit to 
the heterosexual fallacy, stating that he failed to take into account Dora’s 
love for Frau K. as the “strongest unconscious current in the life of her 
mind” (my emphasis)—it appears all the more bewildering that even 
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this ultimate admission had to be undercut by a phallic intrusion. 
The parenthetical insert—“(gynaecophile)”—to qualify the word 
homosexual causes a confounding paradox if we take into account 
the prior definition of “gynaecophile” as “male”. In other words, Dora 
has to become a man in order to feel jealousy toward the father for his 
relationship with the family friend; she has to become male so as to feel 
love for Frau K.; she has to become male for the lesbian fantasy to be 
established (and thus come undone). Hence, the ultimate admission of 
failure, disguised as an appreciation of female homosexuality, presents 
yet another instance of what I would like to term “phallic reading”: the 
hermeneutic effort to recover and maintain the Oedipal paradigm at 
all cost. It’s as though the parenthetical intrusion literalized a phallic 
interloping—something like a phantom erection whose marker would 
slip in precisely to prevent an entirely female libidinal economy from 
becoming analytically passable.
The definition of “gynaecophile” as “male”, mirrored in the later shift 
from “homosexual” to “gynaecophile”, describes a semantic operation 
that secures the Oedipal paradigm on the level of signification. Yet, the 
strong pull of Freud’s phallic reading—though not stronger than Dora’s 
affection for Frau K.—is visible even on the level of the signifier, as shown, 
for instance, in Jane Gallop’s seminal reading where she expounds on 
the prominent trope of the key in the report on Dora. According to this 
tropology, a woman is someone to be unlocked by virtue of the right 
opener’s phallic intrusion. After all, Freud holds, “it cannot be all the 
same whether a female is open or closed. We also know what ‘key’ will 
open her” (56/138). Gallop comments: “In Freud’s question the woman 
is, in either case, grammatically passive: she remains passively ‘shut’ or 
she is ‘open’ through an outside agent” (136). Unable to play the role 
of this agent, Freud fails to unlock her—which might be less an issue of 
not having found the “right key” but instead have to do with the basic 
presumption that the key-lock analogy could structure the logic of a 
case like this. In other words, there might be an openness that neither 
adheres to the binary between open and shut, nor does it respond to the 
key as a metonymy for the phallic analytical enterprise.
The feminist reception of Dora is replete with comprehensive 
commentaries on what may be termed Freud’s readerly phallsifications—
his need “to encode all experience of vulnerability within phallic 
terms”, as Elisabeth Bronfen puts it (335). The grievance launched 
against the analyst aims at the need to coerce Dora’s experience into the 
96 DOMINIK ZECHNER
pre-figured templates of analytical conceptualization. The case of Dora 
must surrender to the analyst’s demand—not the other way around. 
Yet, simply claiming that Freud misunderstood Dora by privileging 
conceptual faith over an engagement with the case’s unreadable 
complications, means choosing the easy way out of this textual mess. 
Instead, I would like to suggest that Freud’s reading strategy led him to 
an aporia that discloses the textual “truth” of Dora’s dilemma precisely 
through the breakdown of a flawed psycho-hermeneutic method.
The supreme moment of this methodological debacle can be found in 
Freud’s interpretation of Dora’s first erotic encounter with Herr K. At 
the age of 14, the patient recalls, she happened to meet K. in his shop, 
right when he was about to end the business day early in order to attend 
a church ceremony with his wife. Before leaving the store, however, he 
suddenly seized the girl, embraced and kissed her. Having broken away, 
Dora fled the scene at once, driven by a lasting sensation of disgust. 
Later on, in analysis, she would report (and relive) a persistent feeling 
of pressure on her thorax, somatic echo of the blindsiding embrace. 
Unsatisfied with the memory recalled, however, Freud insinuates a 
spectral key to unlock the scene: kiss and embrace in themselves, as 
remembered, are not enough, he is convinced, to account for Dora’s 
physical reaction to the assault. Says Freud: “I also think I detect the 
influence of another factor” (23/106). Key to deciphering the onslaught, 
this factor is K.’s sexual titillation. Convinced that the pressure on 
Dora’s upper body signifies more than a mere embrace, the interpreter 
conjures a phantom erection: “I think in that stormy embrace she felt not 
only the kiss on her lips, but also Herr K.’s erect penis pressing against 
her body” (24/107). The aroused member’s “surge forward” (andrängen 
is the word Freud uses) subsequently got displaced from the lower to 
the upper body, hence Dora’s aching thorax. According to Freud, this 
would also explain the distance Dora keeps from men whom she sees 
“engaged in animated or amicable conversation with a lady”—there’s 
always the danger of that erect member and its surge forward.
Not to discredit Anthea Bell’s deserving new translation, but it seems 
important to point out that the verb Freud originally used to interpolate 
K.’s arousal is not “think” but “believe”—“ich glaube aber” (my emphasis): 
erection is a matter of belief. Once again, the hermeneutic elucidation 
of the hysterical circumstance, by dint of a strange doubling, seems 
affected by the very symptomatology it seeks to explain and solve. Wasn’t 
Dora’s pregnancy also a matter of belief ? If the problem of hysteria, to 
channel, once again, Jamieson Webster, is essentially one of conversion, 
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it’s not too far-fetched to consider a faithfully professed erection a 
hysterical symptom. The male erection describes perhaps the most 
basic movement of conversion—as desire materializes physically and the 
sexual arrives at the very intersection of the drive and its organic base. 
Now, add to this process the dubious parameter of belief and you have 
an instance of conversion disorder: erection as hysterical symptom. One 
that is not, however, lived through in experience but hermeneutically 
produced. This symptom disturbs a proper reading, cock-blocking 
certain interpretive passageways.
The question remains as to why Freud could not resist conjuring up a 
fictitious key for this lock. What were the analytical merits of insinuating 
the phantom erection? Why could Herr K.’s sheer embrace and kiss, as 
recalled by the patient, not have been enough to trigger her appalled 
escape? Freud takes an interpretive risk by insisting on the presence of 
an erect penis during the scene in the store, and one might wonder if 
the hermeneutic stakes were in fact high enough to merit his maneuver. 
It is all the more surprising that the analysis, as it proceeds, does not 
return to the phantom erection: the moment K.’s arousal is speculatively 
implemented, it’s swiftly dropped again. Why could Freud not fight 
the temptation? What does this speculative moment tell us about the 
analysis at large? In other words: if it could not “unlock” Dora, what 
does the key-slash-penis disclose and indicate as a textual symptom?
I would like to suggest that the phantom erection marks a moment 
of speculation from which we learn less about Dora’s distress and its 
various causes, than about Freud’s convoluted strategy of interpretation 
and the opposing forces it displays. This is to say that his insertion of the 
phantom erection functions both as the symptom of and resolution to 
some of the misconceptions to which his phallic reading falls prey. In 
order to corroborate this claim, however, we need cut Freud more slack 
than is usually the case in appraisals of Dora. Instead of simply dismissing 
the phantom erection as a moment of analytic delusion, let me suggest 
taking its spectral presence seriously to the degree that it adresses the 
critical theme of male potency and impotence that permeates the entire 
case of Dora. It’s as if Freud were irreversibly pre-occupied with an all-
too-suggestive Männerfantasie, a vision of uncompromised virility that 
inhibits the view on Dora’s feminine associations, the homosexual excess 
welling beneath the interpretive maelstrom. In its lack of significance 
and questionable analytical merit, the phantom erection stands out, 
literally, as so delicate, strange, and scientifically treacherous that it 
turns into a symptom of analytic misprision itself. Freud handed us the 
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key not to Dora, but to the question of how to distinguish between what 
he knew and did not want to know about his patient and her story. Hence, 
I suggest accompanying Freud precisely to this aporetic crossroads 
where the enterprise of phallic interpretation points in one direction, 
while the lawless pussy riot of unreadable female community lies the 
other way.
At large, there seem to be two constellations of desire at play in the 
report on Dora. The first one, privileged by Freud, revolves around the 
verticality of erection, comprising the male triangle of father, Herr K., 
and Freud—three men who all come to stand in for each other in the 
course of the analysis. The second constellation, underrepresented in 
Freud’s account, horizontally connects Dora to her governess, her father, 
and his lover, Frau K.—offering an alternative to the logic of phallic 
substitution determining the first model. As becomes clear through the 
disquieting footnote/appendix cited above with which Freud concludes 
his report, the analyst himself undergoes an interpretive shift, if only a 
partial one, ultimately to privilege Dora’s female communities over the 
Oedipal economy in which he interpretively compelled her to take part.
The floating hinge between these two constellations of desire is 
represented by Dora’s father, and it is precisely the trope of the erect 
penis and its phantom quality that enables the paternal figure to take 
on this relay function. For the father is posited as the carrier of an 
oscillating sign—the penis as erect and defunct—and he may therefore 
interpretively be placed in both constellations: the phallic triangle as well 
as the lesbian community. That Dora’s father suffers from performance 
issues is revealed at a seminal moment in the analysis at which Dora 
famously claims that Frau K. only wants Daddy because he is “well-
endowed [ein vermögender Mann]”. Instantly, Freud suggests that what 
Dora actually means to say with this formulation is that he is, in fact, not 
well-endowed, and he adds: “This could only be meant sexually; while 
her father might be a man of means in the sense of prosperity, he had no 
means of making an impression as a man, that is to say, he was impotent” 
(39/122). Contrary to her MO, Dora affirms this interpretation, adding 
that due to her father’s condition the lovers could only engage in oral 
sex—whereupon Freud immediately connects Dora’s coughing and 
throat tickling to this imagined scene of oral gratification.
It was none other than Jacques Lacan who suggested that Freud might 
have jumped the gun with this last interpretive move—for it still seems 
to hold on to the father’s ability to get it up as the comments on the 
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symptoms connected to Dora’s throat and mouth suggest a fellatory 
phantasy. Freud does reveal as much when, two pages later, he recasts 
the scenario simply by calling it “such a sexual practice as sucking the 
penis, … expressed … by the sensation of a tickle in the throat and 
by coughing” (43/125). To this strangely reductive account, Lacan 
cavalierly responds that there was no “need for him”, Freud, “to invoke 
her awareness of the fellatio undergone by the father, when everyone 
knows that cunnilingus is the artifice most commonly adopted by ‘men of 
means’ whose powers begin to abandon them” (67, my emphasis).7 Freud 
fails to recognize the horizontal community involving the father and 
Frau K. just as much as Dora herself as he keeps rerouting the narrative 
through the signifier of proliferating erections and their forward surge. 
Even the impotent have boners if it serves to corroborate the myth of 
desire’s phallic determination.
Hence, the phantom erection is, in fact, double. And as strange as the 
two scenes (the “scene in the store” and the father’s imagined sex life) 
are if one considers them as stand-alone hermeneutic interventions, 
there might be a possibility for them to elucidate one another. For if we 
think back to the “scene in the store” and its victim’s disgusted retreat, 
the question as to why Herr K.’s erect member and its forward surge 
would have been such a deal-breaker for Dora is more easily solvable 
if we consider it breaching the paradigm of male impotence on which 
Dora’s libidinal economy is based. If we follow Lacan’s argument that 
“Dora’s Oedipal relation is grounded in an identification with her 
father, which is favoured by the latter’s sexual impotence” (66), the 
(phantom) erection would have undermined this identification, whereas 
his erectile dysfunction would have broken the chain of substitutions 
linking Dora’s father to the potent Herr K. 
Contrary to Freud’s interpretive thrust, it’s precisely the trauma of non-
impotence that Dora’s sexual economy is unfit to integrate. The analyst 
gives interpretive privilege to virility, potency, and masculinity—
ensuring the chain of substitutions between the three father figures, each 
marked and distinguished by his own phantom erection. Freud turns 
out to be unable to read male impotence for it poses an overwhelming 
threat to the Oedipal configuration. In other words, it’s precisely when it 
comes to the issue of impotence that the powers of Freud’s own reading, 
to use Lacan’s phrase, “begin to abandon him”. What’s subsequently 
missed, is the horizontal communion activated by an aphallic libidinal 
economy in which Dora’s father can partake precisely because his 
masculine powers fail him. The phallic economy depends on the erect 
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specter. The practice of phallic reading, as marked by the proliferation 
of phantom erections, rigorously gatekeeps the Oedipal interpretive 
frame. Yet, its inherent vicissitudes divulge the very homoerotic desire 
it strives to disclaim.8
Notes
1 Concrete references for these discourses are hardly necessary: a simple 
Google news search for any of the examples invoked will produce evidence 
galore.
2 For a critical response to Haslan, see Cascardi and Brown 2016. 
3 Discussing Freud at a moment in his study Body Work, Peter Brooks produces 
a similar conclusion, holding that “[t]he hysterical body … threatens a 
violation of basic antitheses and laws, including the law of castration and 
the conditions of meaning” (1993: 244). I wonder, however, if the term 
“violation” as Brooks uses it here might not carry too weak a force when 
we think about the relation between hysteria and the established codes (or 
“laws”, as Brooks phrases it) of reading. It seems to me that hysteria does 
not just violate the law, which would still make it subject to and corrigible by 
virtue of the law’s authority—but that the hysterical occurrence challenges 
the established order so profoundly that the law itself needs to change 
so as to be able to grasp its object of confrontation. One might even say 
that hysteria carries an “afformative” quality, to channel the late Werner 
Hamacher.
4 The page references here and going forward refer to the Oxford edition 
of Freud’s Dora paired with the German original according to the 
Studienausgabe.
5 Cf. the entangled semantics of guessing (raten), financial installments 
(Raten), and rats (Ratten) in the “Rat Man” case.
6 Freud talks about a strong Liebesregung, the stir of love (103/184).
7 Hertz comments on this passage in Lacan, saying: “It’s hard to guess what 
Freud would have made of this note of high Parisian savoir vivre; whatever 
everyone else knew, he seems to have taken for granted the more phallic—
and phallocentric—option” (129). I hope to be able to show why Freud 
has to take this option for granted as it serves as the bedrock of his entire 
hermeneutic operation.
8 I would like to express my sincerest thanks to Michael Levine for his 
feedback on this text.
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“A SLIGHT HYSTERICAL 
TENDENCY”
Performing Diagnosis in Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper”
Vivian Delchamps
In the beginning of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story “The 
Yellow Wallpaper” (1892), the unnamed female protagonist writes 
disobediently in her journal: “If a physician of high standing, and 
one’s own husband, assures friends and relatives that there is really 
nothing the matter with one but temporary nervous depression—a 
slight hysterical tendency—what is one to do?”1 Gilman famously wrote 
this semi-autobiographical short story to criticize her doctor, Silas Weir 
Mitchell. Mitchell diagnosed Gilman with hysteria and treated her 
with his famous “rest cure”—a treatment that kept women confined 
to their beds, restricting their bodily and mental freedoms. Gilman 
then wrote the “Yellow Wallpaper”, featuring a narrator who similarly 
was put on the rest cure. Insistent that she is ill—but with something 
more than a “slight hysterical tendency”, a diagnosis which she seems to 
find unsatisfactory—the narrator of Gilman’s story hints at a question 
that dominates her experience in the text. “What is one to do” with 
diagnosis, its consequences and its fallibility? 
Some critics have, in Jane F. Thrailkill’s wording, tried to “doctor” 
Gilman’s text, suggesting ways of reading the story that clarify, organize, 
or heal the hysteria that resonates throughout its pages.2 I similarly 
hope to demonstrate that neatly understanding—or diagnosing 
and curing—Gilman’s short story is impossible for any reader. The 
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narrator’s first-person account articulates the complexity of disorder, 
demonstrating that neatly defining or explaining a condition of a body 
or mind is dangerously difficult. Other critics3 rightly note that the story 
undermines Mitchell’s diagnosis and the rest cure. In this essay I further 
this work but question the assumption that the story’s understanding of 
diagnosis is purely critical. I examine the ways in which the narrator 
of “The Yellow Wallpaper” simultaneously expresses desire for, and 
rejection of, the hysteria diagnosis. The story’s contradictory view of 
diagnosis leads to a destructive, confusing narrative as the narrator is 
trapped in the winding, inescapable contradictions that surround the 
question of how to diagnose and whether an accurate diagnosis for 
medical symptoms is even possible. Ultimately, this paper will argue that 
Gilman’s text provides an interpretive framework for understanding 
issues of gender relevant to modern discourses in disability studies and 
that it challenged masculinized performances of medical diagnosis 
and treatment by resisting the ideology of cure. The story itself is 
a performance of hysteria that also depicts diagnosis and cure as 
destructive, desirable approaches to disorderly bodies and minds.
Diagnosis in History and Literature
This essay begins with the premise that diagnosis and cure are not 
always helpful or desirable. They can also be harmful, and they always 
exist in relationship to destruction and violence. Eli Clare’s book 
Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure (2017), a recent work in the 
fields of disability studies and crip theory,4 has inspired much of my 
work on this topic. As Clare explains, the ideology of cure, which is 
“embedded in a network of five overlapping and interlocking medical 
processes: diagnosis, treatment, management, rehabilitation, and 
prevention” (70), seeks to normalize bodies and other forms deemed 
abnormal. Clare argues that “Elimination of some kind—of a disease, 
future existence, of present day embodiments, of life itself—is essential 
to the work of cure…as a widespread ideology centered on eradication, 
cure always operates in relationship to violence” (28). Clare further 
argues that “cure requires damage, locating the harm entirely within 
individual human body-minds, operating as if each person were their 
own ecosystem…it grounds itself in an original state of being, relying on 
a belief that what existed before is superior to what exists currently” (15, 
original italics). In this reading, cure is part of a medical model that 
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strives to return something deemed “abnormal” to a state of “normalcy”. 
Cure is generally depicted positively, a “restoration of health” and a 
return to a “better” state of being, but in Clare’s framing restoration 
demands elimination and enforced regression. 
Diagnosis, the first of five key processes that aim for cure, is part of 
a system that always involves the violent removal of something from a 
body. Of diagnosis, Clare writes,
I want to read diagnosis as a source of knowledge, sometimes 
trustworthy and other times suspect. As a tool and a weapon shaped 
by particular belief systems, useful and dangerous by turns. As a 
furious storm…Simply put, diagnosis wields immense power….It 
unleashes political and cultural forces (41). 
Diagnosis is contradictory. It identifies, but does not necessarily change 
or correct, disorders, and it is often the first step on the path toward 
normalizing bodies deemed defective. In medical science, diagnosis is 
hardly understood as a straightforward, objective, or perfect process. 
Modern medical practitioners demonstrate that “diagnosis” has two 
primary meanings:
First of all, Diagnosis is the name for the process a doctor goes 
through to arrive at a conclusion about the state of health of a patient. 
Diagnosis, in this sense, is…an activity or action…As such, it can 
be done well or poorly, hastily or carefully. Diagnosis in the second 
sense refers to the outcome of the diagnostic process….in this sense 
involving a labeling of the patient…that classifies a patient, provides 
an explanation of symptoms, and leads the clinician to create a 
prognosis (Daniel A. Albert et al, Reasoning in Medicine, 184, original 
italics).
Diagnosis creates a relationship between doctor and patient that relies 
upon an uncertain system of disease classification. The goal of diagnosis 
is to help both doctor and patient understand a patient’s condition 
and predict next steps in the hopes of finding a cure. Aiming for this 
goal may involve embarking on an unpredictable process, relying on 
systems of classification and prescribing treatments that impact bodies 
and minds. Moreover, this process will necessarily involve destruction, 
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tearing something down to build it back up again, destroying disease, or 
harming an individual for the sake of their treatment.
A doctor may “perform” a diagnosis and “perform” a cure.5 Taking 
these phrases literally, I ask how diagnosis can be understood as 
performative since it involves a labeling that alters identity and might 
lead to treatments that alter bodies and minds. In his foundational 
work on performative utterances in How to Do Things With Words (1970), 
J.L. Austin distinguishes “verdictives” as a category of illocutionary acts 
in which a speaker gives a verdict, such as a diagnosis (147). I want to 
consider the idea that diagnosis is embodied, an utterance that connects 
doctors and patients and stimulates physical, emotional, and mental 
responses as well as transformations of identity. 
Reading diagnosis in Gilman’s text is vital because diagnosis is both 
narrative and embodied. I am not the first to take this approach to 
understanding diagnosis in Gilman’s story, as Paula Treichler explains 
in “Escaping the Sentence: Diagnosis and Discourse in ‘The Yellow 
Wallpaper’” (1984), 
Diagnosis is powerful and public…It is a male voice that…imposes 
controls on the female narrator and dictates how she is to perceive 
and talk about the world. Diagnosis covertly functions to empower 
the male physician’s voice and disempower the female patient’s…
To call ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ a struggle between diagnosis and 
discourse is to characterize the story in terms of language (65; 70). 
Continuing Treichler’s study, I suggest that the performance of diagnosis, 
hysteria, medicine, disability studies, and the study of literature all 
converge in Gilman’s work and can be analyzed to better understand 
diagnosis and cure as contradictory forces that are both damaging and 
desirable. 
“Infinite Numbers of Forms”: Diagnosing Hysteria in Gilman’s 
Time
I turn now to Gilman’s biographical encounters with diagnosis and 
cure—complex engagements with the world of medicine. Gilman’s 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” was written just after hysteria became a 
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“fashionable” disease and a difficult-to-define diagnosis (see Wood). 
Between 1860 and 1880, medical practitioners and the American public 
became obsessed with neurasthenia and hysteria, categories which 
produced new problems about diagnostic boundaries and patient 
agency. In the fifth century BC Hippocrates famously suggested that 
the cause of hysteria lay in the movement of the uterus (Sigerist 2–4); 
however, by the nineteenth century, hysteria was associated with the 
brain and nervous system. Doctors struggled to describe distinctions 
between neurasthenia and hysteria during this time, and “the two 
conditions were intertwined while the medical community struggled 
to define its diagnostic boundaries” (Schuster 5). Mitchell observed 
in an 1888 lecture that hysteria was the most vexing of all diagnoses, 
precisely because it manifested itself in “infinite numbers of forms and 
[an] infinite variety of masquerade” (5). This hard-to-define diagnosis 
became a troubling problem that intrigued doctors, patients, and the 
general public. 
The diagnosis of hysteria was mostly reserved for wealthy white women. 
In 1881, Dr. George M. Beard claimed that because nervousness was 
caused by modernity, neurasthenics stood as proof that the American 
nation had evolved beyond the rest of the world, and that “Catholics, 
southerners, Indians, and blacks” were not susceptible to the disorder 
(Schuster 18). 
Furthermore, “the characterization of the nervous woman” was, 
according to Laura Briggs, figured “over and against a figure 
understood as her opposite: the ‘savage’ woman” (Briggs 246). The 
refusal to associate black women with hysteria and neurasthenia 
further stigmatized black bodies. But for white women especially, self-
diagnosis of neurasthenia became common, ushering in an era of 
patients bypassing the medical profession. Doctors and pharmaceutical 
companies took advantage of those who self-diagnosed, prescribing 
and labeling medicines (sometimes made of alcohol and cocaine) as 
treatments for “nervousness” (Schuster 62). Complexly bound with 
issues of gender, class, and race, the process of diagnosing hysteria was 
simultaneously an authoritative demonstration of clinical control and 
a confusing, unregulated act that could be either helpful or damaging 
for those experiencing illness, leading to experimentations with literary 
forms.
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Like many other (white) women, Gilman self-diagnosed once she 
realized she was experiencing symptoms after the birth of her child. 
She described her condition as “dragging weariness miles below zero. 
Absolute incapacity. Absolute misery” (The Living of Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman 90–92). She traveled west to Pasadena and reported that 
engagement with social life there improved her symptoms (Schuster 
106). This trip west imitated the treatment Mitchell used to help 
men such as Walt Whitman, whom he encouraged to travel west after 
experiencing a stroke. 
After Gilman returned east to her baby and husband in Providence, 
her symptoms came back, and she reached out to the famous Mitchell, 
perhaps hoping he would order her back to the social freedom she 
enjoyed in the west. The fact that Gilman invited Mitchell’s treatment is a 
facet of her history that has often been overlooked by scholars who want 
to depict Gilman as a passive, ignorant victim of Mitchell’s treatments. 
I bring it in now because I want to emphasize that before Mitchell 
exposed her to his treatments, Gilman wanted cure. She claimed that 
she had “brain troubles”, and told Mitchell, 
I am an artist of sufficient merit to earn an easy living when well…I 
am a reader and thinker. I can do some good work for the world if I 
live. I cannot bear to die or go insane or linger on [in] this wretched 
invalid existence, and be a weight on this poor world which has so 
many now. I want to work, to help people, to do good. I did for years, 
and can again if I get well. (Why I Wrote the ‘Yellow Wallpaper’? 271).
Illustrating Gilman’s desire for cure, this shows that Gilman believes 
being an invalid is burdensome. She believes she cannot “do good” if 
she does not “get well”. Her initial response to her symptoms is to paint 
invalidism as pathological weakness. Gilman’s desire for diagnosis and 
her willingness for self-diagnosis are significant parts of her history with 
Mitchell that have largely been ignored and that demonstrate cure’s 
seductive power.
Mitchell did not send Gilman back to her life of freedom in California; 
instead, he put her on the rest cure and demonstrated that he distrusted 
women’s reports on their own health. As one of Gilman’s biographers 
wrote, Mitchell “found utterly useless the long letter she had written to 
him detailing her symptoms; that she should imagine her observations 
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would be of any interest to him was but an indication of her ‘self-
conceit,’ he advised her”.6 Mitchell largely ignored her detailed letter 
and the questions she asked him, and simply put her on the rest cure. 
Mitchell’s creation of the rest cure was based on his belief that the 
patient had reached a state of “cerebral exhaustion”, “a condition in 
which the mental organs become more or less completely incapacitated 
for labor” (Mitchell passim). His remedy was therefore enforced bed 
rest, and the patient was barred from physical exertion and deprived of 
intellectual stimulation. After remaining in Mitchell’s care for a month, 
Gilman was instructed to “live as domestic a life as possible”, to limit 
her “intellectual life” to “two hours” per day, and to never “touch pen, 
brush or pencil” (Knight 277). Mitchell’s treatment forbade Gilman to 
write, and Gilman wrote that this brought her “so near the borderline 
of utter mental ruin that [she] could see over” (Why I Wrote the ‘Yellow-
Wallpaper’? 271).
Mitchell’s use of the rest cure illuminates the damaging quality of the 
ideology of cure. Clare suggests that the ideology of cure relies “on a 
belief that what existed before is superior to what exists currently” (15, 
original italics). Mitchell arguably developed his rest cure because he 
believed that what existed before—a world of women who remained 
in the home and did not perform intellectual labor—was superior to 
what existed in Gilman’s case. Gilman was a woman who worked and, 
therefore, in Mitchell’s mind became hysterical. His rest cure is a clear 
demonstration of Clare’s claim, as his treatment was founded in the belief 
that a working woman should return to a domestic life. While feminist 
critics have noted that Mitchell wielded diagnosis and cure not just to 
aid ill individuals, but to flaunt his authority and to return women to a 
domestic sphere, Regina Morantz has also helpfully observed, “medical 
men [of the nineteenth century] were unable to cure most diseases-not 
just those of women but of everyone. Indeed, they ‘tortured’ men and 
women indiscriminately” (47). Mitchell’s treatment was gendered and 
damaging for women; however, his failure to cure hysteria was part of a 
larger problem: that most attempts to perform cures generally involved 
at least some degree of “torture” of bodies and minds. 
After suffering through Mitchell’s rest cure, Gilman penned “The 
Yellow-Wallpaper” as a thinly veiled autobiographical tale of a woman 
driven mad by her physician-husband, trapped in a room as a part of 
his medical treatment. Gilman eventually published this statement: 
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“The real purpose of the story was to reach Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, and 
convince him of the error of his ways” (Why I Wrote the ‘Yellow Wallpaper’? 
271). The story addresses Mitchell directly, reaffirming this hypothesis: 
“John says if I don’t pick up faster he shall send me to Weir Mitchell 
in the fall. But I don’t want to go there at all. I had a friend who was 
in his hands once, and she says he is just like John and my brother, 
only more so!” (11). Now one of the most famous literary accounts of 
hysteria, this story demonstrates that Gilman no longer trusted male 
medical authority. As Eli Clare argues, “Cure [is] laced with violence, 
which [prompts] resistance, which in turn [is] met with more violence, 
all of it sustained by diagnosis” (47). By seeing Gilman’s history through 
this lens, we can see that Gilman requested a diagnosis, discovered the 
deceptive and violent quality of Mitchell’s gendered treatment, and was 
prompted to resist. The next question is, how does her short story depict 
cure? How and why does the protagonist want to “return” to a previous 
state of being, before her sickness? Though “The Yellow Wallpaper” has 
long been understood as a feminist commentary on medical practice, 
such questions, emerging from disability studies, have not yet been 
thoroughly considered. It is generally assumed that the narrator does 
want a cure—she just doesn’t want the rest cure. I want to question that 
assumption now, to ask how socially constructed cures for a largely 
socially constructed impairment are perceived as simultaneously violent 
and desirable in the story.
Performing Diagnostic Experiments and Destroying Cures
“The Yellow Wallpaper” quickly establishes that the female narrator, 
who relays her story in first person in her secret journal, trusts her own 
opinions about illness more than those of her physician-husband John. 
The narrator self-diagnoses when her husband refuses to admit she is 
ill, writing: 
John is practical in the extreme. He has no patience with faith, an 
intense horror of superstition, and he scoffs openly at any talk of 
things not to be felt and seen and put down in figures. John is a 
physician, and perhaps-(I would not say it to a living soul, of course, 
but this is dead paper and a great relief to my mind—) perhaps that 
is one reason I do not get well faster. You see he does not believe I am 
sick! And what can one do? (10)
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We don’t want to equate Gilman absolutely with her fictional narrator. 
However, this part of the story reflects Gilman’s loss of faith in physicians 
like Mitchell who refused to engage with Gilman’s letter. Suspicious of 
these doctors, the narrator assumes diagnostic authority, suggesting 
that she herself has a better understanding of her own condition than 
do these male doctors. Furthermore, the narrator is willing to diagnose 
her problems, seeing John as one reason she does “not get well faster”. 
The narrator is also willing to consider various cures in hopes of 
mitigating her symptoms. The story continues, 
I take phosphates or phosphites whichever it is, and tonics, and 
journeys, and air, and exercise, and am absolutely forbidden to 
‘work’ until I am well again. Personally, I disagree with their ideas. 
Personally, I believe that congenial work, with excitement and 
change, would do me good. But what is one to do? I did write for 
a while spite of them; but it does exhaust me a good deal-having to 
be so sly about it, or else meet with heavy opposition. I sometimes 
fancy that in my condition if I had less opposition and more society 
and stimulus—but John says the very worst thing I can do is to think 
about my condition, and I confess it always makes me feel bad (10).
The narrator disagrees with the ideas presented by male authorities in 
her life, but, as she repeats several times, what is she to do? She does not 
complain here about any physiological symptoms, instead complaining 
more about the “opposition” she is facing. She clearly desires healing, 
because she has thought about what kind of actions—such as exercise—
would help “do her good”. She is also trying to improve her condition. 
For example, the narrator claims that she does not write so much because 
John has forbidden it. However, of course she is still writing because 
we are supposedly reading her first-hand account. The existence of 
the story itself, penned by the narrator forbidden from pen and paper, 
becomes a symbol of resistance that defies John and his views. The 
narrator is attempting to cure herself—but not just of hysteria or any 
other diagnosable syndrome. She wants to cure herself of opposition, of 
the oppressive attitudes that surround her by resisting her prescription.
The narrator experiments further with the performance of diagnosis, 
embracing John’s diagnostic tendencies even as she disagrees with 
them. Finding John’s explanation that there is “nothing the matter with 
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[her] but temporary nervous depression—a slight hysterical tendency” 
unsatisfactory, the narrator creates her own diagnosis, writing, “there 
is something strange about the house—I can feel it” (10). The narrator 
then spends large portions of the text gazing out of the window and 
contemplates “burning the house” (15). Generally assumed to signify 
the protagonist’s growing insanity, the focus upon the house indicates 
the narrator’s longing for cure, suggesting that the narrator intuits that 
cure necessitates some form of destruction. Hoping to find the answer 
to her problems, the narrator understands the desirability of diagnosis 
but also realizes that a “restoration of health” would require a different 
kind of violent architectural “restoration”. 
John confines the narrator to a room papered with an ugly wallpaper; 
soon, the narrator becomes obsessed with it, and further diagnoses 
herself by insisting that the wallpaper is at the heart of her sickness. 
She fervently writes in her journal: “The color [of the wallpaper] is 
repellant, almost revolting; a smouldering unclean yellow, strangely 
faded by the slow-turning sunlight. It is a dull yet lurid orange in some 
places, a sickly sulphur tint in others…I should hate [the wallpaper]…
if I had to live in this room long” (13). The narrator’s description of the 
paper mimics a body’s experience of sickness. Often critics argue the 
wallpaper symbolizes the narrator’s sickness (hysteria);7 however, the 
wallpaper magnifies the effects not of the illness, but of the cure. The 
winding leaf pattern in the wallpaper resembles a cage, symbolic of her 
imprisonment in the room. Moreover, the narrator’s claim, “I should 
hate [the wallpaper] myself if I had to live in this room long” indicates 
that she realizes that if the rest cure is inflicted upon her for a long 
time, her hatred of the wallpaper will only grow. The narrator grows 
suspicious, not of her hysteria symptoms, but of the paper, and indulges 
in diagnostic patterns of thought that lead her to see the paper as the 
cause of her problems.
The narrator soon begs John to get rid of the wallpaper, hoping that she 
can banish the material embodiment of her imprisonment; however, 
John continues to refuse to believe that his medical treatment could 
damage her. She writes, 
I suppose John never was nervous in his life. He laughs at me so 
about this wall-paper! At first he meant to repaper the room, but 
afterwards he said that I was letting it get the better of me, and that 
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nothing was worse for a nervous patient than to give way to such 
fancies. ‘You know the place is doing you good,’ he said, ‘and really, 
dear, I don’t care to renovate the house just for a three months’ 
rental.’ ‘Then do let us go downstairs,’ I said, ‘there are such pretty 
rooms there (14).
John never does permit his wife to leave the room, and the narrator’s 
desire to be rid of the wallpaper can be read as an attempt to cure herself 
of the rest cure. Just as Clare argues that cure involves restoration, a type 
of destruction with the end goal of returning something to a previous, 
presumably healthy state, the narrator desires to see the room renovated, 
and herself freed from the wallpaper’s winding, lurid pattern. John’s 
refusal to renovate the room can be read as a refusal to help his wife. 
Meanwhile, the narrator’s desire to be rid of the wallpaper, symbolic of 
her hatred of the rest cure, indicates that she wants to cure herself of a 
damaging cure.
As the urge to seek cure is intuitive and desirable, the narrator begins 
to imagine destroying the wallpaper so earnestly that she visualizes 
death within its pattern. The narrator secretly writes in her journal: “I 
never saw a worse paper in my life. One of those sprawling flamboyant 
patterns committing every artistic sin. It is dull enough to confuse the 
eye in following, pronounced enough to constantly irritate and provoke 
study, and when you follow the lame uncertain curves for a little distance 
they suddenly commit suicide—plunge off at outrageous angles, destroy 
themselves in unheard of contradictions” (13). The curves and lines 
of the wallpaper seem to the narrator to “destroy themselves”. While 
this is generally interpreted as symbolic of the possibility that hysteria 
may lead to the urge to complete suicide, the narrator’s interpretation 
of the wallpaper’s pattern could indicate that she recognizes that 
treating hysteria necessitates a death of self. John’s insistence on her 
imprisonment becomes a violent destruction of the narrator’s creative 
desires. Moreover, for paper—the material on which this very story is 
printed—to be described in such an extreme way demonstrates that 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” is becoming as unruly and destructive as the 
wallpaper itself. The narrator’s own written journal and Gilman’s written 
story arguably commit “every artistic sin”. They are written despite the 
commands of the narrator’s and Gilman’s doctors, and they fixate on 
wallpaper—an object traditionally thought to belong to a domestic, not 
literary or scholarly, realm. As the narrator continues to fixate upon the 
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wallpaper as the source and embodied material reality of her physical 
and social condition, the short story itself becomes a meta representation 
of “artistic sin”.
These complexities deepen when next the narrator begins to see a 
woman trapped and creeping within the wallpaper, and the narrator 
becomes fascinated by this human form. The narrator writes, “At night 
in any kind of light, in twilight, candlelight, lamplight, and worst of all 
by moonlight, it becomes bars! The outside pattern I mean, and the 
woman behind it is as plain as can be. I didn’t realize for a long time 
what the thing was that showed behind, that dim sub-pattern, but now I 
am quite sure it is a woman. By daylight she is subdued, quiet. I fancy it 
is the pattern that keeps her so still. It is so puzzling. It keeps me quiet 
by the hour” (23). The sudden insertion of this trapped woman into the 
narrative creates a doubling effect that shapes the story into one about 
two women, the narrator and her echo in the wall. This may inspire 
(especially female) readers to become self-conscious about the fact that 
they themselves are gazing upon Gilman’s on-paper story—especially 
since, evidently, paper has the power to push a woman’s imagination in 
astonishing and dangerous directions. Readers themselves are studying, 
with rapt and productive fascination, a paper which has a pattern that 
becomes more complex “by the hour”. The hysteria of the wallpaper 
is passed onto the narrator’s text, which is then absorbed by Gilman’s 
audience.
The narrator believes the paper is infectious, and that its mind-altering 
consequences impact John’s abilities to diagnose. The narrator satirically 
diagnoses John, demonstrating her simultaneous desire for diagnosis and 
hatred of what the rest cure is taking from her. After noticing that John 
is watching her and observing her symptoms, the narrator mockingly 
imitates John’s diagnostic thought, explaining why he “seems very queer 
sometimes” by saying that “It strikes me occasionally, just as a scientific 
hypothesis,—that perhaps it is the paper!” (26–27). This appropriation 
of John’s scientific approach demonstrates that the narrator continues 
to simultaneously experiment with, and mock, diagnostic performances 
as uncertain and overconfident attempts to understand reality. 
As she follows the movements of the woman behind the paper, the 
narrator confesses her watchfulness to her ever more attentive reader 
and indicates she no longer sees the wallpaper solely as a symbol of 
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imprisonment. Studying the wallpaper gives her mind something to do, 
demonstrating the intriguing power of diagnostic thought: “Life is very 
much more exciting now than it used to be. You see I have something 
more to expect, to look forward to, to watch…[John] laughed a little the 
other day, and said I seemed to be flourishing in spite of my wallpaper. 
I turned it off with a laugh. I had no intention of telling him it was 
because of the wallpaper—he would make fun of me. He might even 
want to take me away” (27). The narrator no longer thinks about her 
“return” to health and doesn’t want the wallpaper to be taken away; 
she rather thinks about what she has “to look forward to” (27). The 
narrator identifies with the woman she sees within it, and the symbol of 
her imprisonment is twisted into a symbol of liberation. However, the 
wallpaper never becomes attractive. It remains indeterminate, complex, 
unresolved, disturbing; it continues to embody, like the form of the 
story we are reading, “unheard of contradictions”. By now the narrator 
is determined to find out its meaning. During the day, by “normal” 
standards, it remains “tiresome and perplexing” (28). But at night she 
sees a woman, or many women, shaking the pattern and trying to climb 
through it. Women “get through”, she perceives, “and then the pattern 
strangles them off and turns them upside down, and makes their eyes 
white!” (30). Medical diagnosis can be relentless and deadly, resulting in 
confusion and a failure to solve problems.
The story ends in total confusion as the simultaneous urge to diagnose 
and hatred of diagnosis and its consequences meet in a moment of total 
unruliness. The narrator invites John into her room. John cries, “What 
is the matter?’. . . ‘For God’s sake, what are you doing!’ I kept on creeping 
just the same, but I looked at him over my shoulder. ‘I’ve got out at last,’ 
said I, ‘in spite of you and Jane! And I’ve pulled off most of the paper, 
so you can’t put me back!’ Now why should that man have fainted? But 
he did, and right across my path by the wall, so that I had to creep over 
him every time!” (36). These lines refuse to clarify what has happened. 
“Jane” has never before been mentioned—the narrator’s true name 
seems to have been dictated only in this moment of destruction. The 
woman in the wallpaper and the narrator—now seemingly the same 
woman—have pulled off the wallpaper, the hysteria liberated and the 
symbol of the rest cure demolished. The narrator claims John fainted; 
she therefore implies that he has been infected with “weakness” or the 
hysteria he himself assigned to the narrator. Furthermore, while at 
the beginning of the story the narrator indicated that she was writing 
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down this entire first-person account in her journal, that narration is 
now thrown into disbelief (for how could she write this account if she 
is “creeping”?). Hysteria is never cured in the story; rather, hysteria, its 
wildness, randomness, and its slippery diagnostic categorization makes 
Gilman’s most famous literary work possible. The story’s narrator rejects 
a restoration or return to health; instead she has produced something 
very new, an outcome completely at odds with her physician-husband’s 
expectations. She has, to put it confusingly, cured herself of the rest 
cure, and that she abandons a traditional form of narration causes the 
story itself to embody the contradictory forms of both disorder and cure.
“The Yellow Wallpaper” embraces destruction, and the narrator’s 
writing itself becomes fragmented and ambiguous. Over the course 
of the text, hysteria, the rest cure, the house itself, and the wallpaper 
are all submitted as possible causes for the narrator’s symptoms. 
Each of these uncertain diagnoses is met with confusion, rejection, 
and demolition while the narrator is trapped in systems of medical 
authority. It is impossible either to concretely diagnose the narrator or 
symptomatically solve the puzzles of the story, for the urge to diagnose 
is itself under question throughout the tale.
Conclusion: Hysteria Undefined, Perpetuated
In 1913, Gilman claimed that her story would put an end to the rest 
cure and that it was successful in preventing hysteria. She wrote that The 
Yellow Wallpaper  was “not intended to drive people crazy, but to save 
people from being driven crazy, and it worked” (Why I Wrote the ‘Yellow 
Wallpaper’? 271). Just as when Gilman distanced herself from insanity 
(which she associated with laziness and invalidism) in her initial letter 
to Mitchell, here she dissociates her own story with craziness, attesting 
that cure and prevention are at the heart of the story’s aims. Though 
Gilman claims that Mitchell amended his treatment of nervous illness 
after becoming aware of her story, scholars have not discovered any 
comment by Mitchell referring either to his treatment of Gilman or to 
her work of fiction.8 Gilman might not have been correct in assuming 
that her story prevented “craziness”, especially as the tale itself unravels 
in a hysterical narrative form and simultaneously embodies the urge to 
diagnose that disorderliness.
“A SLIGHT HYSTERICAL TENDENCY” 119
Nevertheless, critics have largely assumed that Gilman’s story was 
supposed to be therapeutic and to find a cure for something, whether 
it be hysteria or something else. There has long existed an assumption 
that Gilman’s story can be “solved”. As Jane F. Thrailkill argues, 
What has led critics astray in reading Gilman’s story, I would argue, 
is that in presenting a creepy story that in fact becomes a story of 
creeping, it emulates the form of such a patient, which in turn elicits 
in its post-Freudian readers an almost irresistible will to interpret: 
to in fact doctor the text .  .  . And, despite many indicators to the 
contrary, in almost every case the doctoring leads inexorably to an 
account of someone ‘getting better’: whether it’s the narrator (who, 
last seen on all fours, purportedly triumphs over her husband and 
patriarchy), or Gilman (whose biography, which involved a lifelong 
struggle with nervous illness, is dramatically reshaped to model an 
archetypal feminist success story), or even the text itself (which has, 
in recent decades, quite literally been canonized) (552).
I hope to continue Thrailkill’s work of explaining why we readers may 
feel an urge to “doctor” the story. As I have suggested, the story is 
infectious. It embodies an unruly form and it emphasizes the narrator’s 
urge to diagnose, an urge that might resonate with its readers. The 
narrator experiences a deep desire for diagnosis even as she denounces 
patriarchal diagnostic thought. For readers to want to continue to 
diagnose both the narrator and Gilman makes sense in light of the 
fact that the story perpetually grapples with diagnosis, its desirability, 
and its severe consequences. However, it is vital that readers of the story 
be attentive to that urge to diagnose, for reading the story through 
only a pathologizing lens may limit our approaches to its hysterical 
performance.
Furthermore, Gilman’s story does not cure hysteria or offer new 
modes for its treatment. Rather, the story demonstrates that hysteria is 
provocative and therefore a formidable source of literary inspiration. 
Though Gilman claimed her story prevented “craziness”, she wrote in 
a letter, “I read the thing to three women here…and I never saw such 
squirms!” (quoted in Allen 186). By the author’s own admission, the story 
seemed only to induce symptoms of hysteria in some of the women who 
heard it. The story succeeded in rendering the rest cure notorious, but 
it does not succeed in ending hysteria—it instead continues the violence 
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of diagnosis inherent in the history of hysteria and points us to rich and 
fascinating diagnostic mysteries while also embodying hysteria’s unruly 
and destructive power.
Notes
1 Charlotte Perkins Gilman, “The Yellow Wallpaper.” (1973), p. 13. Completed 
in 1890, Gilman’s short story was first published in New England Magazine in 
1892. The original 1892 publication included the inconsistent hyphenation 
of the word “wallpaper”, although I follow critical convention in omitting 
the hyphen from the story’s title.
2 Jane F. Thrailkill, “Doctoring ‘The Yellow Wallpaper.’” (2002). Critics who 
famously read “The Yellow Wallpaper” in order to explain the narrator’s 
symptoms or diagnose the author herself include Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Writer and the Nineteenth Century 
Literary Imagination (1979, 89–92); Annette Kolodny, “A Map for Rereading: 
Or Gender and the Interpretation of Literary Texts” (1980); and Jean E. 
Kennard, “Convention Coverage or How to Read Your Own Life” (1992, 
168).
3 Including Cynthia J. Davis, Bodily and Narrative Forms: The Influence of 
Medicine on American Literature, 1845–1915 (2000) and Diane Price Herndl, 
“The Writing Cure: Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Anna O., and ‘Hysterical’ 
Writing.” (1988). 
4 I tend to use the phrases “disability theory” or “disability studies,” as these 
are used to describe many of my secondary sources. However, the phrase 
“crip theory” is also useful. Crip theory expands disability studies by 
“including within disability communities those who lack a ‘proper’ (read: 
medically acceptable, doctor-provided, and insurer approved) diagnosis for 
their symptoms.” See Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip. (18). Kafer’s point 
that diagnosis has contributed to assumptions about who can identify as 
disabled and participate in the disability studies community underlines 
diagnosis’s power in these fields of study.
5 These phrases are often used in medical texts (Albert 119). Also see R. R. 
Ledley and L. B. Lusted, “Reasoned Foundations of Medical Diagnosis.” (9). 
The phrase “perform a diagnostic test” is also used (Albert 38). I could not 
find the history of the phrase “perform a diagnosis”, but the use of the word 
“perform” as in “perform a cure” has been in use since 1774 (oed.com). 
6 Ann J. Lane, To Herland and Beyond: The Life and Work of Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman (113). Lane’s source for this anecdote is Gilman herself, who wrote 
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of the encounter in her autobiography, published 43 years after “The Yellow 
Wallpaper”. 
7 As Gilbert and Gubar famously do in The Madwoman in the Attic (89–92).
8 The story that Mitchell changed his diagnosis and treatment of hysteria 
and neurasthenia after reading a copy of “The Yellow Wallpaper” is 
unsubstantiated and questioned by Suzanne Poirier, “The Weir Mitchell 
Rest Cure: Doctor and Patients”. Women’s Studies, vol. 10, 1983, pp. 15–40.
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Feminist Collectives for the Twenty-First 
Century 
Elke Krasny 
Hysteria has returned. We are witnessing a hysterical turn in the twenty-
first century. In this chapter I will lay out preliminary thoughts on the 
relationship between hysteria and patriarchy. In particular, the interest 
is on a new and emergent form of hysteria activism in current feminism. 
This hysteria activism is a critical reaction to today’s patriarchal 
misogyny and its widely spread ideology of hate. Weaving together 
observations on the multiple crises of our time and its politics of mass 
hysteria with the knowledge of etymology and insights into histories of 
hysteria as they are of importance to building an understanding for 
the new phenomenon of hysteria activism, the structure of this chapter 
builds on the historic legacy of the wandering womb. Historically, 
the idea of the womb, hystéra, wandering in the body was behind the 
notion of hysteria. This dates back to Ancient Greek medical thought 
and to practices in demonology. Such a wandering approach allows 
for me to connect our hysterical moment today to other, much earlier 
hysterical moments as they have been recorded in history.1 Wandering 
is borrowed from hysteria’s history. The medical legacy of hysteria is 
firmly tied to the attack. Hysteria was understood as a form of attack 
on body and mind. French nineteenth-century neurologist Jean-Martin 
Charcot famously described and detailed the different phases of the 
hysteric attack.2 Here, attack is understood both as the attack suffered 
from patriarchy, which results in the diagnosis of hysteria, and the 
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attack performed by hysteria, which effectively exposes the traumas 
and wounds inflicted by patriarchy. Seen like this, the hysteric is both 
victim and agent of the attack. While wandering is behind the structure 
of this chapter, the attack serves as its motivation for analysis. The 
dual nature of the attack, tied to medical history just as much as to 
military history, is of interest. The attack, paradoxically, is therefore 
at once unplanned for and strategically prepared and planned out, 
unwanted and deliberate. The attack is also borrowed from hysteria’s 
history, yet the motivation of this chapter is firmly rooted in our present 
day and age. Structured in three parts, the first one introduces the 
idea that hysteria and hysterical can be made out as keywords central 
to the formation of historical consciousness in the early twenty-first 
century. Understood as ungovernable emotional excess, hysteria has 
become a global signifier. We are witnessing a hysterical turn in the 
media-based politics characteristic of our period of post-truth politics 
dominated by the economy of emotions. The second part teases out 
connections between the idea of the wandering womb and the present-
day relationship between hysteria, patriarchy, and feminism. The third 
and final part focuses on twenty-first-century hysteria activism with its 
attacks on violently misogynist patriarchy. It offers a first-time overview 
on feminist collectives performing hysteria activism with examples from 
Kolkata, London, Los Angeles, and Vienna. 
Hysteria and Hysterical: Keywords for the Twenty-First Century 
Hysteria is back. The ubiquity of the terms hysteria and hysterical in the 
media, in particular on social media, is astounding. We find political 
opponents accusing each other of being hysterical. We find political 
leaders, journalists, influencers, or public commentators speaking of 
mass hysteria. Those called hysterical are very often painted as hapless 
victims who are overwhelmed by unfounded emotions that cause 
them to have a completely distorted understanding of reality. Such a 
diagnosis of being over-emotional, of being out of control and unstable, 
is very much linked to the feminization the term hysterical engenders. 
Those who are hysterical can by no means be taken seriously. They are 
unreliable. 
If Raymond Williams, foundational figure in the cultural studies with a 
materialist approach to the analysis of mass culture, were to search for 
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society today, hysteria and hysterical 
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would definitely be among his first finds. Keywords are critical tools 
useful to unlock the formation of contemporary consciousness. It is 
of importance to note that hysteria and hysterical are used in a most 
pejorative way today. In the vocabulary of politics, media, culture, 
and society, hysteria and hysterical are expletives. These terms are 
employed much like weapons as they target individuals, public figures, 
communities, large groups, or even the masses. These terms serve 
to discredit those called out as suffering from hysteria and acting 
hysterically. Currently, keywords circulate in real time as they spread 
and multiply digitally. Hysteria and hysterical have gone viral, amplified 
through the algorithms of digital cultures of communication. 
Pejorative Callings: The Hysterical Turn in the Twenty-First 
Century 
The hysterical turn is omnipresent in the media. Headlines, newspaper 
articles, hashtags, tweets, blog entries, and facebook posts all contribute 
massively to this hysterical turn. Hysteria and hysterical have been 
transformed into global mass signifiers. They are used to discredit all 
those who call out the systemic violence of xenophobic, misogynist, 
racist neoliberal authoritarianism, right-wing populism and far right 
extremism. Calling someone hysterical is a pejorative calling. Such 
callings are accusatory, insulting, spiteful, and hostile. Pejorative 
callings are a strategy employed to discredit others. They are a key 
feature of post-factual politics with its economy of emotion and its ties 
to the ideology of hate. 
Let us now take a look at a small sample of news items that make use of 
the term hysteria: “Anti-Trump Hysteria” (Pletka), “Erdogan hysteria” 
(Williams, A.), “homophobic hysteria” (Spektor) fuelled by Brazilian 
president Jair Bolsonaro, “global warming hysteria” (Riddley), “hysteria 
about refugees” (Kristof), “border wall hysteria” (Lyons), “debt hysteria” 
(Chait), “Brexit hysteria” (Moore), “metoo mass hysteria” (Walsh). All 
crisis conditions are linked to hysteria. 
Such use of hysteria is rhetorical, with hysteria referring to emotional 
excess lacking argument, reason, and credibility. This connects to 
historical discourses on hysteria with the hysterics believed to have a 
disordered state of mind and also held to be liars as they deceitfully only 
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perform their symptoms. In Madness and Civilization, Michel Foucault has 
emphasized that Enlightenment medical discourse described hysteria 
as “the feminine illness par excellence” speaking of it as “[…] this 
disease in which women invent, exaggerate, and repeat all the various 
absurdities of which a disordered imagination is capable, has sometimes 
become epidemic and contagious” (Foucault 139, quoted in Bronfen, 
112). Connecting the term hysteria to crisis conditions characteristic of 
our time calls for trouble. The response to crisis conditions is marked as 
hysteria. By calling out the response as hysterical, the crisis is belittled, 
made unreal. To all the others, who are sound of mind, such a reaction 
is alarmism, merely hysterical. Through such strategic use of hysteria, 
the very existence of crisis conditions is called into question.
Hysteria/Hysterike/Hysterikos
Hysteria, hysterikos, and hysterike are interesting words. The 
etymological root takes us to Ancient Greece. Etymologically, the word 
hysteria derives from the Ancient Greek hystéra, the womb. This is the 
part of the body that acts as a protective hollow space sheltering the 
offspring before birth. 
Hysteria does not simply refer to an organ central to reproduction, 
but to the pathologization of the womb. Such pathologization is tied 
to the birth of patriarchy and to what is known as the phallic regime. 
In historical-medical terms, Hippocrates in Ancient Greece, and 
in historical-psychoanalytical, in Freudian terms, the womb meant 
trouble (King; Freud). The womb was understood to be a prime source 
of disorder and illness. Those subjects whom we might call wombed 
subjects were considered to be afflicted by such illnesses. In Ancient 
Greek medical and demonological thought the womb was believed to 
be a moving organ. Discursively, women, whose bodies were marked by 
the wandering womb, were regarded as not in control of their bodies 
and, by extension, of reproduction. Even worse, they were held to be 
dis-ordered precisely because of their lack of willful control over a key 
organ of reproduction, also known as generation. The womb is the 
place of generation, in the dual sense of the word. Generation means 
the act of procreation or production, and generation means the time 
span between the birth of parents and the birth of their offspring. This 
allows us to see the womb in its centrality to generation. Little surprise, 
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then, that Ancient Greek medicine diagnosed the womb as a mobile 
and unruly organ. This provided the perfect reason to shore up the 
patriarchal power for generation as it was ordered and aligned to the 
forces of patriarchy. 
Hysterikos is the adjective derived from hystéra and means to have 
to do with the womb. We might come up with a new adjective here: 
wombic. While women are wombed beings, wombic refers to all beings 
sharing a passage from the womb to the world. Such is natality that 
it is tied to the womb. Interestingly enough, visibility and discourse 
on key reproductive organs, the womb, the breast, the vagina, and 
the penis, have been distributed very unevenly. While the phallus, 
and with it the phallic regime if we follow Jacques Lacan, occupies 
the symbolic order, hystéra and the hysteric mark social and cultural 
norms (Lacan; Butler). In a 1958 lecture, delivered in German at the 
Max-Planck Institute for Psychiatry, Jacques Lacan introduced Die 
Bedeutung des Phallus (The Meaning or Signification of the Phallus). 
This was consequently published in Écrits in 1966. In the Introduction 
II to Feminine Sexuality. Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne, translator 
Jacqueline Rose writes the following: “For Lacan it [the phallus] takes 
on this value as a function of the androcentric nature of the symbolic 
order itself” (38). In her chapter “Gender Regulations” included in the 
2004 book Undoing Gender, philosopher Judith Butler has importantly 
drawn attention to the difference between the symbolic order, the Law, 
and the social sphere of norms (see 43). Building on her thought, we 
come to realize that the hysteric always acts in the social sphere. The 
hysteric embodies, and performs, the attack of the norm: the norm that 
attacks and the norm that is attacked. 
Hysteria Collectives: Feminist Attacks
With hysteria and hysterical having been turned into pejorative keywords 
of the twenty-first century, claiming, reclaiming, appropriating, 
enacting, and performing hysteria can be understood as acts of 
feminism. Such hysteria activism adopts different strategies: deception, 
artful subterfuge, or confrontational attack. Hysteria activism uses 
the media as platform for global visibility and local issues. It performs 
subversive, resistant, defiant, satirical, even militantly violent attacks on 
patriarchy’s attacks.
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The collectives, whose names first inspired my interest in their activism 
made me understand that there is, in fact, a new form of feminist 
activism for the twenty-first century. I have named this activism hysteria 
activism. The four collectives are Kolkata-based Eye Art Collective and 
its HysteriaFemCon, London-based Hysteria, the Association of Hysteric 
Curators in Los Angeles, and the Akademische Burschenschaft Hysteria zu 
Wien in Vienna. They make their claim to hysteria in order to expose 
the wounds and traumas inflicted by patriarchy. The history of hysteria 
is the history of patriarchy. Hysteria is one of the ways through which 
the traumatic wounds of patriarchy are rendered legible—audibly, 
visibly, bodily, performatively. Through feminist scholarship on hysteria 
we have come to understand its dual nature: on one side a symptom 
through which patriarchy’s violence is being diagnosed and on the 
other side an act of defiance that exposes, showcases, makes visible 
and known this violence through its performance. An overview of the 
scope of feminist scholarship on hysteria extends by far the scope of 
this essay. Important contributions include those by Luce Irigaray, Julia 
Kristeva, Elisabeth Bronfen, Christina von Braun, or Elaine Showalter. 
Feminism connects hysteria to patriarchy. Hysteria is therefore not only 
implicated in the history of patriarchy, but also forms part of the archive 
of feminisms into which today’s hysteria activism enters. 
The twenty-first century witnessed the formation of feminist hysteria 
collectives in cities round the globe. Neither connected to each other 
nor adopting the same language, similar concerns can be identified in 
the work of four different feminist collectives based in Kolkata, London, 
Los Angeles, and Vienna. All four of them attack the attack of populist 
patriarchy, in particular right-wing populism and its violent misogyny. 
While right-wing nativism is a widely studied subject, right-wing gender 
politics, in particular misogyny as an ideology, remains in need of 
further study (Mudde; Köttig, Bitzan, and Petö). 
Globally, nationalism, xenophobia, and misogyny are on the rise. Be 
it Brexitism, Trumpianism, Hindu Nationalism, or the Austrian Far 
Right, each locale where hysteria collectives have formed suffers from 
the attacks of violent othering rooted in the ideology of hate. With the 
four feminist collectives claiming hysteria, they make these connections 
understood. Choosing the word attack to describe their actions honors 
the hysterics who performed the attack at the Salpetrière at the end 
of the nineteenth century as they were studied by Jean-Martin Charcot 
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and captured in photographs by Paul Richer. An earlier generation of 
feminist scholarship has identified the hysterics’ agency. Christina von 
Braun wrote in 1985 that the hysteric is not victim to the attack, but 
much rather stages or enacts it (31). Enacting is useful for approaching 
the four contemporary hysteria collectives. Their chosen means of 
enacting attacks range from hashtag to Facebook entry, from citizen 
journalism to poetry, from appropriated imagery to striking visuality 
in art works, from printed publications to conference, from hymn to 
manifesto, from exhibitions to public wakes or demonstrations. The 
forms are at once vehicle and process of attacks. 
“Hysteria is feminist activism”. This is the opening sentence on 
the website of London-based and globally active platform Hysteria 
(hystericalfeminisms). Initiated in 2013 by a number of students from 
the School of Oriental and African Studies Feminist Society at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, 
they have grown into a global collective consisting of more than fifty 
individuals. Dedicated to feminisms in the plural, their publication 
Hysteria is conceived of as a radical platform for publishing. It brings 
together striking imagery, visual art, poetry, essays, and interviews. 
While all content is firmly committed to feminism, it is all about 
feminisms, contradictions, conflicts, and being firm about the fact 
that feminisms are based in supporting disagreements. Independence 
is key to the platform. Each issue of the publication is self-financed 
through crowd funding. In an interview with VICE Magazine, one of 
the members, Ama Josephine Budge, links their collective to historical 
hysteria while criticizing the widespread white bias in hysteria histories. 
She states: “Women diagnosed with ‘hysteria’ were incarcerated and 
studied in Pitié-Salpêtrière [hospital] in 19th century Paris. It previously 
was spiritual and tribal associations of women in heightened states, 
communing with the gods, medicine women, sacrificial virgins. Most 
cultures reference the hysteric in one guise or another. We reject the idea 
that HYSTERIA only references a white, European history, or feminism” 
(VICE Magazine). Asked to explain the notion behind hysterical 
feminism, Jago Rackham explains that “it’s supposed to challenge an 
idea of a hegemonic knowledge or argument” (VICE Magazine). The 
interview is accompanied by a black-and-white photograph from Agata 
Cardoso’s Arche-Types series in which the analog photographer explores 
the visual legacies of hysteria imagery owed to Charcot and Richer. There 
are also two quite troubling photographs of left hands that appear to 
132 ELKE KRASNY 
be wounded. These are documentary images from the installation and 
performance Her/She Senses, a collaboration between Angela Ellsworth 
and Tina Takemoto (covenberlin; aellsworth.com/hershesenses/).
The collective uses launches, events, and exhibitions to share feminisms 
and its contradictions and controversies. Their nine-paragraph-long 
Hysteria Manifesto states the following: “Hysteria is a collective borne 
from juxtaposing and interlacing multiplicities of feminisms that react 
to histories of subjugation” (linkedin). They insist that “f[F]eminisms 
are for everyone and not reserved for the privileged few” (linkedin). 
And they introduce a radically new notion of solidarity, hysterical 
solidarity. They claim: “Without hysterical solidarity we are deluded 
by the composure of patriarchy“ (linkedin). Hysteria counteracts the 
destruction and co-optation “by the multi-faceted, hydra headed, 
machinations of patriarchy, conservatism and capitalism” (linkedin). 
As of 2018, even though the collective’s website has expired, its digital 
presence on facebook and twitter remains active and alive. 
One of the cover photos we find on the facebook account of the Association 
of Hysteric Curators AHC is a black-and-white image titled These Hysterical 
Women. One of the two women suffers from an attack of migraine, the 
older one of the two soothingly gives some advice. The image is from 
a 1932 newspaper advertisement for Lydia E. Pinkham’s Vegetable 
Compound Tablet Form. “Crying … Sobbing … laughing! She has no 
control of herself … […] over wrought. Nerves strung to the breaking 
point“ (hystericcurators). The hysteria history referenced here is that of 
the widespread assumption of hysteria being a typical female affliction, 
and, of course, presenting a source for creating all kinds of marketable 
remedies to be sold as treatments. We identify here the hysteric woman 
in need of cure, the hysteric woman targeted by the market, and the 
hysteric woman consoled by an older female companion. All these 
elements, women accused of spinning out of control, the relation to 
the market, and transgenerationality, we find in the AHC collective. 
Initiated by Mary Anna Pomonis after a male museum curator rejected 
a proposed artistic contribution of hers on the grounds that it was too 
personal and not political enough, she took action. She decided to 
occupy the coveted, and historically controversially discussed, position 
of the curator “as a form of protest” (radicalactions; see Richter). She set 
out to form a supportive team of women of different ages curating each 
other, effectively rejecting the idea of so-called independent curating 
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(Krasny). Their hysteria is their attack on the hegemony in the art world 
system. Their attack is curation without leadership, “working in a non-
hierarchical way” (radicalactions). Their manifesto sums this up as 
follows: 
AHC envelops a fluid, evolving, trans-generational group of women 
who gather bi-weekly to share in a discussion around contemporary 
feminism and the historicity of the term. We seek to explore notions 
of female protest and the presence of gendered articulations through 
a non-hierarchical structure based in dialogue and exchange. […] 
As a working model, we understand that democratic consensus 
is slow and laborious in comparison to the type of fast paced and 
often decentralized systems found today. […] We are invitational 
and open, focused on explorations of female power through vistas 
of holes, blanks, ruptures, and catastrophes. As an agent of chaos 
and change, we posit our curatorial agenda as a figurative fault line 
[…]” (radicalactions).
They meet regularly every two weeks to plan their actions collectively. 
These actions include art making, research on feminist art and 
history, studio visits, exhibitions, public talks, and public performance. 
Though originally formed around the misogyny and patriarchal 
power structure in art world politics rather than motivated by politics 
at large, their active website clearly demonstrates their political 
concerns as they post and lobby that Virginia, the last state in the US 
that has not yet signed the ERA amendment, to do so “that women 
can finally be included in the constitution” (hystericcurators). 
Hashtags they join in and make use of include amongst others 
#equalpay #equality #socialjustice#feminism #feminists
 #metoo #timesup #justiceforsurvivors” (hystericcurators).
“Hysteria will help people understand the nature and method of 
oppression that they face through the patriarchy, and will enable 
them to rise as gender tolerant individuals who actively combat gender 
violence” (autistic org). Hysteria activism was used by the Kolkata-based 
Eye Art Collective to expose and to attack the gendered everyday violence 
in their local Indian context. An article on the 2015 Hysteria FemCon 
written by Perana YSK starts as follows: “In India, a woman is raped 
every 32 minutes. A minor girl is abducted every 36 minutes. A girl 
is trafficked every 46 minutes. A woman is sexually harassed every 12 
134 ELKE KRASNY 
minutes. 21 women are murdered every day” (youthkiawaaz). Against 
this background, the Eye Art Collective, who organized the 2015 three-day 
Hysteria FemCon in Kolkata, emphasizes that hysteria is a way to critically 
understand and counteract patriarchal violence. Hysteria is used to 
build solidarity and to gather knowledge for the collaborative feminist 
attack on the violent attacks of patriarchy. 
The Eye Art Collective was founded in 2014 by a small group of students 
in Kolkata. As of August 2018, their website, which they used for this 
period of four years to announce their “art based programming” and 
their “independent counterculture webzine”, has officially closed 
down (eye-art-collective). In her closing words, the founding member, 
Manisha Ganguly, looks back at their collectively shared work and their 
accomplishments: Starting from a “small room in Calcutta” dedicated to 
“truth-telling of hyperlocal issues […] ignored by mainstream media”, 
the feminist collective employed “citizen journalism” and relied on 
“crowdfunding” and “the goodwill of readers” (Ganguly). In their first 
year they “grew to a team of 30” reporting on “feminist counter culture” 
and “mass civil disobedience” (Ganguli). The collaborative journalism 
team reported on “human rights abuses in Kashmir, from the  white 
papers  to  mass graves;  followed the conflict  in  Bastar;  interviewed 
people like Nobel Peace Prize nominee Parveena Ahangar and A Softer 
World;  and broke the story on illegal land grabs in  Kanha National 
Park” (Ganguli). They commented on “antifascism in the era of Trump 
and Modi” and the “acid attacks on Soni Sori” (Ganguli). As they 
continued their brave attacks through speaking out and reporting, they 
had to learn to survive this kind of investigative journalism as it was 
met by increasing violence. And they also suffered from the emotional 
duress their work caused them. They were “tortured by the trauma of 
reporting on gender violence as a mostly female team entirely composed 
of sexual violence survivors” (autistici). One of their early stories was on 
“hokkolorob, where the West Bengal police denied sending riot police 
to detain 80 students, hospitalised 37, and sexually assaulted women at 
a peaceful protest against sexual assault; a story which gave us 100,000 
readers in a month” (Ganguli). This solidarity and support of readers 
led its being possible to organize “India’s first of its kind national 
feminist convention  Hysteria, at the Goethe-Institute in Kolkata” in 
2015 (Ganguli). 
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The invitation to the conference displays a highly visual artivism. We 
find assembled and grouped together a number of very different images 
that seek to draw attention to the fact that hysteria activism addresses 
the urgent issue of extreme patriarchal violence. Among these images 
there are the following two: a miniature watercolor showing the 
goddess Mahavidya Chinnamasta by the current-day traditional Indian 
painter Kailash Raj and the 1989 iconic work Untitled (Your body is a 
battleground)  by US-American feminist artist Barbara Kruger (exotic-
india; Caldwell). Both of these images, though in very different ways, 
join together women’s bodies, reproduction, and violence. The Hindu 
Godess Chinnamasta is a paradoxical image, both giving life and 
taking life. She appears decapitated, her hand holding her head. Thin 
squirts of blood from her neck feed her own head and devotees. She 
stands on a copulating couple. Barbara Kruger’s black-and-white split 
image of a woman’s face was made in solidarity with the 1989 Women’s 
March on Washington in support of women’s reproductive rights. The 
motivation behind the HysteriaFemCon were the sexually violent and 
murderous attacks on women’s bodies and the widespread rape culture 
in the Indian context, in particular the 2012 Delhi rape case in which 
Jyoti Singh, who was travelling on a bus, was gang raped, tortured, 
beaten, and eventually died from her injuries. This assault led to 
public outrage against murderous sexual violence in Delhi and other 
cities across India, but also in cities in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. The Eye collective strategically chose the name Hysteria to 
address such patriarchal violence and to reclaim hysteria as a tool for 
raising awareness and building knowledge in solidarity. “We named the 
convention Hysteria to obliterate its relation to the fictional feminine 
mental illness by the same name, and reclaim the word from oppressive 
patriarchal connotations” (autistici). The program of the conference 
was structured in the following parts, “The Male Gaze in cinema 
and art”, “Rape culture & the patriarchy”, “practical feminism & self 
defense”, Gender, Queer Theory & LGBTIQA+ Rights”, “Men as victims 
of the patriarchy”, and “Fascism in the Indian Context”. It also included 
screenings, such as the Eye Art Collective’s Video to Hysteria, Macho by 
Linda Broadbent, slam poetry, musical contributions, and songs of 
resistance (autistici).
The conference brought to the fore the nexus of patriarchal, fascist, 
and cultural violence as they converge in misogyny. The collaborative 
feminist citizen journalism practiced on the collective’s publication 
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platform Eyezine attacked this nexus. From their work they learned 
the following: “It is possible to be objective about facts without being 
neutral, because the truths of structural oppression through gender, 
class, and caste in India are not neutral, but have very clear boundaries 
of oppressor and oppressed; and it is naive to pretend otherwise” 
(Ganguly). Hysteria activism is dangerous, laborious, and very hard to 
finance. In the Eye Art Collective’s case it took place “amidst death and 
rape threats from the far-right” and it was challenged, and eventually 
they could not sustain their digital publishing model dues to the 
compulsory neoliberalism of “the advertising model of the digital 
economy” (Ganguly). The collective’s lasting online legacy consists of a 
650-article strong archive.
Vienna-based Akademische Burschenschaft Hysteria zu Wien have effectively 
rewritten two histories. They have altered both the course of history 
as it pertains to hysteria and the recorded history on the beginnings 
of German and Austrian Burschenschaften (see Fetteringhil Zwicker; 
Weidinger). Burschenschaft Hysteria firmly claims that the group 
was founded in 1810. This would make them the oldest existing 
Burschenschaft in the German-speaking context, being even older than 
the so-called Urburschenschaft which was founded in Jena in 1815 and 
has so far been recognized as the oldest Burschenschaft. And it would 
make hysteria’s arrival in Vienna much earlier than Freud’s well-known 
hysteric patients. Sigmund Freud’s and Joseph Breuer’s Studies in Hysteria 
were only published in 1895. 
Burschenschaft Hysteria members have taken it upon themselves to attack 
one of the oldest, most toxic, and also most influential expressions of 
power in masculinity formation in the German-speaking context: the 
Burschenschaft. Even today, many right-wing and far right politicians in 
Austria are members of traditional Burschenschaften. The collective’s 
hysteria attack has led them to band together to enact their enemy’s worst 
nightmare: they are officially recognized and registered as a “feminist 
and left-wing” Burschenschaft, open only to women (Wikipedia). 
They were founded in January 2016 and are officially registered as an 
association with the Austrian Ministry of Interior and with the part of 
the police in charge of registering associations. Their official name 
is Akademische Burschenschaft Hysteria zu Wien and the writer Stefanie 
Sargnagel acts as their headwoman (Wikipedia).
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Burschenschaft Hysteria has adopted all the symbols characteristic of 
conservative, right-wing, and alt-right Burschenschaften. When they 
march in public, they are all dressed in uniform, in black-white-red. They 
wear red hats. They have banners and flags with their mascot animal, 
the crying hyena. They have their own hymn, and much like their 
male counterparts they employ so-called couleur names (code names), 
which they use to refer to each other in public (see youtube). Their 
organization is strictly hierarchical, following rank and order. Like all the 
other Burschenschaften they have a phase of initiation before one can 
become a full member. After first making their appearance digitally on 
facebook, they took to the public. They appeared as self-commissioned 
Saal-Schutz (Hall Security), a term appropriated from Nazi terminology, 
with the Saal-Schutz being the historical beginning of the Schutzstaffel. 
They appeared as self-appointed Saal-Schutz for Stefanie Sargnagel 
when she received the Ingeborg Bachmann Award in 2016. They also 
acted as self-commissioned Saal-Schutz at Vienna City Hall for Elfriede 
Jelinek’s Die Schutzbefohlenen. The performance at the grand auditorium 
of the University of Vienna had been interrupted and disturbed by the 
right-wing extremists called Identitäre, the Identitarians, and had to be 
moved to Vienna City Hall (VICE Magazine). In 2016, they staged a 
wake for patriarchy; its demise was celebrated via a march of mourning 
at Vienna’s Prater. The police responded by sending out female police 
officers to act as the demonstration’s guards. 
Literary scholar Elisabeth Bronfen builds on Michel Foucault’s writings 
on hysteria, published in his 1961 book Madness and Civilization. She 
draws attention to the fact that historically “the hysterical body” was a 
“hybrid of real illness and deception” (112). The Burschenschaft Hysteria 
borrows from the historical hysterical body this strategy of deception. 
As they appropriate it, they take it to perfection. They become what they 
seek to attack. Deception, appropriation, and exaggeration through 
satire are joined together by these feminist activists as they collaborate 
in unison to produce a hysterically real all-feminist and all left-wing 
Burschenschaft. The collective has the capacity to mobilize in the 
hundreds and thousands for collective public actions, in which non-
members are also at times invited to join and increase their numbers, 
as long as they adhere to the before-announced dress code. They put 
forward political demands that adopt the guise of real politics. They 
demand that the right to vote for men be restricted and that an 80% 
quota of women and transgenders be introduced for all positions 
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available in public service (Wikipedia). Their claim is that, through the 
power of the womb, they will pave the way toward “golden matriarchy” 
(Burschenschaft Hysteria facebook).
In concluding: Attacking the Attacks 
Historically, hysteria has been used to turn women into beings at once 
controlled by their bodies and not in control of their bodies. Such is the 
paradox of hysteria. The womb was seen as the source of this disorder. 
Over centuries, hysteria has been made to appear natural to women. 
Thus, a lot of essentializing has been committed in the name of hysteria. 
First wave feminism witnessed the treatment of hysterical women in 
hospitals and in psychoanalysis. Hysterics became case histories. Much 
has been written about these women, at once victims and agents of 
hysteria under patriarchy. Second and third wave feminists in the fields of 
philosophy, history, theory, art making, and activism have rediscovered, 
in critical and analytical terms but also in quite celebratory modes, 
earlier hysterical performances. They have emphasized that the scope of 
hysteria clearly extended far beyond Jean-Martin Charcot’s hospital or 
Sigmund Freud’s couch as hysterics crossed lines of class, race, ethnicity, 
and age. The hysteric has become a key figure of subversive convulsions 
embodying the agony of resistance to patriarchy. The current feminism, 
with women marching and resisting fatally violent misogyny globally, 
resists the global climate of political violence and traumatic social 
and ecological ruination. Today’s hysteria activism is much less a 
reinterpretation or a rediscovery of earlier feminisms’ interest in 
hysteria, but rather a reaction to hysteria and hysterical being used as 
pejorative keywords for the twenty-first century. In light of the history 
of hysteria tied to essentialism and wombed beings, and in light of the 
current pejorative use of the terms hysteria and hysterical, making an 
activist and critical claim to hysteria for performing feminist attacks on 
patriarchy does not come easily. The hysteric activists whose work can 
be found across the globe have taken it upon themselves to wander into 
the traumas and the crises wrought by patriarchy. Attacking the attacks 
of patriarchy is not an easy thing to do. It requires courage, strength, 
endurance, and insistence. Performing these attacks in the name of 
hysteria is even more of a challenge given hysteria’s entanglements with 
patriarchy. The stakes are high for feminist collectives who do.
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Notes
1 While reminiscent of Mike Bal’s notion of travelling concepts, the idea of 
wandering as approach is different, as it values the importance of erratic 
movements. Developing wandering as a critical method in analysis and 
writing extends beyond this chapter and needs further elaboration. 
2 See, for example, Elisabeth Bronfen’s chapter “Charcot’s Vampires“ in her 
book The Knotted Subject: Hysteria and its Discontents, pp.174–240. 
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DELILLO AND MASS 
HYSTERIA
Sean Metzger
This essay offers some thoughts about the American novelist Don 
DeLillo’s work in relation to crowds, hysteria, and a stage adaptation by 
Jody McAuliffe of the novel Mao II.1 DeLillo’s fiction tends to focus on 
white male protagonists, a feature of his writing that I observe in relation 
to the resonance of DeLillo’s work today and the gendered discourse of 
hysteria. Juliet Mitchell has argued in Mad Men and Medusas: Reclaiming 
Hysteria (2000) that “hysteria has been feminized”, and further 
contends that the disappearance of hysteria as a diagnosis dovetails 
with observations of hysteria’s symptoms in men, especially from WWI 
forward (7). Although I am less interested than Mitchell in hysteria as 
a universal condition and its resuscitation as a clinical discourse, I do 
find that she and her fellow travelers like Elaine Showalter provide a 
productive mode of cultural analysis to articulate the stress and anxieties 
pertaining to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For me, 
such anxieties manifest themselves in the visual realm registering on a 
mass scale issues of amnesia, hallucinations, and problems of vision. I 
recognize that in deploying this small list of symptoms once correlated 
with hysteria I draw selectively to sketch the contours of a way of seeing 
characterized by what I would call mass hysteria. Again my point is to offer 
a direction for cultural critique rather than diagnosing an individual’s 
psychic condition. Mass hysteria thus names a process of envisioning 
and a commentary on the visual bombardment that marks the current 
148 SEAN METZGER
historical moment. Similarly, I find myself returning to DeLillo’s fiction 
and drama because his oeuvre expresses the confusion, loss, and terror 
produced in our era of late capitalism. Indeed, DeLillo sketches the 
threads that warp individuals into much larger social fabrics with his 
Mao II being exemplary in this regard.
Situating DeLillo Now
The Trump era has amplified white male terror both in the sense of those 
who openly commit acts of violence and those who deem themselves 
and the nation imperiled by various kinds of immigrants. The frenzied 
attention focused on these issues returns me to the literary corpus of 
DeLillo, an author who has, since the 1970s, frequently linked networks 
with conspiracy and paranoia even as critics often dubbed him a leading 
exemplar of American post-modernism. Whether we understand 
postmodernity in Fred Jameson’s formulation (following Ernest Mandel) 
as the third in a trio of moments containing “technological revolution 
within capital itself”—this epoch being the one in which monopoly 
capitalism yields to multinationalism—or through Jean-François 
Lyotard’s notion as a period and aesthetic that render grand narratives 
suspicious, the content of Don DeLillo’s prose, if not always its form, 
illustrates what one might call postmodern life: human relationships 
mediated by technology, social structures fragmented, terror 
anonymous but augmented, individual subjectivities submerged under 
crowds (Jameson 35; Lyotard). DeLillo’s fiction relentlessly returns to 
these themes notwithstanding those astute DeLillo readers who find in 
this literature figures of hope and redemption, of the innocent and of 
the miraculous.2
Indeed, perhaps because of DeLillo’s skill at using literature to reflect 
on social life in the era of late capitalism, he has been attacked for his 
purported “hysterical realism”. James Wood writing in The New Republic 
in 2000 derided DeLillo along with Zadie Smith and several other 
American and British authors as writing fiction that was “evasive of 
reality while borrowing from realism itself” (Wood). The novels Wood 
grouped as hysterical were in his words “excessively centripetal”; Wood 
argued that the elaborate plots worked like Matryoshka dolls or Chinese 
boxes with layers and layers of action contributing to an intricate whole. 
The problem, Wood opines, is that such emphasis on details and their 
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eventual convergences left little room for character development. The 
criticism Wood offers in this vein is relevant to conversations about 
performance. As Wood writes, “Certainly the characters who inhabit the 
big, ambitious contemporary novels have a showy liveness, a theatricality, 
that almost succeeds in hiding the fact that they are without life: 
liveliness hangs off them like jewelry” (Wood). These ornamentations 
produce what Wood calls a “shiny externality” that offers surface rather 
than depth.
As will become evident, I disagree with Wood’s assertion insofar as I 
value surface encounters as productive. I will try to recuperate a part 
of his key term “hysterical realism” to do work divergent from Wood’s 
intentions. The use of hysterical in his description calls attention to 
a surface theatricality. Within studies of hysteria more properly, such 
corporeal manifestations are generally understood as somatization—
that is the rendering of symptoms through the body or external displays 
of behaviors. Pressing on these particular expressive gestures, I find 
that DeLillo’s fiction seems invested less in the creation of character 
per the tradition of the Bildungsroman than in individuals formed in 
relation to seen and often unseen forces that motivate behaviors linking 
people together.
The emphasis on relationships is precisely why I turn to a stage 
adaptation of Mao II because it further illustrates how networks 
of people and technology have produced an era in which humans 
encounter one another increasingly at a surface level. At the time the 
novel was first published in 1991, such surfaces included television and 
other mass media; by the time of McAuliffe’s stage adaptation in 2002 
such interfaces would include the computer screens that catapulted 
us into the virtual world. McAuliffe’s intermedial theater production, 
therefore, utilized screen images in a manner that foregrounds such 
phenomena. The relationships produced through the screens and 
through the theater space itself generated an apparent paradox which 
DeLillo’s Mao II addresses as a thematic concern: in the age of new media 
and advanced capitalism, human relationships are close and distant 
at the same time, intimate yet often impersonal. Further, the images 
used to convey information about people—whether footage from the 
nightly news or the avatars representing individuals on various social 
media sites—do not guarantee access to truth, personal or otherwise. 
By staging close encounters with live actors and also the images of 
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characters, McAuliffe’s work materializes concerns about liveness, 
mediation, and human relationships. 
The resultant surface encounters in McAuliffe’s theater (between 
actors and the mise-en-scène as well as the audience and the theatrical 
production) suggest a different ground for the manifestation of hysteria 
than what Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud had identified in the then 
relatively recent emergence of the bourgeois nuclear family. Whereas 
kith and kin was at one time more or less localized, technology has 
facilitated circuits of relations across space that might nevertheless 
impact an individual subject. How, then, might hysteria be understood 
differently? By invoking hysteria here and throughout this essay, I am 
in dialogue with the body of literature called psychoanalytic theory 
but with an aim toward productive speculation rather than clinical 
diagnosis. Insofar as I follow scholars like Elaine Showalter in thinking 
about “the cultural narratives of hysteria” or what she calls “hystories”, 
I depart from her intertextual analyses of maladies like chronic fatigue 
syndrome, multiple personality disorder, and other conditions with 
at least partially psychic etiologies (Showalter 5). Instead, I draw on 
certain psychoanalytically inflected theories in order to expand the 
understanding of art that addresses what it means to be human around 
the millennial moment.
In his novels, DeLillo provides a sense of the uncomfortable connected-
ness common to our era of mediatization and commodification. For 
DeLillo, such networks often prove traumatic and lead to individual 
dissociation. Here we might say DeLillo intersects Breuer rather more 
than Freud (who disregarded hypnoid states [dissociation] in favor of a 
theory of repression and a model of psychosexual development). But the 
oneiric has perhaps undergone a cultural revival with the rise of media 
industries that continuously recycle images across a twenty-four-hour 
news cycle. Or we might consider DeLillo’s Point Omega (2010) in which a 
character returns to watch 24 Hour Psycho, an installation version of the 
film where the frames are slowed, so watching them becomes a kind of 
durational performance. That hallucinogenic space becomes one site of 
not quite successful human interaction in DeLillo’s hands. 
Lest we think that my own interest in DeLillo moves too far afield from 
the bourgeois familial structures that gave rise to discourses of hysteria 
in Breuer and Freud, family has remained central in DeLillo’s writing. 
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However, in his oeuvre that term tends to mark tenuous relationships: 
from David and his ex-wife in his first novel, Americana (1971), to Jeff, Ross, 
and Artis in his latest, Zero K (2016). Indeed, Mao II opens with a scene 
of what could be construed as the domestic household form multiplied 
and run amuck. Whereas psychoanalysis frequently turns to intimate 
structures of kinship as causal in individual psychic constitution, DeLillo 
shows his readers permutations of such arrangements that situate the 
individual in vast webs of human and technological agents. This tangled 
state of affairs challenges notions of individual autonomy and erodes the 
social structures that have long supported such a construction. In sum, 
then, DeLillo offers textually constructed worlds that reveal the power of 
described images to alter perception, to illustrate how people see when 
surface image and some version of a more grounded, empirical reality 
blur. Traditional forms of kinship also alter in this Weltanschauung. I 
will argue that such formulations produce a way of seeing productively 
labeled mass hysteria.
DeLillo’s Mao II, Crowds, and Mass Hysteria
Mao II opens at Yankee stadium with a woman named Karen and a 
Korean man she has just met participating in mass nuptials conducted 
by Reverend Moon. From this prologue the book takes us into the world 
of Bill Gray, a reclusive writer based in upstate New York struggling to 
complete his highly anticipated and decades-overdue third novel. He is 
attended by his assistant Scott and Scott’s girlfriend, a post-cult Karen. 
The trio hosts a photographer named Brita, who is interested in creating 
a portrait series of writers (an issue to which I will later return). Gray 
eventually departs Scott’s company to meet his editor, who wishes to 
use the author’s celebrity as an artist who has chosen disappearance to 
assist a French poet who has been disappeared (that is, held hostage) in 
Beirut. This loose parallel compels Gray’s passage to London to speak 
on the poet’s behalf and then on to Greece, where he is coincidentally 
hit by a car; Gray dies in anonymity en route to Lebanon. We literally 
track the death of the author here. An epilogue involves Brita’s trip to 
Beirut to interview and take pictures of the kidnapper terrorists. 
For reasons of space and argument, I focus on the prologue and 
the epilogue. In regard to the former, the witnesses of the scene are 
Karen’s father, Rodge, and his wife, Maureen (although members of 
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the Unification Church, perhaps more frequently called “Moonies”, 
sometimes referred to Moon and his wife as true parents). Founded in 
1954 following partition, the Korean War, and the creation of the DMZ, 
the Unification Church offered one response to the profound trauma 
suffered by Korean families in the middle of the twentieth century.3 The 
novel thus begins with a scene of familial restructuring on a mass level, 
one that recalls larger sociopolitical events that also recast individual 
families into massive quasi-kinship structures held together through 
national ideology. Such dramatic transformations did not only obtain 
in Korea. The very title of Mao II gestures to China’s recalibration of the 
family through socialist policies and the ways in which the Chinese state 
deployed discourses of affiliation and relation to promote communist 
ideology. By deploying references to Asia, the prologue establishes 
a comparative matrix in which the individual American family unit 
encounters its apparent others. 
However, the novel’s submersion of the nuclear family within the larger 
crowd applies to more than the Unification Church and communist 
China. DeLillo sets the prologue in Yankee Stadium, a site of a 
prototypically American pastime. In such a venue, individual spectators 
willingly submit to the ideology of baseball, although such a desire 
for a merging of bodies into a great mass has perhaps more to with 
capitalism than religion or politics. Historian Steven Reiss in his book, 
Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture in the Progressive 
Era, argues that the game expanded with urban mass transit in the 
period and a public relations campaign “waged by baseball magnates 
and sportswriters” (12). Such promotion fostered “civic pride” and 
furthered an “ideology of sport that emerged in the Jacksonian era, 
which justified sport and physical culture as useful and moral activities 
that promoted good health, sound morals, and an honorable character” 
(19–22). According to Reiss’s research, “baseball was said to be second 
only to the public schools as a teacher of American mores to immigrant 
children” (29). Moreover, baseball attracted crowds who would then 
mingle with one another, ostensibly democratizing a frequently class-
stratified society (31).
Notwithstanding such differences among the different crowds referenced 
in the prologue, the first few pages of the novel link different types of 
crowds. Put otherwise, Mao II implies that the individual and the nuclear 
family have subordinated their religious, political, and social lives to 
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various group experiences. Whatever else such groups might produce, 
they all potentially manifest various sorts of what could be described as 
(non-parallel) trauma: departure from a religious sect, reeducation by 
the state, loss at the World Series. Avowing such contexts, the prologue 
ends with the much-cited line “The future belongs to crowds” (DeLillo 
16). 
At the level of the language, sentence construction, and point of view, 
the prologue insists on the presence of the crowd. The opening line is 
“[h]ere they come, marching into American sunlight” (3). The they in 
this case takes form through the elaboration of DeLillo’s specific prose. 
“They are grouped”; “[t]hey assemble” becoming “one continuous wave” 
that becomes “an undifferentiated mass” which takes on increasingly 
military characteristics in its description as “columns” eventually 
approaching “division strength” (3). All this growth happens in a dozen 
sentences. The crowd itself becomes a menacing entity in this scene of 
collective matrimony. The book opens with an omniscient perspective 
that foregrounds Rodge observing the rituals taking place in order to 
glimpse his daughter. The narrative point of view slowly shifts from 
describing those who observe to those who participate—from Karen’s 
parents to Karen herself. This movement from outside the group to 
within it places the reader within the crowd. 
The French writer Gustave Le Bon published The Crowd: A Study of 
the Popular Mind around the same time that Breuer and Freud issued 
their Studies on Hysteria. Le Bon has become a seminal figure in crowd 
psychology, but I note here his remark that “[c]rowds, doubtless, are 
always unconscious” (6). DeLillo’s shift is, in contrast, on the page, but 
he does little to introduce Karen to the reader and, by extension, does 
little to flag the reader’s immersion in the crowd. Rather he places 
us in the scene of the stadium until the prose arrives at a focal point. 
Stated differently, the prologue is cinematic. At the end of one of the 
longest sentences in the prologue “in the middle of their columned 
body, lank-haired and up-close, stands Karen Janney, holding a cluster 
of starry Jasmine and thinking of the bloodstorm to come” (DeLillo 7). 
Following Le Bon, this cinematic crowd that the reader joins through 
the perspective of Karen is more prone to action than reflection in part 
because the terms of subjectivity transform in relation to the crowd. 
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Le Bon’s study of the crowd holds further interest for at least three 
reasons (perhaps despite his own reactionary political inclinations). 
First, as Le Bon writes:
The psychological crowd is a provisional being formed of 
heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly 
as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a 
new being which displays characteristics very different from those 
possessed by each of the cells singly (15).
Second, the crowd is also feminine in Le Bon’s view because of its 
inability to work as a reasoning subject.4 Third, the crowd’s existence 
depends on images. As he writes, “A crowd thinks in images, and the 
image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, having no 
logical connection with the first” (23). Several pages later Le Bon 
continues, “Crowds being only capable of thinking in images are only to 
be impressed by images. It is only images that terrify or attract them and 
become motives of action” (40).
Here one might question Le Bon’s relevance. As Jodi Dean notes in 
Crowds and Party (2018), for Le Bon “[t]he crowd is not a community. It 
doesn’t rely on traditions. It doesn’t have a history . . . Rather, the crowd 
is a temporary collective being” (9). Dean’s analysis acknowledged, 
the material conditions that enable crowds to form and that sustain it 
are not the focus of Le Bon’s work. For example, the crowd may not 
come together because of a shared narrative of the past in his view, 
but Le Bon does discuss toward the end of his text the “history of the 
crimes committed by crowds” (93). Le Bon’s own line of argumentation 
raises questions as to how long the crowd endures before it becomes 
something else. Moreover, when one encounters an apparently random 
assortment of individuals collected together, what is the effect of the 
image of the crowd on the onlooker or even the individual swept up in 
the crowd for a short duration? Such queries point as much to the crowd 
as a temporary entity that morphs into something other than the sum of 
its parts as to the appearance of the crowd. 
These points about the image of the crowd are indeed furthered by 
DeLillo’s Mao II. From its prologue the novel jumps from character 
to character in different locations—Karen looking for signs of Bill in 
New York, the hostage in an enclosed room somewhere in Beirut, etc.. 
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Such spatial transitions inform Laura Barrett’s discussion of space in 
which she states, “Mao II presents a world in which the negotiation of 
unfamiliar territory--labyrinthine urban centers, vexing architecture, 
ambiguous images, and technological communication--compromises 
notions of subjectivity” (788). Situated consciously within a Jamesonian 
understanding of the postmodern, Barret’s argument proceeds to 
develop an analysis of DeLillo’s book in the context of the other 
media that the text references, particularly photography. For Barret, 
the photograph informs the structure of the novel. She sees the 
brief prologue and epilogue serving as the borders that frame and 
complicate the principal narrative. The book’s penguin edition also 
contains several images that she analyzes. The photographs all contain 
multiple people; they are, with perhaps one exception that depicts only 
three boys, crowd scenes. Barrett is finally concerned with the role of 
photography in the narrative itself. Although I do not fully align with 
her argument—if I can do a vulgar summary here—that photography 
destabilizes individual subjectivity in the text, her emphasis on the 
image anticipates my own interest in the crowd and Jody McAuliffe’s 
staged adaptation, Mao II. What happens when the textual becomes 
corporeal—that is, to what uses are images put when novel becomes 
theater? And, more specifically, what does the invocation of Mao early 
in the first chapter achieve for the narrative, theatrical spectacle, and 
the crowd? Finally, how does the crowd image correlate with the form of 
vision I have called mass hysteria?
The epilogue of Mao II returns to crowd scenes. Brita has arrived in 
Beirut to take photos of a local leader named Abu Rashid. Her cab 
driver recounts three observations: about people burning tires to ward 
off mosquitoes, about “a pair of local militias .  .  . firing at portraits 
of each other’s leader”, about “bodies of victims” full of nails from 
improvised bombs (DeLillo 227). These apparently independent stories 
suggest groups acting or formed because of contingent circumstances. 
The narratives shape the setting of Beirut in the epilogue, and they 
continue the hallucinatory dynamics produced by crowds that permeate 
the novel. In the epilogue, crowds prevail as “the streets run with images” 
(229). Indeed, Brita encounters two final images that underscore how 
crowds might determine the future of this place.
When Brita meets her subject, she sees thirty to forty boys through 
the window with Rashid’s picture on their shirts. As an explanation, 
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Rashid’s interpreter states, “These children need an identity outside 
the narrow function of who they are and where they come from. 
Something completely outside the helpless lives of their parents and 
grandparents.  .  . They are children of Abu Rashid.  .  . The image of 
Rashid is their identity” (233). Brita further learns that each individual 
youth has yielded his persona to the image of Rashid by donning a hood; 
individuals submit to the look of the crowd, one with a revolutionary 
tenor that, as a collective, believes in Mao’s legacy of “thought reform” 
(236). Notwithstanding Brita’s own attempt to individualize one of these 
boys by forcibly removing his cowl, the crowd’s articulated purpose is to 
produce terror in order to birth a better future.
Such loosely organized disruptive force is the power of the crowd, which 
Mao historically attempted to orchestrate (sometimes without success) 
and that the character Abu Rashid would reenact in an adaptation of 
Mao’s image or, more precisely, Mao’s process of image-making. As I 
have noted elsewhere, clothing in communist China communicated very 
specific messages to other parts of the world (Metzger, part 3). During 
the Cultural Revolution in particular, the play among regimentation 
as represented through the look of crowds of Red Guards, anarchy in 
terms of the threat to political stability in the country, and possibility in 
terms of the realization of new forms of governance generated anxiety 
and potential. 
The epilogue closes on this dialectic by visiting similar themes, albeit 
in a site far in terms of space and time from Mao’s China. Mao II closes 
with a kind of repetition with a difference, not only, as I have indicated, 
as a reworking of Maoism, but also as a retooled version of the opening 
scene depicted in the prologue. Brita stands on the balcony of her hotel 
after being awakened by a sound. That noise belongs to a seemingly 
impromptu procession as a tank rolls into view followed by well-dressed 
individuals. Brita eventually realizes that the spectacle is “a wedding 
party going by . .  . followed by a jeep with a recoilless rifle mounted at 
the rear” (DeLillo 240). Brita’s initial misrecognition of the spectacle as 
dangerous here occurs in her just woken state. The hallucinatory quality 
of the scene comes into focus only after she has processed the image with 
more attention. This nuptial scene is the culmination of crowd scenes in 
the epilogue. It suggests the ways in which rituals of kinship have shifted 
in this war-torn landscape. The image makes sense only in the context 
of other images. The photographer has had to immerse herself in this 
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world of images where people fight to appropriate or control the look of 
the crowd to produce meaning from the scene below her. 
The subordination of the individual perspective to a collective project of 
image-making is the process of envisioning I have described here as mass 
hysteria. Brita’s (Western) rationality cannot initially draw appropriate 
conclusions about what she sees. Such an assertion is only reinforced by 
the fact that she has given up taking portraits of the author (as singular 
creative genius) and moved to taking pictures of leaders of terrorist cells 
and personality cults. She has to join the logic of the crowd to navigate 
the world. As Le Bon might have written, she needs to think in images 
that call up a series of other images without apparent connections. In 
this manner, she realizes that the tank leads the wedding procession.
Because all this realization happens in Beirut, what Edward Said has 
characterized as orientalism seems operative here insofar as the novel 
closes with a putatively feminine gaze that adapts to the Lebanese 
context. Recall Juliet Mitchell’s notion that hysteria has been feminized. 
In this regard, Gray dies before he can join the crowd’s way of seeing. 
DeLillo’s protagonists often stand at the margins of or just outside 
society. Sometimes they exist in some difficult to access, sequestered 
space within it. In the case of Mao II, what is interesting is that Brita 
is the character who finally has insight and access to a different way 
of seeing. She facilitates a new engagement with the world beyond 
herself, whereas Gray dies en route to staging a moral protest—to speak 
on behalf of a Swiss writer held hostage. Brita instead finds herself in 
a position to ask why Abu Rashid took the hostage in the first place. 
The closing scene of the novel—Brita contemplative on the balcony—
suggests the complexities of living in a world of hysterical vision, which 
in this novel involves a lingering vexation regarding moral certitude. 
Such destabilization occurs along with proliferating images and a focus 
on a photographer. Any claims that pictures represent some sort of 
objective reality fail here, as Brita’s experience in Lebanon demonstrates 
how proliferating images shift not only what we know but how. In other 
words, the image generates meaning in the context of other images. 
This point returns us to hysteria, not to Breuer and Freud so much 
as to their predecessor, Jean-Martin Charcot, a neurologist who spent 
much of his career studying this disorder. As Jonathan W. Marshall has 
written in Performing Neurology: The Dramaturgy of Dr. Jean-Martin Charcot 
158 SEAN METZGER
(2016), for Charcot “vision was paramount” among the senses not only 
for diagnosing hysteria but for cementing certain visual signs to the 
pathognomonic (19).
Such an assertion builds on the work of cultural historian Sander 
Gilman and others, who have studied what I would call the visual 
culture of the Salpêtrière, the hospital where Charcot treated his 
patients and also where he taught. For example, Gilman discusses in 
“The Image of the Hysteric” (1993) Paul Regnard, “a physician and the 
professor of physiology at the National School of Agronomy, [who] was 
the coeditor . . . of the original, three-volume edition of the Iconographie 
photographique de la Salpêtriére as well as a well-received medical atlas. His 
study of 1887 [Maladies épidémiques de l’esprit], which is dedicated to “cher 
maitre,” Charcot, assumes the interrelationship of all forms of mass 
hysteria” (374). The scholarship on Charcot and his legacy links hysteria 
decisively to image production. Indeed, Gilman argues that Charcot’s 
“view [of psychic maladies] is not unique, it is part of a long-standing 
European tradition of representing the insane, into which the image of 
the hysteric must be fitted” (Gilman 359). The popularization of hysteria 
in medical discourse thus involves linking potentially disparate images.
By the end of Mao II, Brita makes sense of the world by linking crowd 
images. Mass hysteria thus involves an amplification of scale in a 
tradition of seeing that began by looking at individual bodies labeled 
hysterical. DeLillo’s novel suggests that living in the millennial moment 
requires understanding images in relation to other images. Otherwise 
how could one make sense of two groups each shooting at pictures of 
each other’s leaders?
Mao II Encore
Jody McAuliffe’s Mao II was produced in 2002 at Duke University.5 In 
McAuliffe’s stage variation of DeLillo’s narrative, scenes are generally 
cross-cut, with two lines of action interspersed within a scene, often 
between two sets of characters. The stage production emphasizes 
Gray’s trajectory. Again, for reasons of space, I focus my analysis on 
the prologue and the epilogue, but I also include discussion of the first 
scene to illustrate better the ways in which the production constructs 
mass hysteria as a way of seeing.
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The prologue of the play starts with Gray, whose monologue on baseball 
is juxtaposed against the moonie wedding recreated onstage through 
the use of a photograph that serves as a background for two actors. 
McAuliffe’s play contains over thirty single, sequenced, or moving images 
that appear throughout the production. She saturates the environment 
of both the actors and the audience with visual reproductions in an 
aesthetic that recasts DeLillo’s narrative in a provocative embodied 
encounter with liveness and mediation. On the one hand, the static 
images that appear shuffle time and space; quite often they depict 
Warhol’s silkscreens or Chinese propaganda posters (by which I mean 
portraits of the Chairman), but they also show the audience crowds 
assembled in famous places from China to Iran to England. The 
audience, then, perceives multiple locales and timeframes often in 
the same moment, when images become disjunctive backdrops for the 
unfolding action onstage.
The prologue provided two projected images, both scenes of crowds 
although set in quite different epochs. The moonie weddings at Yankee 
stadium I have already discussed at some length, although McAuliffe 
adds the sonic texture of “Take Me Out to the Ball Game”. The song 
recalls baseball ideology, and it also suggests a link between Mao II and 
DeLillo’s later novel Underworld (1997), where baseball also serves as a 
key element in the narrative. The other image is the sixteenth-century 
Flemish painter Pieter Brughel the Elder’s The Triumph of Death from 
1562–1563 (in theater, we may remember Brughel as the painter of Dull 
Griet, who appears in Cary Churchill’s 1982 play Top Girls; this is also an 
image associated with DeLillo’s Underworld, as it titles the prologue of 
that novel). Brughel’s painting depicts an army of skeletons overrunning 
crowds of people of different social standing. The sound design also 
features Mendelssohn’s “Wedding March” and a Korean chant of 
“mansei” (ten thousand years), so the opening moments of the play ask 
the audience to navigate music from different traditions through aural 
juxtapositions. McAuliffe’s prologue concludes with perhaps DeLillo’s 
most frequently cited sentence from the novel: “The future belongs 
to crowds”. The line is spoken by Gray’s book, which emerges as an 
anthropomorphic creature (it is a character in the play) as the final 
image of this first section. My interest then is in the animated book 
and the projected images that play against each other: an embodied 
object rendered subject against the crowds (both the images and the 
audience).
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The epilogue in the play mirrors the book’s closely, consisting principally 
of a condensation of the two scenes I have discussed from the novel. 
The production adds visuals including several from Warhol—skulls, 
Mao, and Marilyn—suggesting both mortality and life beyond death 
through circulation of the image. The most significant change is that 
the Book speaks the last words, again suggesting how individuals might 
continue beyond a normative lifespan. As a material instantiation of 
the imagination, the book’s presence also demands that the audience 
see differently. In other words, the play asks us to take the artist’s work 
seriously through the afterlife of the image (by which I mean the artistic 
creation now divorced from its creator moving with a life of its own). 
To reiterate, this hallucinogenic vision embodies how we must see in 
a world of continually proliferating images that have both material 
and imagined referents. Bill Gray’s physical immobility produces an 
anthropomorphic and live figure of his imagination. Certainly, one 
could imagine this situation as a symptom of hysteria. Here again I 
shade this interpretation toward a description of the mode of vision I 
have called mass hysteria.
Scene 1 also cross-cuts lines of action: Bill and the Book constitute 
one segment, while Scott’s initial meeting with Brita comprises the 
second. Early on, a sequence of still images begins with one of Andy 
Warhol’s Mao portraits from the early 1970s. It is worth recalling here 
the circumstances which led to the creation of these silk screens, which 
are somewhat unusual in the Warholian corpus in their focus on a 
political figure. In an interview from 1971 with David Bourdon, Warhol 
stated, “I’ve been reading so much about China .  .  . They’re so nutty. 
They don’t believe in creativity. The only picture they ever have is of 
Mao Zedong. It’s great. It looks like a silkscreen” (317). His interest in 
China, according to Bourdon, was precipitated by the 1971 replacement 
of Nationalist China in the UN General Assembly and Security Council 
by the PRC as well as the press coverage surrounding Nixon’s scheduled 
visit to China in the following year. But Warhol’s Mao portraits were 
perhaps less political commentary than commercial enterprise. From a 
US perspective, the Mao series constitutes simulacra, where the nuanced 
political valences of Mao in different historical moments do not signify 
so much as the charged reception of Mao as an icon. McAuliffe’s image 
sequence moves on to present examples of Warhol’s work—Marilyn, car 
crashes, electric chairs, etc. The audience sees copies of copies that are 
themselves portions of series of copies. 
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The sequence derives from a section in the novel in which Scott goes 
to a Warhol exhibit just prior to meeting Brita for the first time. As a 
photographer, Brita is invested in the duplicable image. In a related 
vein, as Gray’s connection to the outside world, Scott also invests in 
the artist as a kind of facsimile—the reputation of the man circulating 
in the media as much as the man himself. Against the meeting of 
these two characters invested, albeit differently, in technologies of 
reproduction, McAuliffe intersperses a later scene from the novel 
that elaborates Bill’s avowedly stalled process of creation (in the novel 
he is constantly rewriting his work). In McAuliffe’s version, the tome 
to which Gray devotes his time lives. The book is a character, bodily 
enacted by an actor and complete with its own commentary about Gray’s 
process. What constitute the author’s inner monologues in the novel 
thus become dialogic in the theatrical world. This innovation in the 
theatrical production manifests one form of hysteria in which Gray 
finds his thought process externalized and personified. The resulting 
dialogue is doubled since the couple—Bill and the book—who attempt 
to enact artistic creation are juxtaposed against the couple who discuss 
the artist’s reproduction. Outside the diegetic world, the audience in the 
theater also sees McAuliffe’s independent artistic creation (albeit an 
adaptation) about precisely the work of creating art and the ways in 
which art becomes reproduced. Image begets image. 
Registered in the very title of the work, Mao takes on greater significance 
in the stage production than in the novel. Mao figures obliquely in the 
relation of labor to production. As a political head, he was on some 
level responsible for such projects as the Great Leap Forward in the 
1950s. But within Warhol’s work, his image connotes more strongly 
the abstraction of labor and meaning from reproduction. As Warhol 
himself noted, Mao represents a lack of creativity, a kind of group think 
embodied by, for example, the moonies. Mao’s image thus serves as a 
visual anchor for the substitution of a literal crowd of people (indicated 
in the novel but absent on stage). This mass uniformity is reinforced 
literally by the Maoist uniform in Warhol’s portraits.
As I have argued in my book, Chinese Looks, despite the variations 
of the Mao suit internally in China, in the US the outfit connotes a 
kind of endless repetition of same. Warhol’s use of the garment as an 
archival item—in other words, an element he has fixed to represent a 
kind of stasis in time—is in this case used to connote both a specific 
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place and a larger sense of the forces of cultural homogenization. But 
such usage eschews the garment’s dynamism. The costume drapes 
differently on different bodies, experiences different types of wear 
depending on usage, etc. Because Warhol’s Mao image depends, in my 
reading, so heavily on particular clothing—that is, the images would 
mean something very different if Mao were in a tuxedo—the image of 
what seems to be the appropriately suited Mao for Warhol’s purpose 
represents more than a vision of same.
This assertion returns me to my discussion of photography (remember 
that Brita wishes to create a photographic archive of writers’ portraits). 
In performance studies, Diana Taylor has drawn a distinction between 
the archive and the repertoire, with a significant emphasis on the latter. 
Here I want to suggest that McAuliffe’s theatrical piece emphasizes the 
former. The archive implies a durability and at least the potential for 
mass reproduction that the repertoire does not. Performance scholars 
have often opined that liveness might offer a means to think through, 
perhaps even to resist, the malaise that has arisen in our world of 
inexorable reproduction. But in McAuliffe’s first scene in Mao II, liveness, 
that active, present act of doing, continually stalls. Gray winds up to 
work but never delivers anything in the first scene or during the course 
of the theatrical (or novelistic) narrative. Rather than see the writing 
of the book, a process that the play literally makes organic, as a kind of 
generation of new perspectives or new politics, the first scene instead 
sets up those who manipulate copies as those who have the capacity to 
intervene in the world. The mass duplication of the image represented 
in the photograph or the silkscreen is thus not so much to be lamented 
as to be investigated for the ways in which further reproduction might 
encourage us to think anew and to create change in political landscapes 
from the US to Beirut. Moving in this direction, Jody McAuliffe’s Mao 
II—in many ways a copy of DeLillo’s Mao II, which is itself marked in 
a sequence in the title—creates the capacity of intervention through 
proliferation. This is the process of hysterical vision that I have tried to 
adumbrate in this essay as efficacious.
In this context, the repeated image of a silkscreened Mao takes on 
new resonance. It is not simply a commodity fetish, but one where that 
fetish is deconstructed. I mean to suggest that the dialogues about 
liveness and mediatization that surround and emerge in relation 
to the background of Maoist iconography and the very repetition, 
DELILLO AND MASS HYSTERIA 163
recombination, and recontextualization of the iconography itself 
encourage thinking through the processes of copying. Rather than 
valuing bodily performance as an antidote to the postmodern 
circulation of an endless proliferation of images, McAuliffe’s play asks 
us to take seriously the stakes of reproduction, to create new archives of 
knowledge in an increasingly global age in which China has begun to 
emerge center stage. This iteration of  China has everything to do with 
China as the locus of the crowd and the copy: China as the center of 
endless multiplication both in terms of human bodies and also in terms 
of literal reproductions of, for example, products. This China is not seen 
as individuated but resignifies a certain kind of anti-Maoist discourse 
that I discussed in my first book, where the surface image, the group 
without individual opinions threatens the individual’s creative genius. 
Hysterical vision might, therefore, be resignified as a different kind of 
diagnostic—not one pointing to literary quality but to the theatricality 
of the crowd itself.
Notes
1 Julien Gosselin’s DeLillo adaptations, which premiered at the Festival 
d’Avignon in 2018 as Players, Mao II, The Names (that is, three titles in 
DeLillo’s oeuvre, which consists of over fifteen novels and several plays) 
toured Europe throughout 2018 and 2019, although I have not yet seen 
them.
2 For example, see Amy Hungerford, “Don DeLillo’s Latin Mass.” Contemporary 
Literature 47.3 (2006): 343–80.
3 See Suk-Young Kim for the numerous ways that family structures altered as 
a result of the military maneuvers in the middle of the twentieth century. 
She also explores how the state deployed family rhetoric (Suk-Young Kim, 
DMZ Crossing: Performing Emotional Citizenship along the Korean Border New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
4 Le Bon, 23. There is much one could say about Le Bon’s views on race and 
gender, but I do not have space for that discussion here.
5 I thank McAuliffe for sharing her video and script of the production.
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AGE OF MECHANICAL 
REPRODUCTION
Back to the “Image Factory” in Westworld
Cecily Devereux
Westworld is an HBO television series, the first season of which aired 
in 2016, the second in 2018 and the third in 2020; the series has been 
renewed for a fourth season. Based on the 1973 film of the same title 
written and directed by novelist Michael Crichton (1942–2008), the 
series’ narrative is built around a massive near-future American “Old 
West” theme park in which android “hosts” play roles in narratives 
designed to anticipate and realize human “guests’” desires. Those 
desires, it turns out, are mostly oriented around sex and death: guests 
can use what is frequently characterized as the “merchandise” or the 
“livestock” in any way they like, including for violent sexual assault and 
torture as well as random unrestrained killing, activities represented 
within the space of the park and in its propaganda as harmless release 
for working folk from their everyday real-world stress. Coded to play 
particular characters and carefully scripted roles in narrative loops, 
the android hosts are built to be unable to harm the human guests; 
although the hosts are routinely shot to pieces or otherwise violated in a 
range of ways, they are reassembled and repaired in operating theaters 
and laboratories deep within the corporate center of the park, and are 
putatively protected from lasting damage by the erasing or “purging” of 
their memories of traumatic experiences at the hands of humans at the 
end of each loop. For its founding scientists an experiment in artificial 
intelligence, consciousness, and mimetic representation, the park, it 
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is made clear from the beginning, is a business: owned and operated 
by the fictional Delos Corporation, Westworld is run by a board and 
shareholders whose own interests are paramount and whose monetizing 
of the androids’ codes and their use by humans always trumps the 
interests of what it is implied is the less significant advancement of 
science or human knowledge. Indeed, the protection of the codes, it 
turns out, is at the heart of the series’ narrative. 
Thus grounded in capitalism (both old-school industrial and newer-
school virtual), Westworld (both park and series) is also unsurprisingly 
and concomitantly patriarchal, literally a man-made world, in which 
women play roles primarily as animate sex dolls for guests. As Kristin 
Iversen noted in Nylon in 2016, in its juxtaposing the “rich white men… 
[who] need [the park] as a diversion, a new way to exercise their 
strength and find meaning in this world” and “the women hosts” who 
endure suffering as an effect of the guests’ “game” (Iversen), Westworld is 
largely organized around the conception and spectacular reproduction 
of fantasies of sex and death in which women are objects rather than 
agents of desire. All the female hosts are sexually available, even when 
they are not, like key figures Maeve Millay (Thandie Newton) and 
Clementine Pennyfeather (Angela Sarafyan), working in the park’s “Old 
West” brothel: for example, park greeter Angela (Talulah Riley) puts 
herself at the service of incoming guests, and central character Dolores 
Abernathy (Evan Rachel Wood), whose primary role is as “the rancher’s 
daughter”, is likewise put to work to respond to male guests’ desires in 
a narrative loop that ends with her being dragged into her murdered 
father’s barn to be beaten and raped. Women are typically defined in the 
reinforcing dialog assigned to the male hosts (by the male creators and 
male writers) in terms of object-like sexual qualities, such, for instance, 
as tightness, tautness, juiciness, or openness, that communicate to 
male guests both the women’s availability for use and the idea that 
they are fresh and new. Insistently constituting all women—including 
the park’s human management—as metonymically genital commodity 
objects of the guests’ and viewers’ gaze, the series also complicates its 
representation of women by juxtaposing the desire of the male creators 
to see themselves reproduced with what is represented as the female 
hosts’ selfless maternalism: park co-creator Dr. Robert Ford (Anthony 
Hopkins), for example, who sees himself in godlike relation to the hosts, 
makes one a small version of himself as a child, while another of his 
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making, brothel madam Maeve, is tormented by her desire to recover 
her child, lost to her in an earlier and abandoned narrative loop. 
Oriented around a fantasy that is patriarchal and class-consumerist—
the largely white male guest constituency can buy their way to 
unpunished rape and murder, boasting as they do of the money they 
have demonstrated they are able to spend—the experience Westworld 
offers is also grounded in nostalgia for a late nineteenth-century 
moment when Euro-imperial culture was preoccupied not only with 
the plutocratic industrial capitalism that has persisted through the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first (and that arguably accounts 
for the park itself), and not only with the territorial conquest and 
occupation that is problematically evoked in the settler-colonial frontier 
theme of the park and in its serving, as the Man in Black (Ed Harris) 
puts it in episode two, as a place for male guests “to get their rocks off 
and shoot a couple of Indians”, but with the scientific and socio-political 
constitution of women in that moment as definitively reproductive. 
Women, as is pervasively evident through late nineteenth-century Euro-
imperial discourse across the registers of medicine, law, education, 
labour, science, art, and literature, for example, were called upon to 
understand their meaning and being to inhere in their reproduction 
of the patriarchal and imperial babies needed, as Anna Davin has 
observed, to fill what were wishfully represented as the empty spaces 
of empire,1 and in their concomitant reproduction of patriarchal and 
imperial male subjectivity. For example, as the new late nineteenth-
century field of psychoanalysis suggested, “lacking” the penis, women 
desired first it and then, with maturity, a child to replace it; “castrated”, 
women served as the negated obverse or image of and for men. Or, as 
the late nineteenth-century “science” of eugenics suggested, women 
served as the medium for the reproduction of the “fittest” and thus, in 
that work, of a social structure organized around patriarchal exchange 
(land for women, women for sons to inherit the land) and its visible 
affirmations of virility and power precisely over the reproduction of 
itself. 
Like other futurist representations of cyborgs or automated bodies—
director Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) is an important example 
and one to which I will return in this paper—Westworld engages with 
questions of consciousness, humanness, and mechanical reproduction: 
what is consciousness and where does it come from? what makes a human 
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human? what are the limits of artificial intelligence? of the creation 
of life? of humans and, in particular in a world in which the primary 
creators of android life are male, of men and reproduction? Across 
these foundational considerations, however, and, I suggest, saliently 
and compellingly, Westworld also engages from the outset with questions 
of bodies, gender, control, symptoms without any evident or easily 
explicable cause, diagnosis through talk, the traumatic enculturation 
of women as negated images whose primary work is the reproduction 
of patriarchal manhood, and, it might be said therefore, the condition of 
hysteria. When the park’s oldest hosts, female and male, begin, after years 
of violent treatment by the guests, to experience forms of paralysis and 
aphasia, to exhibit convulsive and repetitive hand and body movements, 
and to demonstrate behavior whose causes cannot be determined, 
they are presenting symptoms that are recognizable if not any longer 
identified in the series—or, in fact, in the contemporary “real world”—
as hysteria. Indeed, arguably, Westworld pointedly mobilizes symptoms 
associated with the condition that was named hysteria until in 1980 
its symptoms were by and large redistributed across other psychiatric 
disorders2 and, around 1980 were reanimated in second-wave feminist 
theory as embodied cultural signs of the condition of femininity under 
patriarchy.44 The centrality of these symptoms in the series raises 
questions not only about the current status of the condition (does it 
exist?) and not only of the implications of its code-violating occurrence 
in android bodies (do androids feel?), but of what began to be seen in 
the late nineteenth century as hysteria’s evidentiary operation, attesting 
through seemingly uncontrolled somatic expression to something 
experienced earlier and lost to memory. The “true” nature of the hosts, 
it is suggested, is revealed in the eruption of hysterical symptoms that 
lead us (spectators, diagnosticians) back, through flashbacks which we 
also see, to earlier traumatic narrative loops: all the rest, it is implicit, 
is performance and code, and the androids are only really “themselves” 
(and most human) when they are hysterical—or not staging the characters 
they are charged with performing in the park and in the laboratory for 
their diagnosticians, but really remembering the things humans have 
done to them and understanding them to be harmful.
In this work of evidentiary revelation, hysteria in Westworld significantly 
evokes the early and influential conception by nineteenth-century 
neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) of the condition as the 
real effect of a traumatic “lesion” or unhealed internal injury,4 the basis 
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for the theorizing in the 1890s of hysteria as an effect of traumatic 
sexual experience (“experiences which patients find unpleasant to talk 
about”) by Charcot’s student Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and Freud’s 
colleague Josef Breuer (1842–1925).5 Just as importantly, Westworld 
also evokes Charcot’s “invention”, as Charles Didi-Huberman has put 
it, of hysteria as a seemingly verifiable condition through his staged 
demonstrations of the symptoms of patients at the Salpêtrière Hospital, 
famously a former gunpowder factory turned in 1656 into a prison for 
sex workers and a hospice for women who were poor, mentally ill, or 
suffering from neurological conditions such as epilepsy, all categories 
in the seventeenth century and long after of “madness”. Charcot staged, 
captured, and catalogued these symptoms in the 1870s in a spectacular 
photographic record, the Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière. 
Often accused at the time and since of forcing the symptoms and 
thus “forg[ing]” the condition in the “image factory” the Salpêtrière 
Hospital was seen to become under his direction, Charcot maintained 
that the photographs and his theatrical displays of hysterical patients 
in his Tuesday lectures were simply “the truth. I’ve never said anything 
else”, he wrote. “It would be truly fantastic if I could create ailments 
as my whim or fancy dictate. But, truth to tell, in this I am nothing 
more than a photographer; I inscribe what I see”.6 Charcot’s work, Didi-
Huberman shows, and in particular the publication of the Iconographie, 
was to demonstrate that hysteria’s credibility as a condition depended 
on the intertwined representation of its symptoms as truthful evidence 
of invisible wounds and the evidencing of its symptoms in the new 
putatively truth-telling medium of photography: in its representation of 
hysteria in the near twenty-first-century future, Westworld returns to that 
earlier moment of invention.
This paper considers the return and the representation of hysteria in 
Westworld as a problem of reproduction and an index, in the series’ 
narrative grounding in both the near future and the late nineteenth 
century, of a cultural context in which women are constituted 
simultaneously as saliently reproductive and as themselves images 
or reproductions that stage not their own subjectivity but that of the 
male doctor or, like Charcot, doctor and photographer, who measures 
their compliance with putatively natural and irrefutable codes. The 
late nineteenth-century moment when modern hysteria takes shape 
in the work of Charcot and, only a little later, foundationally, in the 
development of the new field of psychoanalysis in the work of Freud 
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and Breuer, is characterized by pervasive and systemic representations 
across multiple registers of women as “normally” and “naturally” 
maternal, wanting to reproduce (babies, male subjectivity, patriarchy). 
In relation to the modern invention of hysteria, that moment is also 
characterized by a peculiar violence in the exhibition of women who 
appear to belie the norm or nature in their behavior or who refuse 
to act as they are, in effect, coded to do. Thus, in Charcot’s Tuesday 
lectures, in the case studies of Freud and Breuer, and in the influential 
Iconographie photographique, an aspect of the truth, it is clear, is the fact 
that women are effectively forced into a work of reproduction in their 
mimetic performance of the symptoms sought by the doctor and in the 
fact of the photograph that will itself be copied and put into circulation. 
The women of Westworld, subjected repeatedly to forms of brutal 
sexual violence and forced into a work of repeating their part for the 
male guests in narrative loops over and over again, are themselves, like 
the replicants of Blade Runner, reproductions (of humans), developed in 
laboratories and darkrooms, generated by machines that build them as 
three-dimensional images: they have meaning like and as photographs. 
Poignantly evoking the hysterics of the Salpêtrière, as figures in this 
early twenty-first-century television series, the women of Westworld, in 
its production of replicas of humans itself comprehensible as an “image 
factory”, are of this moment (the moment at which the series airs), the 
contemporary ideology that constitutes them brought into significant 
alignment with that of the late nineteenth-century moment to which the 
park returns its “guests”. 
     
Although Westworld is not overtly about the representation of hysteria in 
the way a number of recent films have been (for example, Augustine, dir. 
Alice Winocour, 2012; A Dangerous Method, dir. David Cronenberg, 2011; 
Hysteria, dir. Tanya Wexler, 2011), the condition is nonetheless central to 
its narrative of traumatic experience, memory, the control of gendered 
bodies, and the production of images. Indeed, the representation of 
symptoms in Westworld as hysteria has frequently been noted, and the 
behavior of the hosts has been described (or diagnosed) as hysterical 
in web and social media forums where the series is widely discussed. 
For example, Iversen observes in Nylon that, “as the [first] season wore 
on, it became clear that the creators of  Westworld were subverting … 
common dramatic tropes and that the very personality traits which 
usually define female oppression—i.e., emotional instability, trauma-
induced hysteria, sentimental attachment—would actually be what would 
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lead to the liberation of Maeve and Dolores, and, by extension, the 
rest of Westworld’s robots” (Iversen, emphasis added). In response to 
an article in online magazine The Artifice (“The Hosts of Westworld: 
Human or Synth?”), “Sharell” observes of season two “We’ve had the 
moment of rebellion now lets see the insurrection, breakout and mass 
hysteria [sic]” (“The Hosts of Westworld,” emphasis added). In a thread 
on Westworld on Reddit in midsummer 2018, “electroprime90” asks 
“why does [Dolores] snap out of complete hysteria once someone says 
‘analysis’?” (“William is a good guy, here is why…,” emphasis added) 
And in an episode summary that appears on Rotten Tomatoes and other 
sites of “The Stray” (season one, episode three), the hosts’ behavior is 
described explicitly as hysteria: 
Dolores finds herself alone in Sweetwater when Teddy chases a new 
villain; Elsie and Stubbs go on a mission to retrieve a host who’s gone 
missing in the hills; Bernard tries to get to the bottom of the hosts’ 
hysteria and hallucinations; William persuades Logan to join his latest 
pursuit (“Westworld: Season 1 [2016],” emphasis added).
In fact, it is not hard to see the evocation of hysteria in Westworld 
and, in particular, the series’ engagement with hysteria of the later 
nineteenth century, the period the theme park purports to reproduce 
as a playground for, mostly, as Iversen puts it, “rich white men” not only 
in the symptoms but in their representation and treatment. Westworld, 
that is, can also be seen to return to later nineteenth-century hysteria 
in its positioning of the symptomatic hosts in diagnostic relation to 
doctors who engage them in what is represented as the “talking cure” 
that was named by Breuer’s patient Bertha Pappenheim (1859–1936), 
known in her case study in Studies in Hysteria as “Anna O”. Once a host 
begins to show symptoms, they are brought not only to technicians for a 
readjustment to their code or for physical repair, but to behaviorists who 
work to find out through questioning what has gone wrong: the hosts’ 
repair (or “cure”) begins with diagnosis, and their diagnosis, as we see 
from the outset, begins with talk. Thus the series begins with a scene 
in which a woman is positioned in relation to an invisible analyst who is 
engaging her in talk. Episode one opens in darkness into which a man’s 
voice speaks: “Bring her back online”. Lights come up to reveal a naked 
woman seated on a chair in a laboratory or operating theater with glass 
walls, her head tilted to one side, one arm held like a doll’s at her side, her 
eyes glassy, her immediate association with a machine that comes online 
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rather than a human who wakes up reinforced by the appearance of a 
fly that crawls over her skin, her association with a photographic image 
implicit in her own stillness. The woman’s face shows blood and signs of 
injury; when she speaks, or when we hear her voice at any rate, her lips 
do not move. “I’m sorry”, we hear her say, “I’m not feeling quite myself”. 
“You can lose the accent”, says the male voice, which we will shortly learn 
is that of Bernard Lowe (Jeffrey Wright), head of programming in the 
park (and, we will later learn, himself a host). The woman, who we learn 
is Dolores, the character who is known as the rancher’s daughter, and, 
we will later learn, the oldest and therefore most often and consistently 
traumatized host in the park, shifts from her rancher’s daughter accent 
to a neutral enunciation, emphasizing as she does not only her machine 
status but the fact of her operation as a character: the machine who 
responds to the name Dolores in this opening sequence is playing the 
role of the rancher’s daughter, her character performing within the 
narrative loop that has been written to include her.
Brought online and into conversation with the Head of Programming, 
Dolores in this opening scene and in many subsequent scenes throughout 
the series in which she is dressed in later nineteenth-century fashion 
and engaged in intelligent conversation with her interlocutors, evokes 
later nineteenth-century hysterical patients such as Bertha Pappenheim 
under hypnosis (rendered machinically responsive to the prompts of 
the technician) and “talking things through” with Dr. Breuer (38) in 
the process he characterized as her “remembering work”. Suggesting 
with Freud that “hysterics suffer for the most part from reminiscences” (11), 
Breuer’s conception—again, in this early period, with Freud—was that 
in “talking through” the memories of a traumatic event that can be 
understood to be the cause of the symptoms, the “individual hysterical 
symptoms disappeared immediately and did not recur if we succeeded in wakening 
the memory of the precipitating event with complete clarity, arousing with it the 
accompanying affect” (10) (Breuer’s italics). Breuer describes this work as 
“unwinding the thread of memory” (39). The evocation of the “talking 
cure” in Westworld serves to emphasize the representation of the hosts’ 
symptoms as hysterical, but it is also shown to have a different goal than 
was the stated case for Freud and Breuer: while working to manage 
“the accompanying affect” (“Lose the affect”, Lowe instructs Dolores in 
this opening scene), the “cure” is directed toward the identification of 
“the precipitating event” to purge it for the sake of the efficiency of the 
business rather than the well-being of the patient, per se. In the opening 
HYSTERIA IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION 175
scene, we can already see that the objective is, first, to determine if 
Dolores is exhibiting symptoms that show her not to be compliant with 
the code that determines her behavior and, in effect, to begin to self-
correct, and, second, to affirm the repetitive nature of the symptoms as 
the expected result of traumatic experience. 
Ulrich Baer has astutely observed that Freud departed from his mentor 
Charcot at the point of the visual: “The photograph”, he points out, 
for Charcot, “was meant to exteriorize, make visible, and arrest the 
hysterical symptom in order to sever this symptom from the patient’s 
intentions. This belief in the power of photography sets Charcot’s 
image-driven analyses apart from Freud’s understanding of desire 
and intention as inextricably, if negatively, linked with the patient’s 
symptoms” (30). While Charcot, he suggests, showed an “uncritical 
faith in the force of the image” (30), Freud may have “overlook[ed]” (31) 
the visual. Westworld, while evoking the Freudian—and Breuerian—
approach, returns insistently, again, from the outset, to Charcot’s use 
of “photography to visually represent a disease that defied anatomy 
and, thus, physical examination” (30). Dolores here is presented as a 
still image; we hear the talk only in voiceover. We see, moreover, that 
the scene of talk is itself presented as a spectacle: in this opening 
sequence we do not see the interrogating male figure—and, indeed, 
do not know if this conversation is actually happening here or is being 
remembered—but we will see Lowe and others, notably Dolores’ creator, 
Dr. Ford, seated across from her again and again throughout the first 
season and into the second. In fact, the interrogation is repeated almost 
exactly at the end of the first episode, with Head of Security Ashley 
Stubbs (Luke Hemsworth) asking the same questions posed by Lowe 
at the beginning. Naked and catatonic, doing the will of the godlike 
scientist (Lowe, the park’s Head of Programming, is all voice at the 
beginning), and put on spectacular display not only for him but for us 
to diagnose in a subterranean operating theatre that is enclosed by glass 
walls and, in any case, is opened to our view through the screen, Dolores 
in these first seconds of Westworld evokes the women—notably but not 
only Marie “Blanche” Wittmann (1859–1913) and Louise Augustine 
Gleizes (b. 1861)—who were famously put to work by Charcot during 
his lectures and who were recorded in the images published in the 
Iconographie. Amanda du Preez reminds us that Charcot’s “patients were 
either brought to his office or they were examined in the ‘theatrical 
space’ (Matlock 1994, 133) of the public lecture rooms” of the hospital 
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(48), citing Martha Noel Evans’ observation that Charcot “would have 
the patients brought to his office and stripped naked; he would observe 
them, ask them to perform certain movements, stare, meditate, and 
then have them led out…” (Evans 1991, 20, quoted in du Preez 48).48 
Dolores likewise serves in this way in the space of the operating theater 
that is also, in the series which we are watching, functionalized as a 
“public lecture room”. Immobilized (brought online, taken offline), 
naked, moving only when made to do so, the spectacle of Dolores at 
the start of episode one is like that of a nineteenth-century hysterical 
exhibit at the Salpêtrière and, arguably, like the hysterical patients used 
in the Tuesday lectures, also like a photograph, a “record” of evidence 
of both their condition and his power.
Like hysterics for Breuer and Freud, the hosts of Westworld suffer for the 
most part from reminiscences, stopped short by sudden vivid memories 
of earlier trauma that have not been adequately talked through (the 
purging of their accompanying affect foreclosed), have not been erased 
from their memories, or that, it is suggested, may actually have been 
returned to their memories in the recent problematic update implemented 
by Dr. Ford: Lowe notes in episode one the new appearance in some 
older hosts of memory-associated gestures he refers to as “reveries”. The 
return of those traumatic memories begins to affect the hosts’ operation 
as machines, producing hysterical symptoms or symptoms that evoke 
and are like hysterical symptoms. As we see in the loops reviewed by 
programmers and behaviorists, the hosts in the moment of the return of 
memory act erratically, with convulsive gestures, unpredictable actions, 
loss of language or hearing, paralysis, dislocation of time and space, 
loss, as Dolores puts it in the opening sequence, of themselves. In the 
case of the traumatized hosts, the programmers and behaviorists at one 
level know the cause of the symptoms: they have themselves engineered 
the causes, written them into the narrative, and have recorded them; 
they have watched the story unfold, and can watch the unfolding of the 
story on screen from the host’s own memory. They know, in other words, 
that the response of the hosts is “truthful”, an index of a real experience 
that should have been “purged”. But they also need to believe, like the 
guests, that the hosts are not “real”, and thus cannot bring themselves 
to understand that the symptoms demonstrate responses to trauma that 
are like—or, indeed, identical to—the responses of humans.
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Westworld the park operates on the maintenance of the difference 
between human and android. Human guests at Westworld typically, 
we see, begin with a naïve exploration of the simulated world of the 
park, trying to determine what is real and what is not. “You’re one of 
them, aren’t you?” a little boy guest asks Dolores in episode one. “You’re 
not real”. In episode two, central character William (Jimmi Simpson), 
arriving at the park for the first time with brother-in-law-to-be Logan 
(Ben Barnes), asks greeter Angela, who has just informed him that she, 
like all the other hosts, is there for his pleasure, if she is real: “Well, 
if you can’t tell”, she responds, “Does it matter?” In the same episode, 
when William refuses Clementine’s offer of sex, he tells her, “I have 
somebody—somebody real—waiting for me at home”. William briefly 
changes his view, trying to save Dolores, whom he comes initially to see 
as different than the others, from harm through much of season one; 
but, as we know from his later-life character known as the Man in Black 
(Ed Harris), his brutal treatment of the hosts is an affirmation of his 
first perception that they are not real and, moreover, of the assurances 
given him on his first visit and reiterated by him in his actions that they 
exist for his pleasure. The central white male of the series, the Man in 
Black is also the character most convinced that the park itself exists 
for and serves him; in fact, he buys it for this reason rather than for its 
profitability.
The series, however, complicates the guests’—and our—conviction of 
the differences between android and human through the confused 
responses of “newcomers” like William in the early episodes, as well 
as through a pervasive uncertainty throughout season one of who is a 
host and who is not: pretty much every main character is thrown into 
doubt one way or another in the first several episodes. In the same vein, 
the series raises questions of the extent of humanness for particular 
hosts, such, notably, as Maeve, who takes over her own coding, and 
Dolores, who later changes the codes for at least one host (Teddy), not to 
mention Head of Programming Bernard Lowe, himself, we later learn, 
a reproduction of deceased park co-founder Arnold. It also complicates 
the terms of “reality” in the introduction of photographic images that 
serve at once to emphasize the operation of the park as simulacrum 
and threaten to blur the boundaries between android and human, host 
and guest, reproduction and “original”. Thus, for example, the little boy 
who appears only in flashbacks and photographs as Lowe’s deceased son 
Charlie (Paul-Mikél Williams) is evoked in the figure of the little boy 
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who speaks to Dolores in episode one when she is painting. In this same 
episode, titled “The Original”, Dolores’ father, Peter Abernathy (Louis 
Herthum), finds a photograph on his farm: unable to understand 
this image of a woman standing in front of bright lights in New York’s 
Times Square, he asks Dolores what she thinks it is; it looks, she says, 
like “nothing” to her. The photograph, which we will later learn is of 
William’s “real” wife, the figure he invokes when refusing Clementine’s 
advances, has been dropped by him, as we see in a later episode, serving 
as evidence, first, that William was there although Dolores cannot yet 
remember him. 
If the park depends for its commercial success on the guests’ 
simultaneous fascination with the lifelike qualities of the hosts and 
their understanding that the hosts are not “real”, it also depends on the 
hosts themselves not perceiving the built divide between their codes’ 
drives and the possibility of their agency within their own narratives. 
When Peter Abernathy responds to the photograph of William’s wife 
with hysterical symptoms, losing control of speech, his eyes fluttering, 
his movements spasmodic, he is taken not to the park’s host doctor (a 
character in narratives rather than a “real” doctor) but to the park’s 
“real” operating theaters for diagnosis. There, he confronts his “maker”, 
Dr. Ford, and reveals his dawning ability to remember, and thus his 
new perception, through the photograph, of the world he inhabits as a 
simulacrum in which his work is an endless repetition of a narrative loop 
whose conclusion will always be his death at the hands of someone. He 
is not, he shows himself to have recognized, an “original” or himself a 
subject but a mechanical reproduction of the “real” subjects he is made, 
like all the hosts, to serve, “built”, as Lowe tells Dolores in voiceover 
in this episode, “to gratify the desires of the people who pay to visit 
[their] world”. In this service, Abernathy is constituted like and with his 
daughter Dolores, whose spectacular diagnostic display at the beginning 
of the episode is echoed here, not only as a machine (not “real”) but, 
concomitantly, as a feminine non-subject, his hysterical symptoms, like 
hers, and effect precisely of his recognition that he is not himself, but 
someone else’s image and fantasy. Abernathy vows “revenge” on Ford by 
his own “most mechanical and dirty hand”, we see in this episode, not only 
because Ford accounts not only for the monetizing of violence against 
the park’s hosts, but the systemic operation of the park’s foundational 
ideology of reproduction, building three-dimensional images who are 
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put to work to enable the largely male guests, as Logan tells William in 
episode two, by their own negating to answer the question “Who am I?”. 
In this work, all the hosts of Westworld operate like women; they also 
function like and as photographs in the way Didi-Huberman has suggested 
“[e]very image summoned to appear in the Iconographie photographique de 
la Salpêtrière” (59) can be seen to do—that is, as a “paradox of mendacious 
irrefutability” (61): they appear, that is, to affirm an irrefutable referent 
or original, while marking, like Lowe for Arnold and the photograph of 
Charlie for Lowe, that referent’s absence, and ultimately operating only 
as an index of the photographic act and its work for the subject who is not 
the image but the one who sees. Photography, Didi-Huberman suggests, 
when it emerged in the nineteenth century and began to be used in the 
study of medicine, “became the paradigm of the scientist’s ‘true retina’” 
(32). “The photograph”, he writes, “produced a historic change in sight, 
such that ‘you cannot claim to have really seen something until you have 
photographed it’” (33).49 “[T]he camera”, he writes, “is [thus] merely 
a subjective apparatus, an apparatus of subjectivity[,]…an instrument of 
cogito” (63); this is what he calls photography’s “paradox of spectacular 
evidence” (59). On these terms, when Charcot describes himself as 
“nothing more than a photographer”, the “truth” he indicates is “what 
I see” (emphasis added). Elyssa Marder has compellingly described the 
replicants of Blade Runner in similar terms: “They are”, she writes,
designed to reflect the human figure perfectly—to cast back an image 
of humanity in order to confirm our own. We look at them, as our 
doubles, and see our humanity refracted through our difference from 
them. Like photographs, replicants are mechanically reproduced 
and, like photographs, their likeness to us is the measure and proof 
of a humanity that once was, and is no longer. This humanity is no 
longer in the sense that androids are more physically perfect than 
any of their human counterparts. They are doubles of life that, in 
their doubling and their difference from it, carve out an image of 
“humanity” through which humans attempt to see themselves as 
human (140).
In Blade Runner, central character and Nexus-7 replicant Rachael (Sean 
Young), although identified as an android, cannot escape the implanted 
memories of what she believes to be her childhood; as is the case for Lowe 
with his memories of his deceased child, those memories are affirmed for 
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her by a photograph, which she presents to bounty hunter Rick Deckard 
(Harrison Ford). For Rachael, the photograph of her mother should 
operate as “mechanically produced proof that she was naturally born of 
a mother” (143), or is human—except that, as herself a reproduction, 
she is herself likewise “proof” or evidence not of her own natural birth 
but of her own mechanical reproduction by Eldon Tyrell. Deckard’s 
initial response to Rachael is to dismiss the photograph as meaningless, 
a prop to support her implanted memories, thus, unsurprisingly, given 
the nature of his work finding and destroying runaway android slaves, 
interpreting the reproduction of the real that is the replicant as likewise 
meaningless and disposable. But the photograph in Blade Runner is not 
meaningless, just as the image Peter Abernathy finds in episode one of 
Westworld is not “nothing”, serving in both instances to affirm that the 
reproduction is not the subject but has been designed to constitute the 
subjectivity of the maker, designer, doctor, photographer. For Rachael, 
this realization is devastating: she drops the photograph and leaves. 
Abernathy’s encounter with Ford in episode one of Westworld suggests 
that he is also aware that he has been put to work to demonstrate the 
ability of the doctor/creator to produce the symptoms that show his 
power. Like Charcot, that is, Ford does force his patients to exhibit their 
symptoms for the audience: as the force behind the upgrade that has 
led to the “reveries”, he has produced their symptoms. The cost of this 
production, as Abernathy knows, is the well-being of the hosts who have 
been forced to remember what they are supposed to forget, or to ask the 
question they are not supposed to ask about the nature and the terms 
of their own reality as reproductions. For this reason, when, naked and 
hysterical, Abernathy confronts his maker, Dr. Ford, in the operating 
theater of Westworld in episode two, his rage is comparable to Rachael’s 
grief when Deckard dismisses her photograph of her mother or, indeed, 
the rage of replicant Pris (Daryl Hannah) when, after being shot by 
Deckard, she dies in a protracted scene in which her violent fits suggest 
images of Charcotian hystero-epilepsy. For each android, the affect is a 
result of their sudden awareness that what they see as evidence of their 
being is understood to be evidence only of their programming, and 
thus to affirm not them but, in Abernathy’s case, Ford, the “maker” he 
is facing, and in the case of the replicants, Eldon Tyrell. Abernathy’s 
condition, therefore, like Rachael’s, Pris’s, and that of replicant Roy 
Batty (Rutger Hauer), is an effect of suddenly being able to see that 
what they see cannot be understood to reflect and affirm themselves, but 
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to re-establish their operation as what is seen, the spectacle, and the 
mark of the (absent) maker who is constituted in their reproduction, 
the “meaningless” photograph, the image that looks like “nothing”. “If 
only”, Batty says to eye manufacturer Chu, articulating the impossible 
position of the replicant, “you could see what I’ve seen with your eyes”. 
Felicia McCarren has suggested that hysteria is always “metaphoric, 
replacing the trauma with a physical sign that silently bears witness to it”: 
“The hysteric, speaking silently through the coded somatic mark, hides 
behind or inside the movement, sign or image, using it both to hide and 
to name its content or intent” (772). McCarren has stunningly traced 
the ways in which dancers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries “theatricalize… what the hysterical patient tries, and fails, 
to say” (772), and her consideration of hysteria as metaphorical and of 
dancers “theatricalizing” hysteria are both pertinent to understanding 
the work of the hosts in Westworld. The opening scene makes clear that 
the “character” Dolores who describes herself as not quite herself, and 
who is then instructed to “lose the accent”, is identified as playing a role; 
in the laboratory or operating theater where the opening scene takes 
place, in other words, she is and we are being directed to understand 
her symptoms as what Charcot would characterize as “simulation”. 
McCarren cites Charcot’s comment that “Simulation …. is met with at 
every step in the history of hysteria. One finds oneself acknowledging 
the amazing craft, sagacity and perseverance which women … especially 
under the influence of this great neurosis … will put in play … especially 
when a physician is to be the victim” (765). 
Representing hysteria as a performance for the physician is, of course, 
perversely ironic on the part of a physician whose staging of hysterical 
symptoms has been so central to the modern history of hysteria. 
Moreover, while it does not undermine the veracity of symptoms—
Charcot suggests it is a matter of exaggeration rather than “wholly 
simulated” (765)—it does assign to the physician the power of 
diagnosing and dismissing the symptoms as performance: du Preez 
observes of Charcot’s public lectures that “the females on display could 
be depended upon to produce appropriate collapses and turbulent 
convulsions, almost as if their performances were rehearsed and their 
movements carefully choreographed” (40). The hysterical patient in 
performing symptoms is thus caught in a kind of narrative loop: either 
resisting control or losing control over her own body affirms the fact 
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of control, and in performing a response to traumatic experience, she 
asserts her capacity to be traumatized. When Bernard tells Dolores 
“lose the accent”, and other hosts performing hysterical symptoms 
are similarly shut down and reset when their exhibition of symptoms 
becomes tiresome or uncontrollable, the symptoms thus controlled can 
be seen to serve, for the hosts of Westworld and their programmers as 
for Charcot, as themselves performances invoked precisely in order to 
demonstrate the power of the system that produces and reproduces 
them. 
In this assertion, Westworld reanimates the logic that shapes the invention 
of hysteria at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth, as it moves from being a condition experienced by both 
male and female patients, and from being associated with physical 
trauma (Charcot’s “lesion”) to being a matter of psychological trauma to 
becoming, in Freud’s later theories, more or less the defining condition 
of femininity: the fact of castrated femininity, that is, could be seen as 
an inescapable trauma for all women. As du Preez puts it, “The fact that 
hysteria apparently favoured a female disposition corresponded with the 
conflation of hysteria with the signifiers of both femaleness (sex) and 
femininity (gender) to such a degree that the terms female, femininity 
and hysteria actually became inter-exchangeable” (47). It is, I suggest, 
to the moment of conflation that Westworld returns when it mobilizes 
symptoms of fin-de-siècle hysteria and theatrical scenes of female patients 
and male doctors. What, that is, the park works to reproduce and put 
into circulation are images of women whose performances affirm the 
operation of a system within which they are always already constituted as 
subordinate to patriarchal power—indeed, as a product of patriarchal 
power, a kind of “merchandise”, and a kind of machine that will 
magically perform in response to stimuli.
Elyssa Marder has suggested in The Mother in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction that “photography functions both as a prosthetic 
compensation for the loss of the maternal body and as an uncanny 
medium that purports to bear witness to the unverifiable primal passage 
through the mother’s body” (148). Photography’s prosthetic operation, 
however, is itself arguably symptomatic of the conditions that can be 
seen to produce modern hysteria, precisely in the management—and 
fetishization—of the reproductive body for the reproduction of “the 
species”. For example, when Marder suggests that Roland Barthes’ 
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Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography “conceives of photography as 
a mechanical mother that mimes, distorts, and disrupts the maternal 
function” (150), she implicitly aligns the photographic maternal in its 
mimetic, disruptive mechanicity with hysteria as it was reconceived in the 
years of Euro-imperial industrial capitalism at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Like and with the diagnosis and treatment of hysteria at the fin 
de siècle, photography can be understood as a technology that operates 
ideologically to attempt to affirm patriarchal control over reproduction 
precisely by affirming reproductivity as if mechanical. This is the 
complexity with which this paper ends: the hysterical reproduction of 
symptoms—embodied or photographic—is itself mechanical. 
In Westworld, the reproduction of hosts, that is like photography, is in 
the hands of men, and female hosts become hysterical, at least in some 
cases, when they cannot themselves have or hold onto children of their 
own—or, in other words, in this near-future world, when they are barred 
from the system in which power and capital, agency and mobility, inhere 
in the ability to reproduce and to masterfully stage control precisely 
of that reproducibility. The symptoms thus serve as evidence both of 
the humanness the androids render invisible through their obvious 
performing of their scripts and codes and of the conception of hysteria 
as a condition produced by traumatic experience. The symptoms also 
serve as potent evidence of the patriarchal, capitalist culture within 
which hysteria takes shape as itself an index of that culture’s desire to 
control the terms of its own reproduction. That is, as it might be argued 
was the case at the end of the nineteenth century when modern hysteria 
was, as Didi-Huberman puts it, “invented” in the lecture theaters and 
photography studios of the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, hysteria in 
Westworld attests to the systemic and institutional violence of its own 
making, presented by and in the institution as an affirmation of conditions 
of control and its insistent reproduction of itself. Like and with its scenes 
of hysteria, then, its near-future nostalgia for the nineteenth-century 
Euro-imperial settler past, then, is an index of contemporary violence in 
the representation and ideological constitution of femininity. 
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Notes
1 Anna Davin, “Imperialism and Motherhood” (History Workshop Journal vol. 
5, 1978, pp. 9–65) 10.
2 Derritt Mason and Ela Przybylo note that although hysteria “has been by 
and large disarticulated from gender and medical discourse[, it] remains 
haunted by its history and etymology. In the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013), hysteria is housed as 
“Conversion Disorder (Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder)”, 
which encompasses symptoms including weakness or paralysis, abnormal 
movement, swallowing symptoms, speech symptoms, attacks or seizures, 
anesthesia or sensory loss, special sensory symptoms, and mixed symptoms” 
formerly associated with hysteria (2).
3 See, for instance, Sadie Plant, “On the Matrix: Cyberfeminist Simulations,” 
in The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, edited by Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kath 
Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, 
pp. 265–75: 
 [W]oman is left without the senses of self and identity which accrue to the 
masculine. Denied the possibility of an agency which would allow her to 
transform herself, it becomes hard to see what it would take for her situation 
ever to change… [W]hen Freud extols [women] to get “little ones of their 
own,” he intends this to compensate for th[eir] supposed lack [of a penis]. 
And without this one, [Luce]Irigaray writes, hysteria “is all she has left”. 
This, or mimicry, or catatonic silence. (266–67)
4 See, for instance, Simon Shorvon, “Fashion and cult in neuroscience—the 
case of hysteria,” Brain, vol. 130, no. 12, 2007, pp. 3342–3348: “Throughout 
his life Charcot believed that hysteria was due to a lesion in the brain, but 
the anatomical site continued to elude him”. See also C.G. Goetz, “Charcot, 
Hysteria, and Simulated Disorders,” in Handbook of Clinical Neurology, Vol. 
139 (3rd series): Functional Neurologic Disorders, edited by M. Hallett, J. 
Stone, and A. Carson, pp. 11–23: 
 In the cases of neurologic disorders with paroxysmal or sudden but 
transient signs, epilepsies, migraines, and hysteria, Charcot contended 
that the anatomic lesion underlying the disorder, though well defined, also 
was fluctuating, or, in his terms, “dynamic.” Importantly, such physiologic 
dysfunction was not global throughout the brain, but confined within 
very specific neuroanatomic regions relating directly to the clinical signs 
manifested by the patient (Charcot, 1887). (14)
 Goetz cites Charcot, “Deux cas de contracture hystérique d’origine 
traumatique.” OEuvres Complètes, Vol. 3. Bureaux du Progrès Médical, Paris, 
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1887, pp. 97–124 [In English: Charcot “Two cases of hysterical contracture 
of traumatic origin.” Clinical Lectures on Diseases of the Nervous System, vol. 3. 
(translated by T. Savill). London: New Sydenham Society, 1890, pp. 84–106.].
5 Freud and Breuer begin the Studies in Hysteria with this statement: 
 Prompted by a chance observation, we have for a number of years been 
searching among the most diverse forms and symptoms of hysteria for 
their precipitating cause—the event which, often many years earlier, first 
gave rise to the phenomenon in question. In the great majority of cases 
it is not possible to ascertain the point of origin by means of simple 
medical examination, however, detailed, in part because it often involves 
experiences which patients find unpleasant to talk about, but principally 
because they really cannot remember them, and often have no sense of the 
causal connection between the precipitating event and the pathological 
phenomenon. (7)
6 Charcot, Leçons du mardi (1887–1888) 178, quoted in Didi-Huberman, 29.
7 See also Didi-Huberman 22–23.
8 Didi-Huberman is citing Émile Zola (1840–1902), as he is cited by Susan 
Sontag in On Photography (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977) 87.
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#METOO’S FIRST HORROR 
FILM
Male Hysteria and the New Final Girl in 
2018’s Revenge
Tim Posada
An “arthouse” film for one critic (Naahar) and “trashy exploitation” 
to another (Ide), the fortuitously titled Revenge (2018) became an 
unlikely anthem of the #MeToo movement, according to media critics, 
praised for depicting “a badass woman” who defeats her aggressors in 
“ultraviolent” ways (Schager). But for Slate’s Lena Wilson, the film’s male 
gaze exploits the heroine’s body and the use of violence merely shifts 
that brutality from male to female hands. These concerns are central 
to determining if the film provides insights relevant to #MeToo or if it 
“[keeps] feminism at arms-length”(Wilson). The answer is both. While 
the film might remain problematic in its use of an equally problematic 
horror film subgenre, the rape-and-revenge film, part of the answer lies 
in how the gaze evolves, creating hysterical men facing a new kind of 
Final Girl.
Hysterical Double Standards
The rape-revenge film tends to follow a similar three-act structure—
the rape, survival, revenge— and it is often chided for “eroticizing rape 
scenes” before “masquerading the revenge as female agency” (Virdi 27). 
This places the rape-revenge film agreeably in horror’s longstanding 
tradition of torturing female bodies (Williams 5), contributing to a 
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common trope: the hysterical woman. In Revenge, however, Jen (played 
by Matilda Lutz) does not become a hysteric, uncontrollably crying or 
irrationally running up stairs rather than out the front door. Instead 
she finds herself surrounded by hysterical men, fearing reprisal for their 
actions. The #MeToo movement foregrounds these hysterical men who 
fear a cultural shift, as President Donald Trump, accused by twenty-two 
women of sexual misconduct, implied in October, 2018, when he said, 
“It’s a very scary time for young men in America” (Wilkie).
Recent male hysteria masks itself as a defense against the alleged 
“hysteria” of #MeToo with claims like “‘rape culture’ has led to 
censorship and hysteria” (Kitchens) or “for those in the grips of hysteria, 
proof is the enemy” (Young). Responding to #MeToo, Baltimore Sun 
columnist Michael Cromwell compared “sexual harassment hysteria” 
to McCarthyism, as did filmmaker and child rapist, Roman Polanski, 
who also labeled it “mass hysteria” (Pasternak). But male hysteria can 
be better understood through Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s defense against 
rape allegations in front of a judiciary committee. National Review’s 
Kyle Smith praised his speech as “history changing” and “emotional 
fireworks”, while House minority leader Nancy Pelosi deemed Kavanaugh 
unhinged, “hysterical” (Segers). Comedian Michelle Wolf’s response 
on Twitter more pointedly called attention to the double standard that 
favors men’s emotional excess when she said, “Wow Kavanaugh, why 
so emotional? You on your period or something?”. And as Jon Stewart 
noted in a segment on The Daily Show covering how female politicians 
are mocked for crying while male ones are lauded as brave, “[i]n politics, 
it’s OK to be a pussy, as long as you’ve got a dick”.
Double standards are hardly unique to American politics. As Pierre 
Bourdieu contends, social factors dictate taste, often violently, through 
classist, and implicitly sexist “[a]version to different life-styles” (56). 
This is on display in Revenge’s user scores on websites IMDb and Rotten 
Tomatoes. While critics praised the film, users were less kind: 55 per 
cent on Rotten Tomatoes and 6.3/10 on IMDb. Media feedback is a 
notoriously complicated subject of study, but Wired’s Matt Reynolds 
addresses the former, noting top-rated films are mostly male-led, 
revealing the user bias of the predominantly male participants of the 
site. Rotten Tomatoes user data is not public, but the website arguably 
shares the same or a similar demographic as IMDb. So conflict between 
the critical score of 93 per cent and the audience score of 55 per cent 
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can be interpreted with this user bias in mind, not the inherent quality 
of the film. 
User comments about Revenge’s “suspension of disbelief” problems (i.e., 
Jen’s ability to survive having been impaled by a tree or traverse the 
desert barefooted) or condemnations of political content (“#MeToo” 
and “social justice warriors” directly invoked) must be compared to 
similar male films. For example, revenge films The Revenant (2015) 
and Inglorious Basterds (2009) feature similar challenges to suspension 
of disbelief, like Hugh Glass’ (Leonardo DiCaprio) ability to survive 
the elements with protruding ribs following a bear attack, and even 
revisions to the actual histories they are each based on, like Hitler’s 
assignation in Inglorious. Instead, both films, equivalently as violent as 
Revenge, were nominated for best picture and enjoy audience scores 
comparable to their high critical marks. For that matter, revenge films 
13 Assassins (2010), John Wick (2014), and Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) all 
require suspensions of disbelief by pitting their heroic figures against 
hundreds of attackers. Based on available data, male audiences seem to 
forgive masculine films for sins against realism, while feminine ones are 
considered products of PC culture or merely inaccurate.
From politics to film, double standards are often disguised in other 
argumentative diagnoses, as was the case with the #GamerGate 
harassment controversy in 2014. The online Gamergate community is 
often described by supporters as advocacy for “ethics in journalism”, 
critiquing undeserved positive coverage of female reporters and “the 
burgeoning influence of so-called social-justice warriors in the 
gaming  world”, The Cut’s Jesse Singal writes, detailing her history 
of negative encounters with Gamergaters. In yet another industry, 
women are held to a different standard, harassed with rape threats and 
condescending arguments, often wrapped in the language of logic and 
ethics. But the public outcry against #GamerGate, which deemed the 
movement a form of “hysteria” (Gorton), share one detail in common 
with the (mostly liberal) responses to Bret Kavanaugh’s public defense. 
No longer relying solely on “emotional” or “angry” to describe male 
behavior, the term “hysterical” has been loosed from a primarily female 
diagnosis in public discourse, at least to a degree. This took time since 




Neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot—who championed the hysteria 
diagnosis, noting symptoms in women like ‘masturbation’ and ‘venereal 
excesses’ (Didi-Huberman 72)—often displayed hysterical women 
during public lectures, their afflictions photographically chronicled. In 
his later research, however, he recorded sixty cases of male “hysterics” 
by the 1880s (Micale 365). He argued against common assumptions of 
the time, including practitioners’ claim that a primary symptom of male 
hysteria was feminine behavior. Instead, these “hysterics” were “robust 
men presenting all of the attributes of the male sex” (Malice 380). In 
Revenge, Jen’s weekend lover, Richard (Kevin Janssens), easily falls into 
this “robust” category as a caricature of masculinity: he hunts and sports 
tacky full-body racing attire. And when hysteria overtakes him, he acts in 
equally masculine ways, bribing Jen to stay silent about the rape, slapping 
her when she threatens to expose their affair to his wife, and rashly 
attempting to murder her by pushing her off a cliff.
Following his death, Charcot became known as “a charlatan who 
coached his hysterical female patients in their performances”, resulting 
in the removal of male hysteria “from the record” once its champion 
was discredited (Gilman et al. 314). The diagnosis remained intact for 
women, even though Sigmund Freud, an admirer of Charcot’s work, 
wrote in support of male hysteria. Alas, since his research focused 
mainly on women, he unintentionally aided male hysteria’s erasure 
(Gilman et al. 314–15). That historical revision is easily identifiable in 
horror cinema, which favors Scream Queens and Final Girls more than 
clearly identifying the male hysterics of The Shining (1980), Videodrome 
(1983), From Beyond (1986), Event Horizon (1997), Slither (2006), Maniac 
(2012), and Sinister (2012). More recently, Hereditary (2018) serves as a 
unique example of male hysteria, employing its female counterpart 
as a red herring. Annie Graham’s (Toni Collette) emotional journey 
remains in the forefront, while the slow mental deterioration of son 
Peter (Peter Wolff) is actually the objective of a satanist group making 
his body emotionally vulnerable for demon possession. Annie’s hysteria 
creates distance between her and the rest of the family, especially a 
rational husband (Gabriel Byrne), whose stoicism only exacerbates the 
hysteria of wife and son. Contrasting the father’s rationalism is Peter’s 
hysteria, “effeminate” at points, as defined by Charcot’s opposition (he 
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continually screams for “mommy” and mirrors many of the hysterical 
responses of his mother throughout). 
The conflict between feminine and masculine hysteria diagnoses is on 
display in Jen’s attacker, Stan (Vincent Colombe). According to Charcot’s 
findings, “women fell ill due to their vulnerable natures and inability to 
control their emotions, while men got sick from working, drinking, and 
fornicating too much”, male hysteria manifesting in “rage, jealousy, and 
agitation” (Malice 406). When the rape occurs in Revenge, after a day 
of hunting and a night of drinking, Stan displays all three of Charcot’s 
symptoms, but his subservience to Richard soon shows. Following Jen’s 
rape, alpha male Richard returns to find Stan seated on a couch, guilty, 
waiting for Richard to fix the situation. As events unfold and the three 
men attempt to locate Jen, incorrectly presumed dead, Stan chooses to 
wait in a car, hoping she comes to him. After his attack, Stan reverts to a 
feminized male hysteria, characterized by Charcot’s detractors as “timid 
and fearful” (Gilman et al. 289).
 Stan’s male hysteria transforms into a female hysteria familiar to 
horror connoisseurs, especially when Stan and Jen confront each other 
for the last time. After taking a bullet to the shoulder, Stan begins 
moaning in pain, hysterically, before he chases after Jen. During their 
pursuit, Jen shatters her flashlight’s glass lens in Stan’s path, leading to 
an elongated sequence in which he attempts to remove a large shard 
from his foot. Director Coralie Fargeat recalls film editors’ pleas for a 
shorter cut of the sequence, but she wanted Stan’s suffering extended 
to portray how he “becomes obsessed with taking the glass out” 
(Weinstein). Fargeat intentionally frames Stan’s suffering as hysterical, 
while Jen’s own pain occurs differently.
Before Brett Kavanaugh spoke “too emotionally at times”, as he later 
described his behavior in an op-ed, his accuser Dr. Christine Blasey Ford 
calmly presented her story to that judiciary committee, never hysterical, 
providing expert commentary on a subject she also specializes in as well 
(Engber). Showing emotion, even when discussing trauma, remains 
poisoned by a patriarchal double standard. In Revenge, Jen would be 
justified to mourn, but she confronts the realities of her assaults in a 
more aggressive way, like other emerging Final Girls confronting the 
long arm of the male gaze.
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The New Final Girl
Horror cinema punishes women for their sexual desires. A skinny-
dipping hippy dies first in Jaws (1975). A high schooler’s stomach is 
ripped open in A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984) when she spends the 
evening with her boyfriend. And Revenge’s Jen is raped for dancing with 
a man she does not plan to copulate with. The foremost weapon against 
these women is the male gaze, which establishes “pleasure in looking” 
at female bodies as “passive” subjects of male fantasy “coded for strong 
visual and erotic impact” (Mulvey 19). A primary point here is the passive 
role of women as objects of desire. While Laura Mulvey coined “the 
male gaze” in 1975, one photo in Charcot’s collection provides a unique 
connection to horror film tropes: fifteen-year-old patient Augustine, 
lying on a bed with flowing hair, a nightgown partially revealing a bare 
shoulder, legs crossed exposing more skin (Regnard). What should be 
an academic recording of hysteria is disguised eroticism. As mentioned 
earlier, modern critics suspect she was posed, aware of the camera’s gaze 
upon her, and much like women in horror cinema she “evokes horror-
film visions of vulnerable, beautiful young women sleeping or fainted 
on their beds” like Lucy (Sadie Frost) in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1992), 
donning evening wear while a vampire snacks on her (Smith 167–168).
Jen’s overt sexuality could easily be diagnosable, according to Charcot 
and several decades of horror films that do just that. In the first act, 
the male gaze is intentionally employed, depicting Jen as a sexual prize 
complete with short skirt and red lollipop in mouth, alluding to “the 
fascinating, polarising image of the Lolita”, Fargeat says (Fleming). 
These choices are not abnormal for Rhona K. Berenstein, who claims 
“sexuality is not mere performance but a sartorial display” (36). Each 
shot overdetermines Jen, from revealing outfits to cinematography that 
explores her body. Amidst this male gaze, however, Fargeat does include 
one notable scene of full male nudity to critique “societal attitudes” 
toward the female body, Fargeat says (Birds’ Eye), revealing that the gaze 
never completely belonged to a heterosexual male point of view from 
the start.
Revenge resists depicting Jen as a virginal Final Girl, a term coined by 
Carol J. Clover in 1993 to describe the last female survivor of horror 
films. Clover’s Final Girl, as exemplified by the victim-heroes of The 
Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974), Halloween (1978), and A Nightmare on 
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Elm Street (1984), are “boyish”, “smart”, and sexually reserved (40). In a 
previous decade, Jen’s sexual promiscuity, complicity in an extramarital 
affair, and sartorial flaunting would mark her as an easy target for an 
on-screen death. Instead, “Jen’s desire to ‘be noticed’ isn’t framed as a 
sign of vapidity or moral weakness’” (Dolinh). Her sexuality does not 
make her hysterical. No part of blame belongs to her, only her male 
attackers, who become hysterical when she refuses to comply and die as 
a passive subject should. And after Jen’s assault, the male gaze inverts, no 
longer sexualizing her body for male pleasure.
This is hardly the only case of a shift in gaze. In a problematic example, 
Boys Don’t Cry (1999) establishes a transgender gaze throughout most of 
the film. When Brandon’s (Hilary Swank) secret is revealed to girlfriend 
Lana (Chloë Sevigny), however, the transgender gaze gives way to a 
lesbian one thanks to the director’s “universal vision of humanism”; a 
change in demeanor occurs between both characters in the dialog and 
a final sex scene clearly coded as an intimate act between two women 
(Halberstam 298). French film Blue is the Warmest Color (2013) faces 
similar problems when depicting extensive lesbian sex scenes. A Posture 
magazine video features reactions to the scenes by lesbian spectators, 
who can easily tell the film is created by a heterosexual male director 
and depicts straight women simulating lesbian sex; one viewer even 
chides a scene for including “scissoring”, a sex act common in straight 
male porn (Sleidi). Both films attempt to challenge Mulvey’s claim that 
all “alternative cinema” can “only exist as a counterpoint” to the male 
gaze, eternally responding to, rather than developing entirely separate 
from, patriarchal cinema (16). Enchanted (2007) inverts the gaze by 
depicting a princess saving her man, now the damsel in distress, and 
Revenge’s Jen is a female version of Rambo and Mad Max by Fargeat’s 
own admission (Weinstein). Still, horror has a history of toying with the 
gaze, consciously or not.
Clover argues for an inverted gaze in most horror films come the 
third act, claiming that “fear and pain” draw “the male spectator into 
identification with the Final Girl” (152). Recently, the Final Girl has 
become more self-aware in meta horror films like The Cabin in the Woods 
(2012), Final Girl (2015) and The Final Girls (2015), while others like 
You’re Next (2011) and The Witch (2016) subvert the trope, masking their 
proximity to it. For example, home-invasion film You’re Next includes 
several hysterical women whose responses to increasing doom directly 
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result in their deaths, while Final Girl Erin (Sharni Vinson)—another 
easy candidate for an early death, since she dates her professor—turns 
out to be resourceful not by necessity but because of her upbringing 
in a survivalist compound. She requires no new skills, only the right 
circumstances to put her training into practice. Even the rape-revenge 
subgenre receives occasional updates with films like Bound to Vengeance 
(2015), which begins with a rape victim’s escape and capture of her 
rapist, only to discover she must now free his other victims caged around 
town. Revenge borrows from many of these revisionist horror films, like 
depicting a Final Girl who does not become a temptress to lure her 
enemies into a trap, as Jennifer (Camille Keaton) does in early rape-
revenge entry I Spit on Your Grave (1978). And unlike past Final Girls 
excessively coded as victims, Revenge identifies the men by their “fear 
and pain” at the mercy of an aggressive female gaze.
 
This is a unique choice in a film that features a rape and attempted 
murder. But the rape sequence, which avoids a gratuitous display, lasts 
only two minutes (I Spit on Your Grave’s rape sequence lasts 45 minutes). 
Rape as a topic in fiction media remains controversial. In Hindi cinema, 
Jyotika Virdi claims its omission “bears the marks of a patriarchal 
discourse on honor and chastity”, though showing it runs the risk of 
eroticizing trauma (Virdi 31). The American adaptation of The Girl with 
the Dragon Tattoo (2011) was chastised for depicting the graphic rape of 
Lisbeth Salander (Rooney Mara), but for Jeffrey A. Brown the scene is 
designed not to be erotic but horrific. “There is no hint of titillation, no 
suggestion that Salander wanted it, deserved it, or enjoyed it”, Brown 
says. “There are no snappy comebacks or eleventh-hour rescue; there 
is nothing but violence and victimization” (Brown 56). Similarly, Virdi 
disagrees with Indian critics of one particular film, Insaaf Ka Tarazu 
(1980), which she argues does not “titillate” either (Virdi 33). So if 
Virdi and Brown find examples that resist eroticizing on-screen rape, 
then criticism is based more on showing the act at all. Conversely, HBO 
series Game of Thrones employs a cutaway in season 5 when Sansa Stark is 
raped, but the male showrunners’ decision to focus instead on another 
male character forced to watch removes the female victim’s agency by 
emphasizing a male character’s trauma instead.
Revenge’s use of the male gaze establishes what the film is willing to 
show, and when the attack begins the camera seems ready to bare all as 
Jen’s attacker, Stan, begins to stick a hand down her underwear. Then 
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another male character, Dimitri (Guillaume Bouchède), interrupts, but 
he is no savior—recalling the same outcome from Dragon Tattoo. Instead, 
he closes the door, turns on a TV, and goes swimming, his actions 
juxtaposing two brief medium shots of Jen thrust against a window and 
a third that focuses on her hand and the side of her traumatized face: a 
physical violation by one and a complicit violation by another. So rather 
than dwell on a graphic assault or make the scene about a man’s pain, 
Revenge favors something between both, which emphasizes her trauma 
without eroticizing it. While the film resists exposing Jen’s trauma here, 
no such restraint occurs when she performs cave-surgery on herself.
After Jen is pushed off a cliff and impaled by a tree branch, she must 
treat the resulting wound. She cauterizes it with the help of a beer can 
and hallucinogenic, which numbs her during the process, transitioning 
her from suffering victim to spectator in her own body alteration. This 
surreal sequence taps into the body horror subgenre, which features 
bodily transformation through mutation or mutilation. For Barbara 
Creed, films like Altered States (1980) and The Fly (1986) exhibit “male 
hysteria” that stems from an inability to “create life”, which prompts 
these male hysterics to instead create “uncanny man-made wombs” that 
mutate their bodies in grotesque ways (Phallic Panic 43). Beyond science 
fiction, the Saw franchise (2004-) explores bodily transformation 
through torture; the “wombs” here are serial killer Jigsaw’s unique 
mechanical contraptions that present victims with “decisions”, Jigsaw 
(Tobin Bell) says in Saw II (2005), that coax survivors into becoming 
self-actualized subjects with a new appreciation for life. 
Many popular entries from the 1980s and 1990s focused on male hubris, 
while newer entries in the 2010s breathe life into an array of topics from 
body modification in American Mary (2012) to anxieties about pregnancy 
in Honeymoon (2014) to slut shaming in Raw (2017). In most cases, the 
outcome is rarely positive, often ending with the heroine’s death or 
(social) isolation. Jen’s own transformation, however, is not designed to 
create the next hysterical, mutilated Scream Queen or tragic heroine. 
She feels no pain, which contrasts with body horror’s anxiety over 
“infiltration of the Other” (Bukatman 237). She might be removing a 
foreign object from her body, but she is not becoming Other. Rather, 
she is returning to a pure self “grounded in nature and the elements”, 
director Fargeat says (Birds’ Eye). Hence, she awakens to find a phoenix 
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branded on her stomach (the result of the beer can logo), resulting in a 
positive body modification, one inflicted upon her by a natural monster.
A Natural Monster
In Revenge’s final moments, Jen walks outside after victoriously defeating 
all her attackers. As a helicopter approaches to take her away from the 
desert, she looks over her right shoulder directly into the camera. “Her 
existence would no longer depend on the male gaze”, Fargeat says (Birds’ 
Eye). But something else occurs. Unlike traditional depictions of the Final 
Girl, rape-revenge films are often characterized by graphic sequences 
of aggression, from Jeniffer’s castration of one rapist in I Spit on Your 
Grave to Mary’s off-the-book surgical experiments on her assailant in 
American Mary. By the end, the avenger sometimes transforms into a 
“violent monster” herself, Alexandra Heller-Nicholas notes (Heller-
Nicholas 88). As Slate’s Wilson says, avenging victims “become as cold 
and unfeeling as their attackers”. Clover more broadly uses the term 
“female victim-hero” to describe female protagonists in horror films, 
saying these “heroes” also bear “some degree of monstrosity” (4). 
Creed examines this duality of humanity/monstrosity by discussing 
“bodies without souls”, like a werewolf which “signifies a collapse of 
the boundaries between human and animal”, embodying a violation of 
natural law (“Monstrous-Feminine” 70). Conversely, Jen is not a body 
without soul or a violation of natural law. Rather, her body modification 
is a return to natural law. Hysterical men, of all kinds, would clearly 
see such a return to nature as threatening; it calls into question gender 
expectations that belong to society, not nature. In short, Jen’s return to 
a natural state of being is deemed monstrous Other by patriarchy. 
Berenstein taps into this when she argues that horror cinema offers 
spectators a “form of performance” called “spectatorship-as-drag” 
(30). While the monstrous Other of most horror films is often coded 
as male, it can also be understood as something beyond a male/female 
dichotomy, “a temporary release from everyday identities” (Berenstein 
8). In Dracula (1931), for example, the titular male-coded monster 
(Bela Lugosi) orders a vampire harem “to leave Renfield (Dwight 
Frye) alone so that he can have him to himself”, which can be read 
as both heterosexual—the women thirsting for the man—and non-
heterosexual—Dracula’s desire for him (Berenstein 53). Spectatorship-
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as-drag allows heterosexual spectators to participate in this viewing 
practice, albeit temporarily, but other spectators might refuse to 
“relinquish” the “sometimes-illicit identifications and desires that get 
played out at the movies for those whose everyday identities run contrary 
to dominant culture” (Berenstein 58). The monstrous Other is a site of 
playful exploration amidst ideological constructs.
Taking Berenstein a step further, horror cinema, used in this way, 
ruptures not natural boundaries but socially formed ones that 
masquerade as natural. Jen is a monstrous Other not merely because 
she exacts vengeance but because she resides outside patriarchy’s 
definition of normal. Her newfound identity stems from her treacherous 
walk through the desert, through nature, transforming her into a rare 
iteration of an “Edenic” figure. Women in tune with nature are often 
perceived as “docile, unintellectual and ruled by their physicality”, a 
criticism even employed against films like Mad Max: Fury Road (Yates 
354). But Michelle Yates challenges such a description of the film, 
instead arguing that it “transforms nature into a space of feminist 
possibility” by disrupting “a dominant Western environment narrative” 
(355). Jen, too, becomes empowered by nature, and her return to 
society, marked by that final gaze into the camera, serves as a promise to 
continually, aggressively confront the male gaze and the hysterical men 
who reinforce it most weekends at the box office, both as spectators and 
those boys-being-boys on screen. Jen does this first by embracing what 
is truly natural, found in the wilderness—not what patriarchy decides is 
natural—and then violently removing what is unnatural from her life (a 
rapist, an attempted murderer, a complicite voyeur). And she does this 
without screaming hysterically. To do so—at least for Fargeat, who seeks 
to ensure Jen “never [becomes] a victim again” (Birds’ Eye)—would be 
derivative, another woman screaming for the camera.
Slate’s Lena Wilson is likely correct that the film’s use of “violence 
more than justice” is an insufficient message for #MeToo. It certainly 
can be cathartic to watch Jen penetrate Richard’s shotgun wound as 
he hysterically says to her, “you had to put up a fight. Women always 
have to put up a fucking fight”. The deep roots of his sexism exposed, 
Revenge frames his current suffering and imminent death as justified. 
This is a far cry from I Spit on Your Grave, in which Jennifer tells one of 
her rapists, Stanley (Anthony Nichols), “Suck it, bitch”, before killing 
him with a boat motor. But “revenge against men” is a problem for 
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“feminism”, Wilson says, “because it has nothing to do with men at all”. 
Alas, Fargeat, a French director who did not know about #MeToo or 
Time’s Up when she began developing the film, never intended a literal 
experience: “women today need to be very ‘loud’ if they are going to 
have any chance of building an equal society and establishing crucial 
boundaries” (Birds’ Eye). Her definition of loud involves a substantial 
amount of blood and even louder hysterical men. 
Rather than embrace “bodily hysteria”, described by Linda Williams as 
a notable currency of emotional women’s films (4), Jen does not weep 
or scream throughout the film. Rather she ceases to speak following the 
rape and attempted murder. Practically, this is a problem for Wilson: 
“she uses brutality to dissociate from her trauma”. She is right. To 
understand Jen’s journey as a period rather than an ellips on victimhood 
is a challenge. “It becomes ‘feminist’ for women to solve their problems 
by beating the shit out of them”, Wilson writes. Revenge, then, is an 
anthem of a movement in its early phase, not the goal. But Jen the Final 
Girl belongs to a broader shift away from female hysteria, away from 
masculine double standards that erase male hysteria. And Jen’s final 
gaze is a call to arms directed at passive film spectators, some aware that 
their time might soon be up and others ready to challenge the male gaze’s 
performative trappings.
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Performing Disability in the Possession Film
Johanna Braun
Hysteria seems alive and well. Although the “death of hysteria” has 
been proclaimed on numerous occasions, we nevertheless seem to be 
living in hysterical times. Hysteria has a high currency in current public 
discussions and simultaneously finds its way into countless cultural 
manifestations—as we are able to witness in the colorful and diverse 
discussions in this collection.
In this investigation, I will take a closer look at a specific expression 
of the hysteric’s performance in the present: the hysteric’s politically 
charged and highly popular performance in mainstream US horror 
films and its discussion around pressing issues of disability and mental 
health. The aim of this investigation is to contextualize the figure of 
the hysteric—a historically well-studied object in arts and sciences—as 
a public performer whose hysterical “episodes” are clearly defined and 
understood in the realms of performance. We will look into a selection 
of the most successful US horror films of the past decade,1 which are 
summarized under the umbrella term Possession film (Clover), of which 
The Exorcist (Warner Bros., 1973) is generally seen as the highly popular 
originator. While The Exorcist was produced in the context of a series 
of other films of similar content, it was not until after 2000 that this 
subgenre became one of the most popular daughter genres of the US 
horror film. The box-office success of the restored and revised version 
of the original (2000) spawned two prequels (2004 and 2005). These 
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reinterpretations and evolutions of the original story were closely 
followed by commercially successful, major studio productions of 
similar content that were eager to put the hysterical girl center stage and 
use this figure as a critical commentator on current pressing political 
discussions, especially touching on public health care debates, while 
also promoting stereotypical and stigmatizing images of mental and 
physical disabilities.
The references in the hysteric’s current representations are striking: 
the Possession film echoes evidently the depiction of the hysteric 
from historical medical, artistic, and religious sources, specifically the 
imagery of Jean-Martin Charcot’s medical studies of the mid-nineteenth 
century—with the hysteric dressed in white nightgowns, performing 
preferably in her bed and mimicking the “Grande Hystérie” with the 
excessive movement of the arc-en-circle: the iconic pose where the body 
is literally bending over backwards. Most of the selected films even 
feature the hysteric in this infamous position on their promotional 
posters.
This investigation follows the aim of uncovering how the current 
phenomenon continues the legacy of the hysteric—as popular performer 
who addresses pressing public debates—from historical material to the 
iconic horror film figure she is today.
And here lies already a significant detail: The hysteric in contemporary 
horror film is predominantly represented as a white middle-class girl. 
Therefore, when I use the term hysteric I refer to the female hysteric.2 
Another circumstance is certainly that while women, children, and 
people with disabilities were excluded from large-scale government 
decisions, and even to this day still belong to marginalized groups 
spanning diverse categories that differ in terms of class, race, and 
gender, the presumed mentally ill girl is a convenient bundling of these 
interest groups.
The dominant representation of the hysteric as a white middle-class 
girl can be seen as a reflection of the historical material these movies 
stereotypically reference, while it also reveals the still marginalized 
experiences and representations of a more diverse demographic. But 
what also needs to be addressed is that, through the hysterical/possessed 
white middle-class girl, a wide range of discussions around race, class, 
and gender are voiced, and take possession of and are negotiated 
through the hysteric’s body in those narratives.3
HYSTERICAL CURE 209
My assumption notwithstanding that physical and mental symptoms 
can also manifest themselves in a similar fashion when detached from 
social and cultural influences, the hysteric—as she is represented in 
the Possession film—is also influenced by political, cultural, societal, 
and historical construction processes (Micale/Porter 26). Therefore, 
I am not investigating the personal experiences of hysterics, but the 
historical, cultural, and political frameworks that often lead to such 
forms of representation.
Most importantly, the hysteric in these current narratives strikingly 
references established representations of the hysteric as (public) 
performer that extend well beyond the influential European studies 
of the nineteenth century. Thus, for example, although the medical 
term hysteria was struck from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders at the end of the twentieth century, it simultaneously 
reappeared as Histrionic Personality Disorder (Latin: histrio, actor/actress). 
This rebranding just further underlines my point: the hysteric is thereby 
diagnosed as performer. (For the transformation of the term in a medical 
context please see: Skull 2009, Devereux 2014)
Therefore, while the hysteric’s visual repertoire points to the fact 
that something of pressing urgency is being communicated, it is 
especially the hysteric’s ambivalent performance that is relevant in its 
contemporary context. The hysteric challenges, blurs, and transgresses 
boundaries of race, class, gender, sexuality, religious belief, and time 
periods with ease—all the while performing excessively the repertoire 
of mental and physical impairment. While The Exorcist was the center 
of attention of influential feminist American horror film scholarship 
(Creed, Clover) and was embedded in the public debates of its time, the 
current phenomenon falls on a blind spot in relation to its evidential 
discussion of pressing contemporary political discourses. Therefore, 
the contemporary hysteric’s excessive performance in US mainstream 
horror film provides interesting insights into current public discourses 
of healthcare politics—especially with regard to people with disabilities 
and mental illnesses—while additionally extending to women’s rights, 
racial politics, and migration policies.
To understand these current debates we have to bend over backwards, 
stretch through the hysteric’s complex and at times contradictory 
“hystories” (Showalter 1997), and look at the historical connection of 
hysteria, performance, and politics in order then, hopefully, to be able 
to contextualize the ways this “Kunstfigur” has again attained such 
currency in our present day.
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Mapping the Hysteric Playing Field
Before we can move forward I need to explain what I mean when I use 
such broad terms as Hysteria and Performance, which are central to 
a variety of academic fields and whose definitions are ambiguous and 
remain contested. I choose the term hysteria deliberately, because it 
encompasses religious, medical, and political concepts through its 
extensive histories (in fact and fiction), and the forms of its representation 
were conceived in terms of performance art. This figure is not just mad, 
possessed, or simulating excessively one of the former: it references a 
range of representations that are historically specific to the hysteric. I 
use the term performance broadly and inclusively, to describe the hysteric 
as performing (doing) an action in front of an audience.
My investigation is furthermore located in the relatively new field of 
performance (history) studies, and unites the hysteric as mediator 
between historical practices that were aware of their own performativity 
with the current representations in US culture that are performing this 
historical awareness and self-reflection. These performances can again 
be either in the framework of religious practices, medical studies, or 
theater and film productions, or in the form of political debates and 
protest culture as well, or they can be a combination of all of them. 
Either way, they are culturally informed and in turn produce culture. 
Influential New Hystorian Elaine Showalter termed those cultural 
narratives Hystories (1997, 5).
With the high impact these films have, they are highly successful in 
publicizing and circulating views of hysteria, and Elaine Showalter 
already outlined how such representations are influenced by medical 
practices and then, in return, influence the latter (100). However, the 
focus of this analysis is more concerned with how these representations 
are embedded in the evidential discussion of pressing contemporary 
political discourses, especially around disability rights. In pursuing 
this focus, this investigation follows the mission of the New Hystorians: 
“All of us realize that we have been coaxing out the representations 
of hysteria, rhetorically searching for its metaphors and metonymies, 
visually following its iconographic relations and imagery—all this out 
of a belief in the significance of the cultural representations of illness 
within society” (Hysteria Beyond Freud xi-xii).
This is especially evident in the portrayal of the ritual of the actual 
exorcism, which represents the cure. While historical instances, into 
which we will look in a moment, mostly played on the notion that the 
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possession has to be overcome through ritual and performance, it is 
interesting to witness the fact that current portrayals show the hysteric as 
“resistant to cure”, and thereby place the hysteric within the framework 
of identity politics in disability studies that celebrate and protect the 
protagonist’s disabilities, instead of framing them as a state to be 
overcome. Therefore, these representations are very much informed by 
current scholarship and discussion of disability studies that refuse to 
re-subscribe to a cure narrative.
My research, as a consequence of these tendencies, takes as its basis a 
series of studies that examine the cultural relevance of the representation 
of the hysteric. Although, as mentioned before, the diagnosis of hysteria 
started to vanish from—or let’s rather say, began to disguise in new 
forms—a medical context by the end of the twentieth century, a wealth 
of historical studies about hysteria simultaneously appeared as a cultural 
phenomenon (Veith, Micale, Shorter, Showalter, Skull). Mark S. Micale 
gave the first comprehensive overview of the research landscape in 
Approaching Hysteria (1995), introducing the term New Hysteria Studies. 
Elaine Showalter later coined in response the term New Hysterians (1997, 
7) and I see this investigation as continuation and homage to their 
influential work.
My project is in part based on the cultural studies that deal with the 
representation of hysteria in its medical context, especially in the context 
of visualizations of “madness”, in visual media in general (Gilman, 
Haslam, Philo, Blackman/Walkerdine, Pickering, Didi-Huberman, 
Harper, Cross, Serlin, Hustvedt, Scott/Scarth/Chung, Timpano), in 
theater (Kaplan/Rudolph, Mukherjee, Wald, Reiss, Harpin/Foster, 
Marshall), and in film in particular (Fleming/Manvell, Gabbard/
Gabbard).
As the hysteric is clearly embedded in medical discussions throughout 
its history spanning centuries—especially public discussions on mental 
health and physical impairment—it is meaningful to tie the field of 
disability studies into this discussion.
Disability studies have emerged as an interdisciplinary endeavor of 
the social sciences, humanities, and medicine, alongside performance 
studies. The field can be broadly categorized into two main research 
scopes: disability as a metaphor in cultural productions, and artists 
(from all kinds of artistic backgrounds) who deal first-hand with 
disability in their practice. Both disability and performance studies, 
overlapping in their interdisciplinary approach and their originating 
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disciplines, have also increasingly embraced their shared research 
interests. These merging developments of the fields therefore influence 
this investigation. (for performance studies and disability studies please 
see: Kuppers, Sandahl/Auslander, Henderson/Ostrander.) While I 
acknowledge and celebrate scholarship and artistic practices that bring 
disability activists, artists, and scholars to the forefront, this paper is 
dedicated to the metaphor of disability and the political, social, and 
legal implementations embedded in the representation of disability 
within the hysteric’s performance in the Possession film.
And here we are already at the intersection where the horror genre 
comes into play.
Horror film scholarship and performance studies have an often-
overlooked, nevertheless highly interesting connection. In particular, 
Linda Williams’ concept of horror as “body genre”, on account of 
the strong physical response elicited by it (1991), Rhona Berenstein’s 
concept of gender performativity to “offer a theory of classic horror spectatorship 
as a form of performance” (30; “spectatorship-as-drag”, drawing on Clover 
Carol Clover and Judith Butler) and Matt Hills’ notion of “thinking about 
theories of horror as performative” (Hills 205; drawing on Austin’s speech 
act theories) serve here as guiding lights to establish a link between 
(new) hysteria studies, (horror) film studies, and performance studies. 
Furthermore, horror and disability studies have been increasingly 
investigating their shared research interest, especially as the horror 
genre has been historically and from its core tropes very much invested 
in distributing images of mental and physical disabilities (Wahl, 
Zimmerman, Robinson, Butler/Palesh, Wedding/Boyd/Niemiec).
So, as we can see here, the hysteric bundles a diverse group of fields, 
and it comes therefore as almost no surprise that hysteria, on one hand, 
inspires diverse cultural productions and, on the other, attracts such 
a productive scholarship legacy to this day. This only underlines the 
assumptions of most hysteria studies scholars who have emphasized 
the non-linear, complex, and at times contradictory history and 
manifestation of hysteria—as is also visible in several contributions in 
this collection.
Three Key Stages for the Hysteric’s Performance
So let’s stretch a little further and look at three key moments where 
the hysteric is performing on the political center stage. It is important 
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to keep in mind that this is only a selection of the hysteric’s historical 
political performances, but nevertheless, as we will see in a moment, they 
are significant recurring themes in its contemporary manifestations.
Medical Theater
Hysteria revealed its connection to the performing arts at the very 
moment of its diagnosis. The notorious characteristic of hysteria, as a 
mimetic disorder, to simulate other disease symptoms ultimately led 
to the rebranding of hysteria as Histrionic Personality Disorder. Histrionic 
derives from the Latin histrio, and thus diagnoses the hysteric as actress. 
Feminist, psychoanalytically informed studies have already described 
the hysteric in the medical context as performer (e.g. von Braun 31, 
Bronfen). However, this portrayal is dominated by a certain epoch: 
the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. The fact that hysterical patients at the Salpêtrière were treated 
as actresses, that they “performed” in scientific amphitheaters in front 
of a (paying) public audience, and that “successful acts” went on tour 
to other hospitals and amphitheaters testifies to the close relationship 
between hysteria and performance arts. Two often-cited studies have 
dedicated themselves to the Theater of Hysteria in the Salpêtrière: Georges 
Didi-Huberman’s Invention of Hysteria. Charcot and the Photographic Icono-
graphy of the Salpêtrière (2003) and Asti Hustvedt’s Medical Muses. Hysteria 
in Nineteenth-century Paris (2011). I want to add Jonathan W. Marshall’s 
detailed analysis in Performing Neurology. The Dramaturgy of Dr Jean-Martin 
Charcot (2016) to this discussion.
Although these insightful studies focus on this specific setting, they 
clearly show that the representation of the hysteric at the Salpêtrière 
was inspired by a broad historical performance repertoire. Thus, 
Didi-Huberman writes: “hysteria in the clinic became the spectacle, 
the invention of hysteria. Indeed, hysteria was covertly identified with 
something like an art, close to theatre or painting” (xi). Asti Hustvedt 
describes Hysteria’s Theater in a short chapter, and confirms the 
interaction of art and science: “The diagnosis of hysteria identified it 
as a ‘theatrical’ illness, and illness of surface and illusion, as a form of 
fiction. This diagnosis produced in turn further layers of fiction and 
theater” (90). This testifies to the fact that the representation of the 
hysteric at the Salpêtrière was informed by historical depictions and, in 
turn, produced new templates of hysteric performances.
It is well known that Jean-Martin Charcot, the famous director of the 
Salpêtrière, was keen on art history and co-published the illustrated 
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books Les Démoniaques dans l’art (1887) and Les Difformes et les malades 
dans l’art (1889) with Paul Richer. In the former, the two authors follow 
the historical connection between the hysteric and the possessed through 
art history, and Charcot himself concludes in the introduction that 
hysterics (especially the ecstatics) can be compared with demoniacs in 
many ways (1887 xxii). Laure Murat illustrated in The Man Who Thought 
He Was Napoleon. Towards a Political History of Madness (2014) that the 
relation between psychotherapy and theater was already well established 
a century before Charcot was the director of the Salpêtrière (consult 
especially chapter two).
The studies of Charcot and his colleagues clearly relate to public 
exorcisms, in which hysterics had to perform before a public audience. 
In spite of this historical awareness of the medical context at the 
Salpêtrière, the close relationship between hysteria and performance 
goes unnoticed in the studies of Hustvedt and Didi-Huberman. The 
Salpêtrière is described as a high-profile tourist attraction (Gilman 
1982: 194; Showalter 1997: 32; on performance and pathology in the 
nineteenth century see Kapsalis) and Jonathan W. Marshall’s analysis 
goes into great detail to reveal this pressing intersection of theater and 
performance practices in the Salpêtrière’s amphitheaters. Nevertheless, 
the focus in these studies is the Paris of the outgoing nineteenth 
century; the transmissions of this discourse to the present time remain 
unaffected. This investigation aims to build on those discussions in 
relation to their current manifestations.
Theater of Possession 
The imagination of mentally ill people, particularly of hysterical girls 
and women, as possessed by the devil is widely dispersed in European 
history. In Western societies, demonology as an explanation for 
psychopathological phenomena and thus the stigmatization of mental 
disorders was well established in the Middle Ages in science and art and 
prevailed up to the eighteenth century, be it in the form of the actual 
imagination of  supernatural phenomena or simply as a literary motif. 
It is important to note that hysteria and melancholia were the main 
explanatory models for demoniacs. This European phenomenon has 
already been extensively investigated in historical studies (de Certeau, 
Walker, Caciola, Kallendorf, Almond, Ferber, van Dijkhuizen, Levack, 
Uszkalo, Weigert). It is interesting to note, however, that in these studies 
on exorcism it is emphasized again and again that these rituals resemble 
theatrical performances, that the hysterics used a “script”, and that they 
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were staged on public stages in the marketplace as moral entertainment 
and embedded in political discourses. The phrase “to perform an 
exorcism” further underlines my point that exorcism and performance 
are closely related.
Michel Foucault already wrote about the Theater of Possession (Abnormal 
Lectures: 205). The historian Michel de Certeau dedicated a chapter 
to the Theater of the Possessed and described the possessed as actresses 
(85ff.). See also Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen’s Devil Theater. Demonic 
Possession and Exorcism in English Renaissance Drama 1558–1642 (2007). 
Brian Levack also has a chapter on The Performance of the Possessed (2013, 
139–168), illustrating how the possessed followed scripts and other 
written templates. Hilaire Kallendorf has devoted a book-length study 
to these text documents in England (2003). Sarah Ferber confirms 
that the events were theatrical demonstrations in front of thousands of 
people (2004: 36). All these studies focus on European case studies such 
as Marthe Brossier (1598), Nicole Obry (1566), and Jeanne Féry (1584–
1585) in France and Anne Gunter (1604) in England. It is significant, 
however, that this is not only a European phenomenon, since already in 
the founding years of the United States hysterics emerge as possessed 
witnesses in politically charged events, as in the case of Elizabeth Knapp 
in October 1671, or the so-called Salem witch trials in New England 
(1692–93). William W. Coventry’s Demonic Possession on Trial. Case Studies 
in Early Modern England and Colonial America, 1593–1692 (2003) depicts 
these transferences. Thus, even though there is extensive reading on 
the phenomenon of the hysteric as possessed in a European context, 
and even on the relation between the staging of public exorcisms and 
the performing arts, the transmissions of these discourses to the United 
States in general and the current US pop culture are pressing on a blind 
spot.
Theater of the Occult
Within the framework of the extremely popular spiritualist séances 
in Europe and America in the mid-nineteenth century, the fertile 
interaction of science, performance art, and the occult is all too visible 
around the depiction of the hysteric’s performance. Charcot himself 
wrote a paper on “Spiritualism and Hysteria” (1877–89). Charcot and 
Freud used hypnosis in their treatment of hysteria and were greatly 
inspired by so-called “trance performers”. There are several studies 
which depict the close relationship between hysteria and spiritualism 
and their involvement in politics (see Luckhurst 96ff., Porter/Nicholson/
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Bennett 5, Finn, McGarry 126, Grimes 91ff.). Furthermore, my project is 
especially informed by studies on the structure and performance of the 
séance as a form of theater (see Lehman, Hammer, Kontou/Willburn, 
Lingan, Bennett: chapter: Sacred Theaters 83ff). Alex Owen was able to 
establish that a series of spiritual mediums in England and the US in the 
nineteenth century, such as Victoria Woodhull, had previous experience 
with acting training before they performed séances (54–55).
However, the spiritualist performances were not bound just to theater 
arts. Spiritualists consciously took advantage of the latest technological 
achievements and integrated them into their innovative politically 
charged performances. (On the implication of the feminist and 
spiritualist movement see Basham, Wessinger, Braude, McGarry.) 
Matthew Solomon shows how spiritualism and film projection were 
closely interrelated: using the records of the History of the Kinetograph, 
Kinetoscope and Kineto-Phonograph—published by W.K.L Dickson, the 
inventor of the Kinetoscopes, and his sister Antonia Dickson—the first 
film screenings strongly resembled séances (40–41). Thomas Edison, 
according to Dickson and Dickson, screened the projection to the 
auditorium from behind a projection screen, separating the rooms 
with a black curtain. This approach is strongly reminiscent of séance 
reports under test conditions, and here the suspicion arises that the 
spiritualist mediums used the new technology of image projection, as 
they did before with magic lanterns and similar illusion apparatuses, 
before the images were used in public film screenings. (See also 
Barber 78, Braun 2017 77ff.) Professional mediums not only used slide 
projectors in their performances, but later also staged projections of 
moving pictures effectively. (For the close interaction of spiritual and 
technological medium see Lockhurst 3.) These practices occurred 
simultaneously with the staging of the hysteric in Charcot’s psychiatric 
and later in Freud’s psychoanalytical studies and were influenced by, 
and in turn had an influence on, those studies. To this day, the current 
representation of the hysteric in US mainstream horror film references 
extensively this material of the hysteric as a technologically aware and 
medial body of communication. While the spiritualist medium has been 
analyzed in its connection to the performing arts and new technologies, 
the transferences of these discourses onto the present day, especially the 
obvious references to these practices in the current phenomenon of the 
hysteric in the US mainstream horror film, are noticeably left out.
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The Hysteric in The Exorcist as a bundling of these discussions
So before we can look into the contemporary manifestations of the 
hysteric’s performance in the Possession film, we need to look at the 
Possessions film’s origin and the debates that were, on the one hand, 
influences on it and, in turn, had a great impact on these ongoing 
discussions.
Generally, The Exorcist (1973), heralding the so-called mainstream horror 
film in the 1970s (King 284, Waller 5, Derry 203), is seen as the core of 
the Possession film. The Exorcist stands out because it resonated with 
audiences enough to give rise to decades’ worth of cinematic imitators 
who faithfully copied the basic premise of the film, to the extent that a 
new and highly prolific sub-genre formed.
Also, The Exorcist had a similar effect to Frankenstein (1931), since the 
hysterical girl became the iconic trope in horror film that extends to 
film incarnations not having the “supporting role” of an actual exorcist. 
Therefore, although The Exorcist has inspired many different cinematic 
tropes, the core of the subgenre is firmly set on the spectacle of the 
hysterical girl’s performance.
Although mostly overlooked, The Exorcist is evidently firmly embedded 
in discussions surrounding disabilities and (horror) film. Interestingly, 
the scholarship on disability studies and horror film studies is still 
surprisingly slim, although stereotypes of physical and mental 
disabilities are the core tropes of the most influential horror movies, 
which range from The Hands of Orlac (1924), The Phantom of the Opera 
(1925), the “Mad Dr.” and his disabled patient/assistant/creation in 
Frankenstein (1931), Freaks (1932), Whatever Happened to Baby Jane? (1962), 
or the physically and mentally impaired serial killer in the Slasher films 
(most prominently, the Halloween, Nightmare on Elm Street, Friday the 13th, 
and the Texas Chainsaw Massacre series), to name only a few.
The film history of the representation of psychiatric disabilities, 
especially with a focus on “possession”, can be traced back to the 
early twentieth century, with such influential examples as The Cabinet 
of Dr. Caligari (1919) and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1931). Nevertheless, 
it was especially after World War II that the visibility of mental illness 
dramatically increased on screen (Schneider). The Exorcist is very much 
informed by those discussions and was instrumental in creating and 
promoting stereotypical images of disability.
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In one of the fist substantive looks at feature films, Robert Bogdan, 
Douglas Biklen, Arthur Shapiro, and David Spelkoman’s “The Disabled. 
Media’s Monster” (1982), examined the symbolism of disabilities in 
horror films, with particular emphasis on the stereotype of the person 
with disabilities as dangerous. They emphasized that such standards as 
scarred, deformed, and physically and mentally handicapped monsters 
presumably led to a fear of people with disabilities. Disability historian 
Paul K. Longmore examined in his landmark piece “Screening Stereotypes. 
Images of Disabled People in Television and Motion Pictures” (1985) numerous 
negative themes and images across a wide range of films (and especially 
horror films), as did disability scholar Martin Norden in his book The 
Cinema of Isolation. A History of Physical Disability in the Movies (1994) and 
Michael Fleming and Roger Manwell in Images of Madness. The Portrayal 
of Insanity in the Feature Film (1985). More recently, Angela Smith’s often-
quoted Hideous Progeny. Disability, Eugenics, and Classic Horror Cinema 
(2011) analyzes in detail how classic horror cinema and disability studies 
intersect in particular, and Travis Sutton’s “Avenging the Body: Disability 
in the Horror Film” (2014) examines how these discussions are especially 
relevant in the horror film in general.
However, the story here is much more complex. While one can 
definitely argue that the portrayal of the brutalized, vandalized, and 
victimized body of the young girl Regan in The Exorcist, whose physical 
and psychological contortions seem to be a manifestation of “the devil 
inside” and, therefore, very much inspired by the discussions of mental 
illness and demon possession from the Middle Ages, it is also interesting 
to see that the film addresses pressing questions of cure and healthcare 
in front of the political stage it was filmed against. More specifically, 
The Exorcist is embedded in public debates against the background of 
antipsychiatry and the imported European critique of psychiatry—
especially influenced by French thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, among others—as well as the 
resulting Psychiatry Reform, the Student Revolt, and the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States. Therefore, The 
Exorcist is clearly embedded in discussions around deinstitutionalization, 
which was also prominently featured in such films as The Snake Pit (1948) 
and One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), and operates in two ways: it 
represents the stigmatizing perceptions of people with disabilities and 
criticizes their medical and religious treatments.
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The “deinstitutionalization” movement describes the development 
where people with psychological disabilities were gradually released 
from institutional care in asylums to long-term community care 
networks in more private settings. John F. Kennedy introduced the term 
“deinstitutionalization” in the Community Mental Health Centers Acts 
(CMHC) in the early 1960s, which was a response at a time when several 
instances were exposed for their overcrowded, insanitary, and abusive 
care in US asylums, which led to a public outcry and ultimately to John 
F. Kennedy’s unveiling of a new policy regarding national mental health 
care in February 1963.
The Community Mental Health Centers Acts very much built on the 
National Mental Health Act of 1946, which established and provided 
funds for a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), signed into 
law on July 3, 1946. The National Mental Health Act was first created in 
response to the increasing number of veterans battling with mental illness, 
but was later broadened when studies revealed that the US population 
in general had an increased risk of undiagnosed and untreated mental 
health issues, a move which led to several new strategies in diagnosing 
and treating people facing mental health issues and emphasized proper 
medical and therapeutic treatment over institutionalization. This came 
also with the Community Mental Health Centers Act, which allocated 
federal funding towards the release of mentally ill persons from asylums 
into nationwide community care networks.
Anthony Carlton Cooke has shown in Moral Panics, Mental Illness Stigma, 
and the Deinstitutionalization Movement in American Popular Culture (2017) 
how the deinstitutionalization movement led to several stigmatizing 
tropes in horror, crime, and thriller film genres which have a lasting 
impact on public notions surrounding mentally ill patients released and 
“roaming free” amongst society. The fear of the “mentally ill patient” 
who escapes the asylum or somehow escapes institutionalization can be 
found universally in US horror films, from Halloween’s (1978–) Michael 
Myers to the “seeing” insane in Birdbox (2018).
The Exorcist is very much embedded in these discussions of its time, as 
we can see how a single mother is trying her very best to care for her 
daughter in the private setting of her home while bringing in medical 
and in the end religious practitioners—as the last resort—to cure her 
daughter of the hysteric psychological and physical outbreaks that she 
performs so vividly in her bedroom. While we learn later, through 
countless re-tellings of the story, that the supposedly happy end of The 
Exorcist’s cure narrative does not last, the original nevertheless ends 
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with the curing of the hysterical girl. This is something that changes 
drastically in the current manifestations.
The New Hysteric and the Resistance to Cure
While The Exorcist was produced in the context of a series of other films 
of similar content, it was not until after 2000 that this subgenre became 
one of the most popular daughter genres of the US horror film. The 
box-office success of the restored and revised version of the original—
with the promising title The Exorcist: The Version You Have Never Seen 
(Warner Bros., 2000)—spawned two prequels: Exorcist: The Beginning 
(Warner Bros., 2004) and Dominion: Prequel to the Exorcist (Warner Bros., 
2005). These reinterpretations and evolutions of the original story were 
closely followed by commercially successful, major studio productions 
of similar content.
A selection of the most successful US horror films of the past decade, 
such as An American Haunting (Lionsgate, 2005), The Exorcism of Emily 
Rose (Sony, 2005), the Paranormal Activity series (Paramount, since 
2007), The Last Exorcism I and II (Lionsgate, 2011/2013), The Devil Inside 
(Paramount, 2012), The Possession (Lionsgate, 2012), The Conjuring series, 
which evolved into the “Conjuring universe” with several spin-off series 
(Warner Bros., since 2013), Deliver Us From Evil (Sony, 2014), The Quiet 
Ones (Lionsgate, 2014), Jessabelle (Liongate, 2014), Insidious series (Sony, 
since 2015), Ouija I and II: Origin of Evil (Universal, 2014/2016), The 
Possession of Hannah Grace (Sony, 2018), to name only a few, are prime 
examples of the hysteric’s resurrection as a vibrant horror film icon that 
negotiates pressing public discussions in recent years.
Consequently, my investigations tie in with a small series of film 
studies that examine the young hysteric girl Regan from The Exorcist 
in particular (Carroll, Clover, Creed, Schreck, Lebeau, Derry, Rommel-
Riuz, Renner, Kord) and the current phenomenon of Possession film 
in general (Balmain, Wetmore, Miller, Scahill). What has thus far been 
missing in (horror) film studies, however, is a comprehensive analysis of 
the current phenomenon and an extensive problematization of these 
productions in their mediation and representation of hysteria.4
Furthermore, along the way, this investigation follows a strain of 
scholarship that makes connections visible between various cycles of 
horror films and their historical contexts regarding specific historical 
events in relation to gender, sexual orientation, race, class, and more 
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recently disability (e.g. Kracauer, Ross, Derry, Grant/Sharrett, Twitchell, 
Jancovich, Benshoff, Lowenstein, Blake, Smith).
Due to their production and distribution period, the aforementioned 
films belong to the so-called post-9/11 American horror film. It is interesting 
that, in post-9/11 horror film criticism, which mainly associates the 
emergence of various mainstream horror films with the political and 
cultural discourses of their time, the resurrection of classic (male) 
horror film figures such as the vampire and zombie, as well as the wave 
of big budget horror remakes of the Slasher film and the emergence of 
the so-called “Torture Porn” film, are well discussed (e.g. Birkenstein/
Froula/Randell, Briefel/Miller, Wetmore, Aston/Walliss, Kerner, 
Westwell, McCollum), whereas the widespread resurrection of the iconic 
figure of the hysteric/possessed girl in mainstream American horror film 
is in contrast under-analyzed. Therefore, this investigation is dedicated 
to bridging this gap in research concerning the representation of 
women in contemporary (American) horror film.
All these aforementioned movies of the Possession film reference in 
evident ways the historically informed performance repertoire of the 
hysteric, with the girl starting to communicate with invisible entities 
that are perceived by their caretakers either as “invisible friends” or 
as voices in their heads. The at first playful attempt at communicating 
with the dead through Ouija boards or séances leads to the girl’s direct 
communication with an outside presence that tries to communicate 
something of pressing urgency to the hysteric’s surroundings through 
her body. The cinematic climax is often the hysteric in her iconic 
pose of the arc-en-circle that she impressively performs, in her white 
nightgown, in her bed, while her caretakers bewilderedly listen to what 
this excessive body is revealing. While it is often framed in the beginning 
that the hysteric has a mental disability, which later manifests itself in 
physical impairment and then turns out to have a supernatural origin, 
it is nevertheless the cure narrative that prevails throughout these films.
Without wanting to spoil any viewing experiences, I need to disclose that 
it is interesting to witness that, in current instances, the hysteric turns 
out not only to be a vessel for an “outside” presence, but she is somehow 
in collaboration with the possessing entity, as in Jessabelle (2014), Ouija: 
Origin of Evil (2016), or highlighting the contagious nature of hysteria, 
as in the Insidious series (2015–) and The Conjuring series (2013–), and 
in spin-offs of the Annabelle series (2014–) or The Nun (2018) and, most 
recently, The Curse of La Llorona (2019). 
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The Curse of La Llorona (2019) highlights the “wandering” nature of 
hysteria through a “migrating” curse from Mexico to Los Angeles, 
and its contagious essence as it is afflicting multi-generational family 
bonds and travels through different time periods. The Conjuring Universe 
in general highlights this concept of “wandering” hysteria in all of its 
productions, as each “chapter” is focused on a different time period 
and location. Conjuring I centers on a family in 1971 in Rhode Island, 
Conjuring II is set in London in the late 1970s, Annabelle in 1967, and 
Annabelle: Creation in the late 1940s and 1950s in California, The Nun 
in 1952 in a monastery in Romania, and The Curse of La Llorona is set 
between 1673 Mexico and Los Angeles in the early 1970s. The Nun also 
makes countless references to the historical well-covered possessions 
at Loudon, highlighting the historical awareness of those productions. 
The Annabelle series features the demonic puppet that transfers hysteria 
epidemically to its surroundings throughout different time periods, 
therefore referencing imaginations of the contagious inanimate body 
to the human body (for more on hysteria, corporality, and puppets, 
please see Timpano). 
It is also interesting to witness that only in the films that feature a girl or 
woman as the main hysterical afflicted character is the hysteric showing 
the stereotypical images of hysteria, crawling, speaking in tongues, and 
most prominently performing the “Grande Hystérie” with the excessive 
movement of the arc-en-circle. In films where the main hysterical 
character is a boy or man, we can still see direct references to broader 
concepts of hysteria, although the “iconic” performance repertoire of 
the hysteric is missing, as we can see, for example, in the Insidious series 
(2015–). In the first two films the narrative focuses on a father and his 
son. While there are evident references to disability and health care 
debates and questions of the hereditary nature of mental illness, and 
that it is the father who is clearly getting more “hysterical” throughout 
the narrative, it is especially Insidious: Chapter 3 (2015) and Insidious: The 
Last Key (2018) that center on the female hysteric who exhibits all the 
iconic gestures of hysteria.
Although, often, the origins of the possession in all those instances 
are still supernatural, and therefore very much drawing on historical 
and stigmatizing views on mental illness and disability as “curse”, 
the happy end is not celebrated with a cure. This new take on the 
hysteric very much facilitates the current trend for prequel and sequel 
iterations, and can therefore be seen as a choice for production and 
economic reasons, as well as the trend of the unreliable narrator as a 
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film device in general; however, it also shows a new self-awareness of 
the self-reflective media figure of the hysteric. It is especially interesting 
to witness that perspectives on the “anti-psychiatry” movement, with 
insanity presented as a means to exist in a “mad world”, as a cinematic 
trope, are experiencing a revival in the current manifestations of the 
Possession film. These tendencies evidently reflect current discussions 
around disability rights and activism and broader public discussions 
about hysteria and our current political climate.
The so-called disability rights movement, with the establishment of the 
Society of Disability Studies in 1982, has been a powerful force in the 
past decades, addressing public attitudes toward people with disabilities 
and advocating for federal legislation, beginning with Sections 501–4 
of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and culminating in the 
landmark legislation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 
1990, which is the most comprehensive and foundational civil rights law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. These landmark 
legislations were only achieved by the relentless and continuous work 
of countless disability activists, scholars, and artists (see also Linton, 
Shapiro, Fleischer/Zames, Sandahl/Auslander, among others).
More recently, the signing into law by President Obama of the Mental 
Health Reform Act in December 2016—in tandem with the Helping 
Families in Mental Health Crisis Act of 2015—which is a component of 
the 21st Century Cures Act, is considered one of the most significant 
bills targeting mental health reform since 1963. On the other hand, 
since 2017 there have been many proposed changes to US healthcare, 
including several efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which also led to funding cuts in the health sector in general 
and to reduced access to treatment by people with physical and mental 
health disabilities in particular.
The decision to portray the hysteric as resistant to any kind of cure in 
these current narratives is evidently informed by these public discourses 
as well as by discussions circulating in the fairly new scholarship on 
disability in film and disability justice, as well as by the emerging field of 
Crip theory and popular writings, such as Alison Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, 
Crip (2013) in particular, which criticize the often expressed notion of 
disability as something to overcome and thereby heavily critique the 
so-called cure narrative (see also McRuer 2006 and 2018, Hall). The 
field is defined by the turn of disability studies from a medical model, 
which framed disability as pathological and an individual problem 
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that needed to be cured or rehabilitated, to the notion of disability as 
socially constructed.
Unfortunately, however, the progression of disability rights has been 
anything but straightforward since then. The Possession film therefore 
also addresses problematic tendencies, for instance the passing of 
legislations such as Kendra’s Law, a New York state law that has been 
effective since 1999 and authorizes forced outpatient treatment for 
people with severe mental illnesses, and which reinforces the link 
existing in public imaginations between mental illness and violence. In 
several of the selected films the hysteric is treated under brutal and 
violent circumstances in private settings, often framed as tortured, 
vandalized, and forcibly restrained in locked-up hidden bedrooms, 
attics, and basements. The hysterical girl, who is not medically treated 
but in a religious context mis-treated, is experiencing a comeback as 
a consequence. The Exorcism of Emily Rose (2005) is based on Felicitas 
D. Goodman’s influential study The Exorcism of Anneliese Michel (1981), 
which told the story of a girl who was suffering from epilepsy and was 
subjected by her parents to an exorcism instead of medically supervised 
treatment, a decision that led to the girl’s death. Anneliese Michel’s 
sensationalized story was then also revisited in Requiem (2006), Anneliese: 
The Exorcist Tapes (2011), and The Devil Inside (2012). The Taking of 
Deborah Logan (2014) in a similar fashion links demonic possession with 
Alzheimer’s. The film ends—caution: spoiler alert—with the girl Cara, 
a cancer patient abducted by the hysteric title role Deborah Logan, 
with the report that the girl has survived cancer but has been possessed 
instead. The medical cure narrative is overturned by a supernatural 
resistance to cure.
What becomes evident in these films is that the Possession film gives 
interesting insights into the complex relations of how disability is 
portrayed and negotiated for a contemporary mass audience. The 
Possession film heavily draws on historically well-established notions 
around staging and performing hysteria to discuss pressing topics of its 
time, especially around disability and healthcare. And just as the history 
of the hysteric is not linear and straightforward, the Possession film 
as well falls into the trap of representing and promoting stigmatizing 
perceptions of people with disabilities, while also severely criticizing the 
treatment methods used. Furthermore, these films can be very much 
seen to discuss the old premise: you have to be mad in a mad mad world, 
and therefore can be seen as an intriguing reflection of the hysterical 
times that we are currently living in.
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Notes
1 The selection for the core filmography is based on fifteen horror films that 
belong to the so-called Possession film subgenre, that were distributed in 
the early twenty-first century by major American film studios (that promote 
these films nationwide—and even internationally), that were commercial 
successes and are rated in the top 100 “most popular” horror films since 
1980 (based on ratings by box-office reporting service Box Office Mojo; 
as well as Rotten Tomatoes and IMDb) and that reference the female 
hysteric of European studies from the late nineteenth century in obvious, 
stereotypical, ways.
2 It is striking that although Thomas Sydenham studied hysteria in men in 
the late seventeenth century and Charcot and Freud later did so in the 
late nineteenth century, it is especially girls and young women who are 
the center of attention in European and American hysteria studies. This 
is also the case of the fairly new medical term Histrionic Personality Disorder. 
HPD was intended to have a gender-neutral connotation; nevertheless it is 
mostly diagnosed in women. (Confer: Kaplan 1983; Ford/Widiger 1989; 
Hamilton/Rothbart/Dawes 1996). Although, there are currently several 
instances where the hysteric is male (as analyzed in several chapters in this 
volume), it is evident that the Possession film draws heavily on the female 
hysteric’s experience.
3 While the focus of this investigation is to look into the ways the hysteric 
performs disability, it is the outline of my postdoctoral research project,“The 
Hysteric as Conceptual Operator”, to investigate how the hysteric in those 
narratives communicates and negotiates pressing issues around race, class, 
gender, and migration, through the entities that take possession of the 
hysteric. But those topics deserve a detailed analysis of their own.
4 Influential scholarship in American horror film, which emerged in the late 
1970s, drew primarily from (Freudian) psychoanalytic film theories, and 
also the study of women in horror has been firmly shaped by the dominance 
of psychoanalytic theories, which is due to the influence of psychoanalysis 
in the 1970s in the development of feminist film theory, in film theory in 
general, and in (American) horror film theory in particular. Influenced by 
those developments and in turn influential on the development of (feminist 
horror) film theory were Linda Williams (1983), Carol Clover (1993), and 
Barbara Creed (1993), who have been to this day the main reference points 
regarding women in horror film scholarship. Although Creed discussed 
hysteria briefly (56–7) and The Exorcist and the possession film at length as 
well, she left out the correlation between the two. Clover also analyzed The 
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Exorcist among other films in Chapter Two and mentioned a “narrative of 
female hysteria” (70ff.), but does not elaborate further on the connection. 
While the scholarship on women in horror produced a variety of influential 
and interesting studies around the 1990s, the research has since been 
significantly marginal.
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